Chat with us, powered by LiveChat IntroductiontoU.S.Counterintelligence.pdf - STUDENT SOLUTION USA

INTRODUCTION TO

U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ___________________

“CI 101 — A PRIMER”

1 July 2005

by

Mark L. Reagan, COL USA (Ret)

[email protected] ______________ The views and comments expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Office of National Counterintelligence Executive, or the United States Government.

1

“We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever more

sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us.” 1

— Doolittle Report (1954)

_________________________

“Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations

conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities…” 2

— Current U.S. Government Definition of Counterintelligence

_______________ 1 Presidential directed “Special Study on U.S. Covert Activities” prepared by Lieutenant General James Doolittle in 1954. 2 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981; counterintelligence is defined at section 3.4, subparagraph (a); copy of E.O. 12333 available on line at http://www.odci.gov/cia/information/eo12333.html.

2

Introduction to U.S. Counterintelligence

“CI 101 – A Primer”

Agenda

• Introduction • Historical Background

• Counterintelligence Defined • Counterintelligence — an Intelligence Activity

• Key Principles of Counterintelligence

• United States Counterintelligence Community

• National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Counterintelligence

• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Counterintelligence

• Defense Counterintelligence

• Closing Thoughts

• Appendix A – The Traditional Counterintelligence Functions

• Appendix B – Four Core Defense Counterintelligence Mission Areas

________________

The greatest enemy of successful counterintelligence is not a spy, but incorrect perceptions of counterintelligence 3

____________ 3 Paraphrased from Kenneth A. Krantz, “Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 4

No. 1, Spring 1995, pg. 22.

3

Introduction This paper provides a general introduction to U.S. counterintelligence — a strategic national security instrument that is a unique intelligence activity… both an operational capability and a strategic enabler. Counterintelligence or CI is a complex discipline which is not easy to explain and even harder to fully comprehend… much ambiguity, confusion and, at times, even disagreement exists. The phrase counterintelligence — a wilderness of mirrors 4 best captures the essence of this ambiguity.

“Outside of the CI community there is limited understanding of CI capabilities and limitations…”

— IDA Study “Roles and Missions for DoD CI” (Oct 2003) Many view counterintelligence as broken. Perhaps William Webster, former FBI Director and Director of Central Intelligence, described the CI dilemma best when he said –

“…when you are not catching spies you are accused of having bad counter- intelligence and when you are catching spies you are accused of having bad counterintelligence. You cannot have it both ways.”

— William Webster, Former DCI (1985) Counterintelligence is much more than merely “catching spies” — it is concerned with understanding and exploiting or neutralizing, all aspects of foreign intelligence activities directed against U.S. interests. The strategic importance of counterintelligence is often ignored and misunderstood by many, and under appreciated by most… in fact few disciplines are so distorted or misrepresented by its critics.

“There are far too many in the Intelligence Community who either do not understand counterintelligence or, who understanding its concepts, have climbed to the top of their career ladders by opposing it.” — Senator Malcolm Wallop, Senate Intelligence Committee (1985)

Counterintelligence is a fascinating and challenging discipline. Hopefully this paper will provide the reader with a basic understanding and appreciation of counterintelligence. This paper is not meant to be all inclusive but rather an overview of strategic U.S. counterintelligence… CI 101 — A Primer. ___________ Only unclassified, open source references/materials were used to compile this paper. 4 “A wilderness of mirrors,” description of counterintelligence attributed to James J. Angleton, legendary CIA chief of

Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1974. It comes from T.S. Eliot’s poem “Gerontion” (1920); available on line at http://www.camdenfamily.com/thunder/framer.cfm?frame=http://www.bartleby.com/199/13.html. Also is the title of a 1980 book about CIA counterintelligence by David C. Martin.

4

Historical Background • As espionage is ancient, so is counterintelligence…

“[I]t is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you…” — Sun Tzu, Art of War, circa 500 B.C.

• Since the founding of the Republic, counterintelligence has historically played a key role in U.S. national security, especially in its unique ability in supporting efforts to shape and influence adversary decision makers – military, intelligence, and political… CI an integral part of American history

• During the Revolutionary War, George Washington was an avid user of intelligence

and counterintelligence as well as a consummate practitioner of the intelligence craft… not only did he understand and appreciate the value of counterintelligence, he also made excellent use of offensive counterintelligence operations

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

There is one evil I dread, and that is, their spies. I could wish, therefore, the most attentive watch be kept…

There is one evil I dread, and that is, their spies. I could wish, therefore, the most attentive watch be kept…

George Washington24 March 1776

……an integral part of American history andan integral part of American history andcritical component of our national securitycritical component of our national security

CounterintelligenceHistorically…CounterintelligenceHistorically…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 May 2003

• Counterintelligence played a critical role in World War II, DESERT STORM

(Persian Gulf War of 1991), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to name a few… demonstrating its value as a force multiplier and operational capability

• Recommended Reading: For a comprehensive historical background on

counterintelligence see the multi-volume Counterintelligence Reader published by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.5

_______________ 5 Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into the New Millennium, Volumes I – IV, Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive; available on line at the ONCIX website http://ncix.gov/history/index.html.

