https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895820922291

Criminology & Criminal Justice
1 –18

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DOI: 10.1177/1748895820922291

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Ecology and criminology?
Applying the tenets of
procedural justice on
compliance to environmental
regulations

Sheila R Maxwell
and Christopher D Maxwell
Michigan State University, USA

Abstract
Criminologists are increasingly investigating the harmful intersections between humans and the
natural environment, largely under the green criminology banner. However, most discourses have
largely remained at the macro level and empirical tests are limited. The foci of research had been
industry, state/national actors or policy discourses and not individuals responding to mandated
environmental regulations. Individual actors are especially important in developing countries
where environmental regulations can substantially impact citizens’ livelihood opportunities.
This research uses the procedural justice framework to understand citizens’ responses to an
environmental regulatory body. A team of local researchers conducted face-to-face interviews
with citizens affected by environmental regulations in the Banahaw protected landscape in the
north-central Philippines to assess their trust and cooperation with the regulatory body. Results
demonstrated high reliability for the key procedural constructs of respect, impartiality, voice, and
trustworthiness. Path analysis showed that impartiality and voice were significantly related to
perceived trustworthiness of the regulatory body and impartiality is directly related to cooperation.
The results provide evidence that criminological perspectives are useful in organizing the complex
dynamics of laws, enforcement and behavior change that is inherent in environmental regulations.

Keywords
Banahaw, conservation criminology, environmental conservation, environmental management,
environmental regulations, green criminology, legitimacy, Philippine environment, Philippine
protected area management board, Philippines, procedural justice, trust and compliance

Corresponding author:
Sheila R Maxwell, Michigan State University, 650 Auditorium Road, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA.
Email: [email protected]

922291CRJ0010.1177/1748895820922291Criminology & Criminal JusticeMaxwell and Maxwell
research-article2020

Article

2 Criminology & Criminal Justice 00(0)

Introduction

A growing body of research in criminology has examined the intersections between
humans and the natural environment (flora, fauna, landscapes, seascapes, water).
Particularly, research has focused on the negligent, harmful or criminal use of natural
resources, often by corporate actors (Beirne et al., 2008; Lynch and Stretsky, 2003).
These discourses have come under many names, most prominently under green crimi-
nology (Ballif-Spanvill et al., 2008), but also under conservation criminology (Gibbs
et al., 2010) or environmental justice (Bullard, 2000; Zilney et al., 2006) among others
and have propelled the highly important global issue of environmental/ecological con-
servation into the criminological purview.

Notwithstanding, criminological research on conservation and ecology (to distinguish
this from environmental criminology—crime in space) has often employed macro-level
approaches and critiques and lacks empirical testing (Lynch et al., 2017; Zilney et al.,
2006). Lynch et al. (2017) has reasoned that the lack of empiricism in green criminology
is possibly the reason why it remains largely at the fringes of crime research and also
hinders the adaption of ecological/conservation related inquiries into mainstream crimi-
nology (Lynch et al., 2017). Yet, criminology is an inherently multidisciplinary field of
study. The theories and perspectives that have been used in criminology to advance
knowledge about law and human behavior, enforcement agents and citizen interactions,
sanctioning mechanisms and public policy interventions are potentially useful elements
that can be tapped to understand the complex dynamics that characterize the human–
environment intersections particularly within the environmental regulatory context.

This paper uses a commonly used framework in criminology, procedural justice, to
examine perceptions by affected citizens of an environmental enforcement body. Citizens’
actions in many protected land and marine areas in developing countries are significant
drivers of compliance behaviors as citizens’ social and livelihood needs are impacted,
sometimes significantly, by conservation laws (Catedrilla et al., 2012; Chaigneau and
Brown, 2016; Pietri et al., 2009). Striking an appropriate balance between conservation
and household needs poses a considerable challenge, as is the case in the Philippines, and
calls for individual-level analyses of eco-use behaviors. This individual-level analysis is
consistent with most works in criminology and many of its sub-fields and is also consist-
ent with disciplines outside of criminology that study uptake of environmental regula-
tions (Bartel and Barclay, 2011; Catedrilla et al., 2012; Chaigneau and Brown, 2016;
Christie et al., 2009; Jagers et al., 2012; Pietri et al., 2009; Valkeapaeae and Karppinen,
2013). This diverges, however, from much of current works in conservation and green
criminology where units of analysis used are often groups, organizations, or govern-
ments/states, or where studies have assessed policies or philosophical perspectives
around environmental harm (Gibbs et al., 2010; Heydon, 2018; White, 2018). While
industry compliance to environmental regulations remains a substantial concern in the
Philippines and in conservation generally (Gibbs et al., 2010; Hawkins, 1990; Simpson
and Piquero, 2002), this paper focuses only on individuals who are recipients of environ-
mental regulations.