5

Counterintelligence Defined • There are many definitions and numerous descriptions of counterintelligence • 1958 Government definition of counterintelligence —

Intelligence activity… protecting the security of the nation

“…intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. …includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting such activity.” 4

— National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5

• 1969 CIA special study outlined the function and goal of a counterintelligence service —

“Generally speaking, the function of the internal counterintelligence service is to protect the lawfully constituted government against concealed attack. …the CI service is properly concerned only with hostile clandestine and covert activity. Clandestine activity is that which the enemy tries to conceal totally. It usually takes the form of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, or—much more rarely—sabotage. Covert activity is not fully concealed; in fact, it is likely to take the form of a newspaper article or radio broadcast, or even terrorism, for which the widest possible publicity is sought. What the enemy tries to hide in this type of action is his sponsorship or other involvement. The goal of the CI service is to learn everything it can about these two kinds of inimical action, and therefore about people carrying out the action, without letting these persons become aware that the service is acquiring such information. Only by making available to the government information about its enemies which is complete enough to include all essentials and which was acquired secretly, so that the enemies remain unwarned, can the counterintelligence service do the task for which it was created and designed.” 7 — CIA Special Study (1969)

_________________ 6 National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 5, “U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad,”

21 April 1958; NSCID 5 subsequently updated 18 Jan 1961 and 17 Feb 1972; both updates retained the same CI definition. 7 “The Anatomy of Counterintelligence” by A. C. Wasemiller in CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (Winter 1969),

pp. 14-15; declassified, originally classified CONFIDENTIAL.

6

• In 1976, The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (aka Church Committee), chaired by Senator Frank Church, described counterintelligence —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

A “special form” of intelligence activity, separate and distinct from other disciplines

Its purpose is to discover hostile foreign intelligence operations and destroy their effectiveness

Involves the protection of the US Government against infiltration by foreign agents, as well as the control & manipulation of adversary intelligence operations

An effort is made to both discern and decive [sic] the plans & intentions of enemy intelligence [efforts]

CounterintelligenceIntroduction…CounterintelligenceIntroduction…

Counterintelligence is intelligence activity dedicated to undermining the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities

Counterintelligence is intelligence activity Counterintelligence is intelligence activity dedicated to undermining the effectiveness of dedicated to undermining the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activitieshostile intelligence activities

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 21 July 2003

Counterintelligence wages nothing less than a secret war againstCounterintelligence wages nothing less than a secret war against antagonistic intelligence servicesantagonistic intelligence services

Source for bullets: Senate Report 94-755, “Foreign and Military Intelligence – Book I, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” United States Senate, pg. 163, 26 April 1976

• The Church Committee referred to counterintelligence as “…the most secret of secret

intelligence activities—the heart of the onion.” • In 1985, Francis McNamara (The Nathan Hale Institute), described counterintelligence as

“…intelligence of a special kind, plus something else.”

• Counterintelligence according to FBI Assistant Director Dave Szady —

“It's much broader than just espionage–the traditional spy game. It also includes the protection of our critical national assets. And by that, I don't mean the bridges, the railroad stations, the nuclear plants. I mean things like our country's advanced technologies, its weapons systems, its military capacities–classified information and systems that are strategically important to our nation's well-being. [CI] also involves protecting trade secrets and guarding against operations or disinformation campaigns that would disadvantage the U.S.” 8

• CI is used to defeat and exploit foreign intelligence services and others (e.g., terrorists,

foreign criminal enterprises, cyber intruders, etc.) who use clandestine/covert activities and operations to harm and disadvantage U.S. interests… CI is a national security tool

_________________ 8 “Focus on Counterintelligence,” an interview with FBI Assistant Director Dave Szady, 20 July 2004; copy available at FBI web

site http://www.fbi.gov/page2/july04/szady072004.htm (last accessed 19 April 2005).

7

• The United States Intelligence Community (IC) website provides that —

The IC is faced with “…the problem of identifying, understanding, prioritizing and counteracting the intelligence threats (from foreign powers) that are faced by the United States. This activity is known as counterintelligence.” 9

— Intelligence Community Website • Current Government definition of counterintelligence per Executive Order —

…information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities 10

— Executive Order 12333

• Counterintelligence often viewed as “protecting secrets, frustrating attempts by foreign intelligence collectors to acquire those secrets, and catching [traitors] who spy for those foreign intelligence services.” 11

• CI is much broader than just “protection focused”… CI protects & exploits

• Counterintelligence “embraces all activities, human and technical, whether at home or

abroad, that are undertaken to identify, assess, neutralize and exploit foreign intelligence threats… counterintelligence is inherently a strategic, national security instrument.”

— Hon Michelle Van Cleave, NCIX (18 Nov 2004)

_________________

Counterintelligence wages “nothing less than a secret war against antagonist intelligence services” 12

______________

9 IC website http://www.intelligence.gov/2-counterint.shtml (last accessed 30 March 2005). 10 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981; this E.O. specifically notes that

counterintelligence does not include “personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.”

11 Frederick L. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 13, No. 3, Fall 2000. 12 U.S. Senate Report 94-755, 26 April 76.

8

CI — an Intelligence Activity… historically, doctrinally, as well as by statute & policy Counterintelligence is an intelligence activity. Although some continue to debate this premise, within the United States, by statute and policy, counterintelligence is an “intelligence activity” and is identified as such in the National Security Act, Executive Order, and various directives. National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) — as amended • Basic law governing intelligence in the United States, which specifically defines

intelligence as including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Executive Order 12333 — U.S. Intelligence Activities (4 Dec 1981) • Provides the U.S. Government definition for counterintelligence: “information gathered

and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.” [para 3.4]

• Under goals (Part I) with respect to the national intelligence effort, it directs that “special

emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, or United States corporations, establishments, or persons.” [para 1.1(c)] …this activity is part of counterintelligence

• Directs the Intelligence Community to conduct intelligence activities necessary for “the

protection of the national security of the United States, including… collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents.” [para 1.4(c)]

Department of Defense Directive 5240.1 — Intelligence Activities (25 Apr 1988) • Intelligence activities defined as “the collection, production, and dissemination of foreign

intelligence and counterintelligence by the DoD intelligence components…” [para 3.1] • “DoD Intelligence Components include… US Army Intelligence and Security Command

(USAINSCOM); counterintelligence elements of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); counterintelligence elements of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI); and the 650th Military Intelligence Group… [para 3.4]”

___________

Counterintelligence is intelligence activity focused on undermining the effectiveness of — as well as exploiting — adversary intelligence activities

9

Key Principles of Counterintelligence • CI acknowledged in Senate Report 94-755 as a “special form” of intelligence activity…

separate and distinct from the traditional intelligence disciplines (INTs) • Counterintelligence is a unique intelligence discipline… as is foreign intelligence (FI) • Foreign intelligence focuses on collecting information to learn adversaries’ secrets,

whereas CI focuses on countering & exploiting foreign intelligence activities —

o Espionage… stealing others’ secrets o Counterintelligence… preventing others from stealing our secrets, as well as

exploiting their collection efforts directed us • Foreign Intelligence & Counterintelligence… equally important strategic assets, which

focus on distinctly different content, as well as outcomes

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CounterintelligenceForeign Intelligence vs. CI… CounterintelligenceForeign Intelligence vs. CI…

US intelligence activities consist of CI & FI… different disciplinesPrepared by Mark L Reagan – 12 Mar 2005

It is the job of [foreign] intelligence to collect and analyze information. Espionage for this purpose… acts only with the objective of getting past the opposing counterintelligence and security forces as uneventfully as possible. …Counterintelligence, on the other hand, is engaged in covert war, all-out and immediate. It has to take action—at home by investigating, arresting, interrogating, doubling, and prosecuting [foreign intelligence] operatives, and abroad by carrying out recruitment, neutralization, harassment, diversionary, and psywar operations against their secret service system.

— C.N. Geschwind, “Wanted: An Integrated Counterintelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, V7: 3 (Summer 1963), pp. 25-26

• Per Executive Order 12333, counterintelligence is “information” and “activities conducted”

…hence CI is both knowledge and action —

o Knowledge of foreign intelligence activities directed against U.S. interests o Action to frustrate and exploit those activities

• CI is a collector as well as a consumer of intelligence… although not considered a traditional INT, it can provide valuable intelligence

• CI can supply unique insights into the actions of our adversaries and the clandestine/covert

threats directed against us, as well as provide opportunities for advancing our own interests • CI counters espionage directed at us by a wide variety of adversaries and sometimes even

friends… espionage long proven the highest leveraged means of defeating U.S. capabilities

10

• CI is critical in wartime to defeat & exploit adversary intelligence capabilities • CI “bridges” foreign intelligence, law enforcement, security/homeland security, and

combating terrorism (CbT)… all mutually supportive but each distinctly different

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Counterintelligence A “bridging” discipline…Counterintelligence A “bridging” discipline…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 May 2005

CI

COMBATING TERRORISMCOMBATING TERRORISM

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCEFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

SECURITY

LAW

E NFORCEMENT

Mutually supportive… yet each distinctly differentMutually supportive… yet each distinctly different

What Counterintelligence is NOT… • CI is not HUMINT… often confused with human intelligence

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI versus HUMINTCI versus HUMINTCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Although CI & HUMINT are different disciplines… Although CI & HUMINT are different disciplines… they have interdependencies & can be mutually supportivethey have interdependencies & can be mutually supportive

* Neutralization is the primary mission… collection is secondary

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 18 Feb 2003Updated 11 June 2005

Mission: deter, detect & neutralize Foreign Intel Activities/Espionage

Focus: adversary collectors

Seeks out foreign intelligence collectors… engages the threat

Impacts adversary's knowledge of US

Collection one of five CI functions*

CI Requirements & Threat Driven

Key Players: FBI, CIA, Military Services, and DoD Agencies

Mission: overtly and/or clandestinelyacquire intel info via human sources

Focus: obtaining foreign secrets

Seeks to avoid foreign CI… uses CIto protect its own operations

Shapes our understanding of adversary

Collection is the Mission

Requirements Driven

Key Players: CIA-Directorate of Operations (DO) & DIA-Defense HUMINT

Note: Clandestine military HUMINT operations discussed at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int014.html

11

• CI is not Security… CI transcends the purely defensive nature of security 13

“CI attacks the actor. It attacks the opposition intelligence structure. It is not speculative. CI feeds security because it helps them focus on meaningful measures and safeguards. Using CI to help security is just smart security.

— Robert P. Hanssen (Soviet Spy, former FBI Agent & current federal inmate) 14 • CI vs. Security… security only protects it does not “attack”

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

• Physical Security/Facilities Protection• Industrial & Personnel Security• Personnel Security Investigations• AIS/Information Systems Security• Information Security/Document Control• Personnel Protection Operations• Security Education & Training

• CI Investigations• CI Operations (Defensive & Offensive)• CI Collection/Liaison• CI Analysis/Production• CI Services to include TSCM, CI

polygraphs, CI training & awareness, etc.