This challenge of environmental enforcement and citizen compliance closely paral-
lels citizen-police interactions particularly in the police’s attempt to exact cooperation

Maxwell and Maxwell 3

from citizens. Numerous research on citizen–police interactions have used the proce-
dural justice framework (Bradford et al., 2009; Hinds and Murphy, 2007; Mazerolle
et al., 2013; Murphy and Cherney, 2012), and these have generally underscored the
importance of citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy on citizens’ cooperation with
law enforcement (Murphy and Barkworth, 2014; Nix et al., 2015; Sunshine and Tyler,
2003; Tyler et al., 2015; Wolfe et al., 2016). Subsequently, many policing agencies have
adopted training modules that incorporate elements of procedural justice (fairness, giv-
ing citizens the opportunity to voice their opinions) in order to enhance police legitimacy
in the eyes of the public and maximize citizen cooperation (Hagan and Hans, 2017;
Skogan et al., 2015).

Criminologists can certainly contribute to the body of research in environmental
enforcement with the same systematic framework that the discipline has used in general
law enforcement policies and practices. In this spirit, this paper will specifically (a)
assess the measurement properties of procedural justice constructs when used within the
context of environmental enforcement and (b) assess the effects of procedural justice on
citizens’ cooperation.

The procedural justice mechanism

Procedural justice specifies the fairness of processes behind a decision made or an out-
come allocated (Lind and Tyler, 1988b; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). This fair process is
then assumed to influence the judgment of an exchange recipient, regardless of the out-
come actually received. Procedural justice purports that fair interactions—where indi-
viduals feel respected, their voices are considered, and where they believe authority
figures give impartial and fair decisions—increase citizens’ cooperation with authority
figures and their acceptance of laws and regulations. Several studies in criminology have
shown that citizens who believed their interactions with the police were procedurally
fair, regardless of the favorability of the interaction outcome, were more likely to believe
in the legitimacy of the police, cooperate, and provide support to authorities (Mazerolle
et al., 2013; Molm et al., 2003; Paternoster et al., 1997; Tyler and Fagan, 2008–2009).

Proponents advocate that the procedural justice process is found across all social set-
tings—in interpersonal interactions as well as formal proceedings (Lind and Tyler,
1988b; Molm et al., 2003; Tyler, 1989). Lind and Tyler (1988b; Thibaut and Walker,
1975) originally outlined three mechanisms that are important in a procedurally just
interaction: the presence of trust, where intentions of group decision-makers are regarded
as good and benevolent; neutrality, where decisions are generally considered unbiased
within a group or community and promotes equitable benefits for the group in the long
run; and respect, which provides feedback to group actors of their standing or status
within a group (Lind and Tyler, 1988b; Tyler, 1989). These elements focus on the rela-
tional aspect of procedural justice as opposed to an instrumental model proposed earlier
by Thibault and Walker (1975) that emphasized control of the decision-making itself and
control of the opportunity to present one’s voice in the decision-making process. The
relational model emphasizes how involved parties, which include decision-making
authorities and outcome recipients, interact and preserve social relationships within the
context of potentially contentious and competing ends. In such contexts, the elements of

4 Criminology & Criminal Justice 00(0)

trust, neutrality and respect become sources of positive attitudes about the decision-mak-
ers, the decisions, and the regulations or laws.