Counterintelligence versus SecurityCounterintelligence versus SecuritySECURITYSECURITYCOUNTERINTELLIGENCECOUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Focus:

Objective:

Perspective:

Concern:

KeyAuthorities:

Nat’l Board:

identify/understand/counter adversary collection efforts …mission driven

establish/adhere to standards; fix system weaknesses …rule driven

deter/detect/disrupt/control adversary collection …reduce or control “threat”

deny/prevent unauthorized access …reduce “vulnerability”

adversary’s perspective …looking “outside – in”

internal perspective …looking “inside – out”

EO 12333; NSPD-1; PDD-24; PDD-75;PDD-63; CI Enhancement Act of 2002; DoDD 5240.2; and DoDI 5240.1

EO 12958, 12968 & 12829; PDD-63; NSSD-298; DoDD 5200.1/.8/.28; DoD 5200.1-R/.2-R; 5200.8-R; & 5220.22-R/-M

Activities

National CI Policy Board (NCIPB) PCC/RA & IS (Records Access & Info Security)Security Policy Board (SPB) originally established Sep 94 (PDD-29) was abolished via NSPD-1 (13 Feb 2001)

Mutually Supporting… protecting critical resources & secretsMutually Supporting… protecting critical resources & secrets

clandestine & covert threats unauthorized access

Sword directed at the adversary collector…Sword directed at the adversary collector… Shield to protect friendly activities… Shield to protect friendly activities…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 Jul 2002Updated 11 June 2005

• Security focuses on protecting friendly sensitive information and secrets from unauthorized access… it does not directly engage foreign intelligence threats

• Risk Management… where CI and Security intersect 15

o Close partnership required to ensure security directives are based on the “threat” o Prior strategy of risk avoidance too resource intense and not cost effective o Threat assessments are critical for security & security countermeasures policymakers o Counterintelligence provides the “window” into the adversary threat o Today’s security protection must be “rational, threat-appropriate and cost effective”

______________ 13 Security is defined as: 1) Measures taken by an activity to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its

effectiveness; 2) A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences; or 3) With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

14 Robert P. Hanssen as quoted in “Dairy of a Spy” by Paul M. Rodriquez, Insight on the News, 16 July 2001 15 Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling, risks arising from operational factors and making

decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (DoD Dictionary – Joint Pub 1-02); a security philosophy which considers actual threats, inherent vulnerabilities, and the availability and costs of countermeasures as the underlying basis for making security decisions (Joint Security Commission Report, 1994).

12

Counterintelligence – essential for sound risk management “Getting …the threat information necessary to support coherent, risk-based security countermeasures…is an ad hoc rather than a systematic process. In the absence of access to threat assessment information, security policies have been based on risk avoidance, constrained primarily by the availability of resources.” — Redefining Security, The Joint Security Commission Report (28 Feb 1994)

• Effective CI and security are integral to program efficiency, combat, and operational

effectiveness, and foreign policy success… mutually supportive but yet distinct

“Security and counterintelligence serve as the foundation of the Intelligence Community. As with any sound foundation, its parts are mutually supportive.” — George Tenet, Director Central Intelligence, in “The DCI’s Strategic Plan for Personnel Security…”

• Counterintelligence is not synonymous with Law Enforcement (LE)… although there are

similarities and they can be mutually supportive Law Enforcement versus Counterintelligence

LE is police work waging a war against crime… evidence–prosecution centric

CI is national security work waging a war against foreign clandestine & covert threats… information–exploitation centric

• CI vs. LE —

o Operate in fundamentally dissimilar manners… different legal authorities, different oversight structures, and different governing paradigms

o Counterintelligence… primarily focused on identifying, collecting on, and exploiting foreign intelligence activities/clandestine & covert threats – proactive action

o Law Enforcement… focused on investigating, arresting, and prosecuting those who violate criminal laws – reactive response (uses ex post facto arrests and trials governed by rules of evidence)

o These two specialties merge or intersect when hidden intelligence activity is also criminal… national security crimes (e.g., espionage, treason, spying, sedition, etc.)

o Primary difference… in targets and timing rather than methods • Criminal investigations & counterintelligence investigations… many basic investigative

skills and methods applicable to both [following list is not all inclusive] —

o Legal principles, to include rules of evidence, rights warning, etc. o Records checks, elicitation, interviews, interrogations, courtroom testimony, etc. o Search and seizure, including collecting, processing and preserving evidence o Investigative reporting writing, sworn statements, waiver of rights, etc. o Specialized investigative techniques, e.g., confidential sources, undercover

operations, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, concealed monitoring, etc. o Penetration of clandestine/secretive closed organizations

13

• CI vs. LE… different cultures

[LE] wants to identify bad guys and put them in jail. [Intel/CI] wants to identify bad guys and follow them or recruit them, so they can keep getting information from them. These are different cultures…

— Robert M. Gates (2 Feb 1996) 16 Former DCI

• CI vs. LE… a Defense view 17

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Services have different approaches to CI due to their unique missions

Navy & Air Force doctrine: CI primarily a law enforcement mission

Army doctrine: CI, first & foremost, an intelligence mission

Lines of jurisdiction between many traditional law enforcement activities, criminal intelligence activities, CI activities, and positive intelligence collection activities are, and should be, by nature blurred

Attempting to demarcate the disciplines… artificially is difficult and not in the best interest of DoD

Counterintelligence is not strictly a law enforcement matter… nevertheless CI is not strictly intelligence

CounterintelligenceCI vs. Law Enforcement… DoD ReportCounterintelligenceCI vs. Law Enforcement… DoD Report

Separate but parallel interests…Separate but parallel interests…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 8 May 2003 Source: “Report of the Advisory Board on the Investigative Capability of the Department of Defense – Volume I,” DoD, Jan 1995, pp. 69-70

• A Special DoD Advisory Board found that “considerable intersection exists between law

enforcement, counterintelligence, and intelligence…” and it specifically noted that —

“…the intelligence and law enforcement communities need to improve their understanding of their respective needs and operating practices and cooperate earlier, more closely, and more consistently on matters in which they have separate but parallel interests” 18

• Within DoD, law enforcement activities by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations

and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service have facilitated the collection of relevant threat information from a variety of foreign sources

_____________ 16 As quoted in “Overview: After the Aldrich Ames Spy Scandal,” by Mary H. Cooper, CQ Researcher, Vol 6, No 5, 2 Feb 1996 17 Report of the Advisory Board on the Investigative Capability of the Department of Defense – Volume I, Department of Defense,

January 1995, pp. 64-76.

18 Ibid, pg. 70.

14

• Counterintelligence can be viewed as a “bridge” between law enforcement and foreign

intelligence… information obtained by any of one of these disciplines may potentially be of value and use to the others

(CI a bridging discipline which also bridges to security and combating terrorism as discussed earlier) • Law enforcement is often in the best position to detect indicators of terrorist planning and

execution. • LE and CI are distinct disciplines… yet they are mutually supportive and complement one

another as collaborative partners in protecting U.S. national security interests 19

_________________________________

Counterintelligence a unique “bridging discipline

_____________ 19 For additional information on the cultural differences between intelligence and law enforcement see Siobhan Gorman, “FBI,

CIA Remain Worlds Apart,” Government Executive, 1 August 2003. Also see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., updated 3 December 2001, by Richard A. Best.

C I Law Enforcement Foreign Intelligence

15

• CI is a critical function deemed essential by most nation states to the effective pursuit of both their national interest and national security… it is an instrument of national policy

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

To protect sensitive national security information, it is critical for us to effectively counter the collection efforts of foreign intelligence services and non-state actors through vigorous counterintelligence efforts…

US Government CICI an instrument of national policyUS Government CICI an instrument of national policy

* A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White House, December 2000

Espionage is an instrument of national policy… CI is the instruEspionage is an instrument of national policy… CI is the instrument of ment of national policy which counters foreign intelligence activitiesnational policy which counters foreign intelligence activities

— National Security Strategy (NSS)*

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 9 May 2003

…it is critical that the U.S. maintain a highly effectiveand coordinated counterintelligence capability…it is critical that the U.S. maintain a highly effectiveand coordinated counterintelligence capability

PDD/NSC-24 (4 May 1994)

• Counterintelligence represents a philosophic approach that can bring coherence to many areas of national policy —

o Counterintelligence enables successful execution of sensitive national security

operations… to include foreign intelligence activities and operations o CI must be an integral part of the entire intelligence process… intelligence is vital to

the formulation and execution of U.S. policy and to the nation’s security o Significant failures in CI can produce damaging failures in intelligence, in both

collection and analysis, and negate enormous investments in sensitive intelligence capabilities… we must safeguard the integrity of intelligence – both FI & CI

CI plays a critical role in ensuring the reliability of U.S. intelligence “Intelligence requires secrets…. The future of US intelligence effectiveness depends to a very significant degree on keeping its secrets about collection sources and methods and analytical techniques. When secrecy is breached, foreign targets of US intelligence—such as adversary countries and terrorists—learn about, and then often develop countermeasures to, US intelligence techniques and operations. As a result, the effectiveness of intelligence declines, to the detriment of the national security policymakers and warfighters, and the citizenry that it is meant to serve.”

— James. B. Bruce, “The Consequences of Permissive Neglect” in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47 No. 1 (2003)

• CI is a unique & valuable operational capability… it can proactively influence decision and knowledge management outcomes of specific adversaries and competitors

16

• CI capabilities are high-demand low-density resources… CI efforts must be focused • National Core CI Issues as identified in PDD-75 20 —

o Detection and neutralization of espionage o CI support to protection of U.S. persons, critical information, and assets o CI support to the protection of research & development (R&D) and technology o CI support to the protection of critical infrastructure including economic security o CI support to the protection against covert foreign influence and manipulation

• On 1 March 2005, the President approved a new National Counterintelligence Strategy 21

which identified the following Strategic CI Objectives —

o Identify, assess, neutralize and exploit foreign powers, terrorist groups, international criminal organizations, and other entities who seek to do us harm

o Protect our intelligence collection and analytical capabilities from adversary denial, penetration, influence, or manipulation

o Enable the successful execution of our sensitive national security operations o Safeguard our vital national security secrets, critical assets, and technologies against

theft, covert foreign diversion, or exploitation

• CI enhances National Security… an operational capability & strategic enabler • Full-spectrum counterintelligence… encompasses a wide range of activities from defensive

(reactive) to offensive (proactive) • Robust aggressive CI is critical… the first commandment of CI is be offensive

Our CI mindset should be relentlessly offensive. We need to go after our CI adversaries. 22

— James M. Olson, Former Director, CIA Counterintelligence Center

• The “new” direction for U.S. counterintelligence… is global proactive engagement

U.S. counterintelligence will shift from a reactive posture to a proactive strategy of seizing advantage. 23

— The National Counterintelligence Strategy _____________ 20 PDD/NSC-75, U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness for the 21st Century (U), 28 Dec 2000, classified CONFIDENTIAL;

unclassified fact sheet available on line at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-75.htm.