Subsequent tests of the procedural justice framework have veered away from the
purely instrumental framework originally proposed by Thibault and Walker (1975), or a
purely relational framework (Lind et al., 1990). Researchers recognize that aspects of
both the instrumental and the relational models are important depending upon context
and that judgments of fairness generally include elements from both models (Lind et al.,
1990; Lind and Tyler, 1988a; Molm et al., 2003). Recent research identifies key elements
of the procedural justice process as respect, neutrality and voice which then influence the
recipients’ perceptions of the trustworthiness of the enforcement body (Mazerolle et al.,
2014; Nagin and Telep, 2017; Skogan et al., 2015). These three elements include the
relational elements of respect and neutrality originally outlined by Lind and Tyler (1988a)
and the control element of voice in the decision making process that was originally advo-
cated by Thibault and Walker (1975). Studies have assessed the effects of these main
elements of procedural justice across behavioral responses such as compliance to imme-
diate or longer term regulations (Tyler, 2003) but more notably to perceptions of the
trustworthiness and legitimacy of police authorities and the law (Barkworth and Murphy,
2015; Bates et al., 2016; Mazerolle et al., 2012; Murphy and Barkworth, 2014; Nix et al.,
2015; Rosenbaum et al., 2015).

Within studies of environmental regulations and enforcement, the procedural justice
model is rarely utilized. A small number of studies have employed some procedural jus-
tice constructs to examine opinions about environmental policies (Ebreo et al., 1996;
Valkeapaeae and Karppinen, 2013), and a recent work in green criminology by Heydon
(2018) assessed procedural fairness in the Canadian oil sands projects affecting indige-
nous peoples. Still the framework is not used as a model for understanding justice in
regulation allocation, or for assessing cooperation and compliance to environmental
regulations.

Procedural justice and environmental regulations

Procedural justice is a potentially useful framework for understanding perceptions of
environmental regulations and enforcement because exchanges between stakeholders
and enforcement agents entail elements of respect, fairness, trust and compliance behav-
iors. The interaction dynamic is complex and calls for a framework that can incorporate
assessments of fair interactions between the regulators and the regulated recipients.
Environmental laws are indeed designed to protect natural resources from adverse use
and degradation in order to protect public health, improve the quality of land, water and
air, and level the playing field across stakeholders with regard to reaping benefits from
these natural resources. Yet the degree of cooperation and compliance to environmental
regulations vary markedly within a given area, and more so across broader regions and
jurisdictions. The top-down command and control models that have characterized envi-
ronmental protection strategies for decades (Holling and Meffe, 1996) have generally
used macro-level factors such as forest covers (Verburg et al., 2006) or the recovery of
threatened species (Mallari et al., 2013) as indicators of compliance and have character-
istically pursued the singular goal of conservation, at times to the detriment of livelihood

Maxwell and Maxwell 5

needs (Chechina et al., 2018). While macro indicators of conservation are very useful in
detecting and projecting longer term changes, there is increasing awareness of the neces-
sity for a devolved and multisectoral approach to conservation that also includes analysis
of decision-making by individual agents and micro-level dynamics and relationships
particularly regarding compliance to environmental regulations (Ostrom, 2008; White
et al., 2002).

A study by Winter and May (2001) outlined elements of environmental compliance
very similar to elements within the procedural justice model. Winter and May (2001)
outlined three factors that they found to be key elements in Danish farmers’ compliance
to agricultural regulations: the farmers’ awareness of the regulations, normative and
social motivations (moral duty and social pressure), and the enforcement style of the
inspectors, where coercive styles have negative effects on compliance (Winter and May,
2001). Similarly in explaining why firms comply with environmental laws, Dao and
Ofori (2010) classified compliance behavior under two general, though not completely
independent models: the rationalist model and the normative model. Rationalist firms
comply primarily because of economic self-interest, fearing punishment and backlash
for non-compliance (Dao and Ofori, 2010). This model highlights deterrence and
enforcement as critical elements for compliance. This is consistent with findings by
Jagers et al. (2012) which showed that large fishers (thus, with more to lose economi-
cally), were more concerned with deterrence when complying with fishing regulations.
Normative compliance, on the other hand, highlights civic responsibilities and societal
norms as the primary impetus for compliance. Thus, environmental regulations are
viewed as appropriate protection measures, and regulatory actors as legitimate bodies.
Social reputation plays a significant role in compliance as well as the perceived fairness
of procedures used in implementing regulations (Dao and Ofori, 2010).