21 The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States, March 2005, pp.1-2; available on line at http://ncix.gov/publications/law_policy/policy/FinalCIStrategyforWebMarch21.pdf.

22 James M. Olson, “The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence,” CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, Fall-Winter 2001, No. 11,

pg. 54; available on line at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/fall_winter_2001/article08.html. 23 The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States, March 2005, pg. 4.

17

• U.S. Counterintelligence to go on the offensive —

Offensive counterintelligence, put into a larger context, can be used —

— to diffuse or shape an emerging threat, — to influence key decisions of our adversaries, — to mask vulnerabilities, to advance diplomatic objectives, or — to confer advantages on the negotiating table or on the battlefield…

In wartime, we must be able to defeat the adversary’s intelligence capabilities, including their ability to deceive or mislead us…

Strategic CI planning can also increase the options available to decision-makers for advancing national objectives while avoiding war.

— Hon Michelle Van Cleave, National Counterintelligence Executive as quoted in “Inside the Navy,” 23 Nov 2004

• Essential to the success of counterintelligence —

Aggressive double agent (DA) operations…[and] penetration. For every American spy, there are several members of the opposition service who know who he is or she is. No matter what it takes, we have to have penetrations.

— James M. Olson, Former Director, CIA Counterintelligence Center

• The traditional functions of counterintelligence — see Appendix A for details

• Globally engaged… every day counterintelligence executes its wartime mission —

“…[Counterintelligence] is performing its wartime mission every day as agents counter foreign intelligence threats – that’s why we call it the Silent War.”

— COL Stuart Herrington, USA (Ret)

Adversary intelligence

activities and other

clandestine & covert threats

Investigations

CI Functional Services

Operations

Collection

Analysis & Production

CI Full array of active and passive (offensive & defensive) measures to protect friendly activities from adversary exploitation and manipulation

18

• The President’s charge for Counterintelligence today —

“…identify and access what foreign intelligence services are doing against U.S. interests and how they are doing it, and develop doctrine, assign resources and implement operations to neutralize those activities proactively at home and abroad.” 24

• Seven Pillars of US CI Strategy 25 as identified by the National CI Executive —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

US Government CISeven Pillars U.S. CI Strategy…US Government CISeven Pillars U.S. CI Strategy…

Extend the safeguards of strategic CI to the Global War on Terrorism

Shift emphasis from a posture of reacting to a proactive strategy of seizing advantage

Protect the vital technology secrets that are the bedrock of our strategic security

Safeguard the integrity of intelligence and identify & defeat foreign denial, deception and covert influence operations

Help level the economic playing field so that U.S. business and industry are not disadvantaged by unfair intelligence practices of foreign competitors

National security decision-making process must be informed by CI insights

National CI system to enable the execution of the National CI Strategy

The National CI Strategy of the United States;Remarks by Hon. Michelle Van Cleave, National CI Executive on 5 March 2005

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 15 Mar 2005

• Counterintelligence “is and ought to be at the forefront of the general movement of

intelligence [and at] the center of U.S. projection of national power and influence.” 26 — Roy L. Reed & Anthony D. Mc Ivor

_________________

Counterintelligence — an instrument of national security _________ 24“The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States,” speech by Hon Michelle Van Cleave on 5 March 2005,

pg. 9; copy available on line at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/CI21Conf/TexasspeechCI.pdf. 25 Ibid, pp. 3-8. 26 Roy L. Reed and Anthony D. Mc Ivor, “Making the Case: Counterintelligence as a Strategic Asset,” American Intelligence

Journal (Spring/Summer 2004), pg. 46.

19

United States Counterintelligence Community • Macro View… The Key Players

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

National CI Executive (NCIX)… authorized by PDD 75 (replaced NACIC)

FBI… policy & coordination at CI Div at HQ — Field Offices execute

CIA… Counterintelligence Center (CIC) at Headquarters

DoE… Office of CI (OCI) at HQ [all CI Policy w/in DoE] & Office of Defense Nuclear CI (DNCI) at the Nat’l Nuclear Security Admin (NNSA)

DoS… CI within Diplomatic Security at HQ (Office of Investigations & CI)

DoD… policy at OSD, management at CIFA, and execution at Services…the most CI resources, as well as –– the most places… over 500 fixed facilities worldwide – the most cleared people… over 2.4 million with clearances– the most SECRETS… over 80% of all w/in US Government

US Government CIMacro View — The Key Players…US Government CIMacro View — The Key Players…US Counterintelligence is a conglomerate of services, agencies, and components with varying responsibilities, jurisdictions, and capabilities…

CI an integral part of the National Intelligence Community CI an integral part of the National Intelligence Community Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 10 May 2003

Updated 5 Dec 2003

Largest U.S. GovernmentAgency/Department

…huge global footprint

Largest U.S. GovernmentAgency/Department

…huge global footprint

• Macro View… The CI Community

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

DHS DoJ DNI DoD DoS DoENCTC

USCG FBI CIA CMS

Congressional Oversight

HPSCI SSCI

White HousePRESIDENTPRESIDENT

NSC Asst to President forNat’l Security Affairs

NSC/PC

NSC/DC

NSC/PCCsPolicy Coord Committees

PCC/Intelligence & CIassumes duties assigned to

“Nat’l CI Policy Group”in PDD/NSC-75IAW NSPD-1

Replaced theNACIC

DiplomaticSecurity

DefenseAgencies

JCS

USD-I

DUSDCI & Security

CIFA

J2X

MilitaryServices

J2/CI

CombatantCommands

CISO

House Senate

J2

DO

CTC

OCI

Counterintelligence Community U.S. Government…Counterintelligence Community U.S. Government…

(CI Staff Officer)

Principals Committee

Deputies Committee

Strategic Counterintelligence… an instrument of national securitStrategic Counterintelligence… an instrument of national securityy

PresidentVice PresSec StateSec DefenseAsst to Pres for Nat’l SctyAffairs

Statutory AdvisorsCJCS & DNI

NSPD-1

National CIExecutive

(NCIX)

Office of NCIX

Section 902 *

Section 904 *

National CIPolicy Board

• Nat’l CI Executive, Chair• Senior Reps from–

DoJ (incl FBI)DoD (incl Joint Staff)DoS – DoE – CIAOthers as specified by the President

Section 903*

NCTC = National Counterterrorism Center TTIC = Terrorist Threat Integration CenterFTTTF = Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force NJTTF = National Joint Terrorism Task Force JTTFs = Joint Terrorism Task Forces DNCI = Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 12 May 2002Updated 14 June 2005

HPSCI = House Permanent Select Committee on IntelligenceSSCI = Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

FTTTF

CIC

NJTTF

Note: structure diagram highlights majorityof US CI although not all inclusive

JTTFs

x 84nationwide

* Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002(Public Law 107~306, 27 November 2002)

NCIX reports to New DNI

• Nat’l Threat Identification & Prioritization Assessment• National Counterintelligence Strategy• National CI Strategic Analyses• Nat’l CI Collection & Targeting Coordination• Nat’l CI Outreach, Watch, and Warning• Program Budget

Func

tions

TTIC

DS/DO/ICI

New Dir of Nat’l Intelligence

PL 108-458 [S. 2845]

17 Dec 2004

Dir NCTC reports to DNI per EO 13354 (27 Aug 04)

PL 108-458 (17 Dec 04)

J2

J2X

on planning & progress of joint CT ops D

ir NCTC

reports direct to PO

TUS

per PL 108-458 (17 Dec 04)

DNCI

CG CI Svc

NNSA

• Regional x 6• Functional x 11

StatutoryHead of US CI

20

National CI Executive (NCIX) —

o Charge with leading and integrating the CI activities of the United States o Established 1 May 2001 by PDD-75 as the substantive leader of national-level CI o Appointed by the President and under the intelligence reform act reports to the new

Director for National Intelligence (DNI) 27 o Advisory budget authority with little visibility into individual agencies’ CI operations;

no current ability to assign operational responsibility or evaluate performance 28 o NCIX heads the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) and

chairs the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NCIPB)

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Office of the National CI ExecutiveOrganization…Office of the National CI ExecutiveOrganization…

Staffed by senior CI & other specialists drawn from across the nStaffed by senior CI & other specialists drawn from across the national security communityational security community

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 14 June 2003Updated 30 March 2005

NCIX

Deputy

NCIX

Deputy

Strategy & Policy

Strategy & Policy

Operations Support& Special Programs

Operations Support& Special Programs

Collections & Analysis

Collections & Analysis

Community Programs & Resources

Community Programs & Resources

Public Affairs,Training & Education

Public Affairs,Training & Education

General Counsel

Source: “About NCIX” at www.ncix.gov; downloaded 29 March 2005

Chief of Staff

Security

Executive Officer

Special Assistant

IT

HR

Logistics

Budget/Contracts

AssessmentsAssessments

NCTC

AnalysisAnalysis

CollectionsCollections

NCIOsNCIOs

Legislative Affairs

Legislative Affairs

Executive SecretariatExecutive Secretariat

o ONCIX is an outgrowth from CI-21 and PDD-75; it replaced the National

Counterintelligence Center (NACIC)29 o In 2002 the NCIX was codified into law and its “center” renamed an “office” 30 o Recent WMD report identified the need for an empowered NCIX and recommended

NCIX become the DNI’s Mission Manager for Counterintelligence 31 o For additional information about the ONCIX go to http://www.ncix.gov/

__________________

27 Section 103, P.L. 108-458, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 17 Dec 2004.

28 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction – Report to the President of the United States, 31 March 2005, pg. 490 (WMD Report); Chapter 11 addresses Counterintelligence, pp. 485-497; full report available on line at http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf.

29 NACIC was addressed in PRD 44 and established under PDD-24 (May 1994) to coordinate and improve the effectiveness of

CI activities across the U.S. Government 30 Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-306), 27 Nov 2002 31 WMD Report, pp. 490-492.