As stated earlier, discourses within criminology on regulatory compliance have espe-
cially focused on business/corporate actors. The debate by Pearce and Combs (1990,
1991) and Hawkins (1990, 1991) for example, grappled with how regulatory agencies
should encourage or enforce compliance by corporations—that is, via persuasion or
threat of sanctions. Compliance behavior by individual citizens may follow similar pro-
cesses as corporate actors, however, a body of knowledge that can provide a framework
to better understand compliance to environmental laws is lacking. While procedural jus-
tice elements had been sporadically incorporated into these discourses (e.g. Valkeapaeae
and Karppinen, 2013; Winter and May, 2001), it had not been used as the functional
framework and most empirical work have not been done by criminologists. A framework
that allows understanding of why stakeholders (individuals or corporate actors) cooper-
ate and comply with environmental regulations and how abiding behaviors are devel-
oped and sustained still needs to be advanced.

Site background

The Philippines is one of only a few countries in the world that was originally densely
covered by rainforest and was home to thousands of endemic flora and fauna that repre-
sented an array of exceptional biological diversity that was unique in the world (Heaney
and Regalado, 1998; Mittermeier et al., 1998 Myers et al., 2000). In their analysis of

6 Criminology & Criminal Justice 00(0)

biodiversity hotspots, Myers et al. (2000) highlighted the Philippines as one of only three
regions in the world with very high diversity in a small area, underscoring the necessity
for protections. However, this biodiversity is threatened by widespread deforestation,
especially due to widespread illegal logging concessions (Chechina et al., 2018; Van Der
Ploeg et al., 2011). Since 1992 the Philippines has recognized the necessity for environ-
mental protections and has since passed several environmental protection laws
(Hashiguchi et al., 2016; Villamor, 2006). The research site of Banahaw is one of the
largest protected areas in the Philippines and covers two mountain ranges and approxi-
mately 27,000 acres in the southern region of the main Philippine island of Luzon. The
area had been declared a protected zone since 11 December 20091 and had been closed
to most human activities including trekking except for research purposes and occassional
religious observances.2 Yet, enforcement and the challenge of conservation in protected
zones is complicated by the needs of area residents and indigenous communities for
economic livelihood where most depend on forest products for sustenance (Chechina
et al., 2018; Goliat and Pasa, 2009). There are also difficulties inherent in policing large
park boundaries with little resources in generally difficult terrains (Verburg et al., 2006).
Thus, while environmental laws set standards for protections and therefore encourage (or
sanction) beneficial transformation in land use utilization, a key component in compli-
ance (as in compliance to laws of behavior) is how these laws are perceived by the regu-
lated, and particularly the delivery of these laws as manifested by the enforcement agents
on the ground.

Project methods

The project was conceived collaboratively between the researchers and local Filipino
partners after a decade-long partnership. Local non-governmental organizations that
work in the Philippines’ protected zones have sought information and potential solutions
to the challenges of balancing conservation laws with local residents’ livelihood needs.
After several years of consultations and work in the field, the researchers and local part-
ners deemed it appropriate to conduct a survey of citizens within a protected zone. The
survey included the main conceptual domains of the procedural justice framework to
assess the utility of this framework in understanding citizens’ perceptions of regulations
and the regulatory body. It was also an attempt to assess the feasibility of conducting
face-to-face interviews across a wide rural landscape. Many of the elements of the sur-
vey were taken from Hamm’s Natural Resource Survey that assessed the awareness and
opinions of Nebraskans on the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (Hamm et al.,
2016). Hamm assessed several potential bases of trust for the Commission from this
survey, specifically the dimensionality of six potential bases of trust which included
procedural fairness and dispositional trust (Hamm et al., 2016). Questions taken from
Hamm’s et al. (2016) survey were reworded to reflect realities in the Philippine context.
For example, instead of questions pertaining to the Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission, the survey asked about the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of
the Banahaw protected landscape. PAMBs are local regulatory bodies that are given the
responsibility and the authority by the Philippine government to enforce national envi-
ronmental regulations and follow an environmental management plan for their specific

Maxwell and Maxwell 7

protected area. All protected areas in the Philippines have their own appointed PAMBs
that create local regulations based upon broad national laws. These regulatory bodies are
typically comprised of representatives from the local and municipal governments, an
appropriate non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and representatives from indige-
nous communities in the area when applicable.

The main elements of procedural justice included in the survey were respect, neutral-
ity/impartiality and voice. Consistent with the tenets of procedural justice, these ele-
ments are expected to significantly impact citizens’ views of PAMB’s trustworthiness.
Respect represents residents’ views of the Protected Area Management Board’s (PAMB
or Board from here onward) treatment of them and other residents in the area. Four sur-
vey questions were used to represent this concept (see Table 1) such as “Banahaw PAMB
respects citizens’ rights” or “PAMB treats people with dignity, even in disagreement.”
Response set ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 6 “strongly agree.” Impartiality rep-
resents residents’ views of the neutrality and fairmindedness of PAMB particularly with
regard to preferential treatment of the rich and special interest groups in the community,
characteristics that are illustrative of regrettably many governmental agencies in the
Philippines (Batalla, 2015). Four questions were used to represent this concept such as
“PAMB is overly influenced by interest groups.” Response set ranged from 1 “strongly
disagree” to 6 “strongly agree.” Voice represents residents’ views of PAMB’s willingness
to be influenced by their opinions and concerns. Four questions were used to represent
this concept such as “PAMB listens to the opinions of the people it regulates” or “citizens
can influence decisions of PAMB.” Again the response set ranged from 1 “strongly disa-
gree” to 6 “strongly agree.” As mentioned earlier, respect, impartiality and voice are
expected to significantly influence citizens’ views of PAMB’s trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness, the residents’ views of the uprightness and worthwhile goals of PAMB
was measured using three items. Similar to the above measures, the response set ranged
between 1 “strongly disagree” and 6 “strongly agree” (see Table 1 for all the items com-
prising these constructs). Trustworthiness here is treated similarly as the construct of
legitimacy often used in policing research (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Wolfe et al., 2016).
Legitimacy had been conceptualized as citizens’ views of law enforcement as inherently
trustworthy or upright such that citizens feel the moral and ethical obligation to abide by
or provide deference to authority figures (Tyler, 2003; Wolfe et al., 2016) out of trust in
the legitimacy of their purpose and the process by which they achieve this purpose.

Besides trustworthiness, cooperation is also measured. Cooperation here is repre-
sented by three items “I always obey the laws/regulations of PAMB,” ‘I generally obey
environmental regulations,’ and “It is sometimes necessary to break the laws of PAMB
(reversed).” Both trust and cooperation/compliance (obeying authority agents such as the
police) have been used in prior research to unitarily represent legitimacy (Gau, 2011,
2014; Wolfe et al., 2016). However evidence has found trust and compliance/cooperation
to be distinct constructs (Gau, 2011, 2014). Specifically, Gau (2011) used confirmatory
factor analysis to test for the convergent and discriminant validity of procedural justice
constructs and found that trust loaded into the legitimacy subscale but that the obligation
to obey (cooperation) stood as its own construct. In the same vein in this research, to
more clearly see how these constructs may be different from each other, cooperation was
created as a separate subscale from trustworthiness.

8 Criminology & Criminal Justice 00(0)
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Maxwell and Maxwell 9

Survey questions were translated from English into Tagalog, the national language of
the Philippines and the prominent language spoken in the study area. This translated ver-
sion was then retranslated into English by a person who had never been exposed to the
original questionnaire. The original and the retranslated versions were almost verbatim,
creating confidence in the similarity of meanings between the English and the Tagalog
versions of the questionnaire.

A convenience3 sample of citizens and stakeholders were interviewed face-to-face
across five municipalities surrounding the protected area of Bahanaw. The five munici-
palities were chosen because of their proximity to the investigator’s main contact person
in the area. An average of three interviewers were dispersed across a municipality to get
a potentially diverse set of opinions about environmental regulations and the PAMB. A
total of 76 interviews were completed in the course of eight interview days in the field.

Analytic plan

The first goal in this research is to assess the measurement properties of the procedural
justice constructs of respect, impartiality, voice and trustworthiness within the environ-
mental regulatory milieu. Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alphas and exploratory
factory analyses (EFA) are used to assess measurement properties. Depending upon the
results of this first step (i.e. reasonable factors and reliability measures), the relationship
between the constructs is then assessed. Procedural justice theory states that respect,
impartiality and voice are the main drivers of citizens’ perceptions of agency/enforce-
ment trustworthiness. Thus, the next step assesses this relationship using ordinary least …