21

• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) —

o Investigative arm of the Department of Justice with jurisdiction over violations of more than 200 categories of federal law; also a statutory member of the IC

o Lead agency for counterintelligence within the United States o Centralized management and oversight of CI at the Counterintelligence Division o See FBI web site at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/cointell.htm

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CounterintelligenceCounterintelligence

Source for Organization: Attorney General Memo 4 Mar 2004, Subject: Reorganization of the FBI Source for FY 2004 Budget: Congressional Statement — Director FBI (27 Mar 2003)Source for FCI Priorities: FBI web site at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/cointell.htm

Director———-

Deputy Director

IntelligenceCounter-Terrorism/CounterintelligenceCounter-Terrorism/Counterintelligence

Law EnfServices Administration

Executive Assistant Directors for– Executive Assistant Directors for–

Office of Intelligence

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 July 2003Updated 7 April 2004

• 11,500 FBI Special Agents(working Criminal/Law Enforcement & CT/CI)

• 56 Major Field Offices• 400 Resident Offices• 44 Overseas Locations

36% of 8,900 Field Agents are dedicated to CT/CI/Cyber issues

48 w/ full-time CI Squads

CriminalInvestigations

Counter-TerrorismDivision

CounterintelligenceDivision

FBI’s FCI investigative priorities are to:• Prevent or neutralize the foreign acquisition of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology or equipment

• Prevent the penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community

• Prevent the penetration of U.S. Government agencies or contractors

• Prevent the compromise of U.S. Critical National Assets• Conduct aggressive CI operations focusing on those

countries that constitute the most significant threat to U.S. Strategic interests

CI Division integrates law enforcement with intelligence effortsCI Division integrates law enforcement with intelligence efforts to investigate to investigate violations of the espionage statutes under Title 18 of the US Crviolations of the espionage statutes under Title 18 of the US Criminal Code iminal Code

• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) —

o Primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities abroad including the conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States32

o Primary CI focus is mostly defensive, aimed primarily to protect CIA operations33 o Counterintelligence Center (CIC) at Headquarters34

• Department of Defense (DoD) —

o DoD, with its component CI units located within the military services, principally focuses on protecting the armed forces35 — broad overview of Defense CI follows

“Primary responsibility for carrying out [CI] activities should remain with CIA, FBI, and the Department of Defense.” 36

__________________

32 NSCID 5, “U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad,” 17 February 1972 [para 3].

33 WMD Report, pp. 489-490. 34 CIA/CIC established in 1988 by DCI William Webster to mobilize and coordinate counterintelligence capabilities inside the

CIA, and to integrate CIA’s counterintelligence work with the FBI and the Department of Defense. 35 WMD Report, pg. 490. 36 Ibid, pg. 492.

22

Defense Counterintelligence • The business of the Department of Defense is national security… national security cannot

succeed without a viable CI program and robust CI capabilities

• Department of Defense (DoD) Policy —

Counterintelligence activities shall be undertaken to detect, identify, assess, exploit, and counter or neutralize the intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorist activities, and assassination efforts of foreign powers, organizations, or persons directed at the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, material, facilities and activities. — DoD Directive 5240.2 DoD Counterintelligence (22 May 1997)

• DoD Counterintelligence Vision —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

DoD CounterintelligenceVision…DoD CounterintelligenceVision…

The integrated application of aggressive counterintelligence activities by highly capable professionals empowered by leading edge technologies to detect, deter, and defeat foreign intelligence activities, sabotage, terrorism

and other clandestine or covert activities directed against DoD– DoD Counterintelligence Strategy (16 Dec 2004)

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 27 Jan 2004

DoD CI must be more integrated, agile & effective than ever befoDoD CI must be more integrated, agile & effective than ever before…re…

• The focus of Defense CI is worldwide due to DoD’s national security mission and global footprint 37 —

o Operates in more than 146 countries… permanent bases & temporary deployments o Over 3 million personnel… over ½ million overseas or afloat o Operates from more than 6,000 locations… uses in excess of 30 million acres and

600,000 buildings & structures

____________ 37 Information on DoD presence & infrastructure obtained from www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101 (last accessed 30 Mar 2004).

23

• The Defense CI Challenge —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

“Ensuring that DoD assets are defended from attack byforeign and hostile intelligence services…”

“Ensuring that DoD assets are defended from attack byforeign and hostile intelligence services…”

The end of the cold war did not reduce the efforts of hostile espionage services to target DoD activities. DoD counterintelligence efforts need both to protect DoD activities and, in collaboration and coordination with the intelligence community and law enforcement, work to deny and disrupt theefforts of foreign services to target the DoD.

— Dr. Stephen A. CamboneUnder Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD/I)

Source: Answers to advance congressional questions – 27 Feb 2003(at that time Dr Cambone was the nominee for USD/I)

DoD CounterintelligenceThe Challenge…DoD CounterintelligenceThe Challenge…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 May 2003

• According to the National Defense Strategy (March 2005), “Uncertainty is the defining

characteristic of today’s strategic environment…[with] an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and methods threaten[ing] U.S. interests.” — Defense CI must be capable of operating seamlessly throughout today’s security environment, as well as responding to the emergence of developing threats

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Today’s Security EnvironmentPersistent & Emerging Challenges…Today’s Security EnvironmentPersistent & Emerging Challenges…

TerrorismInsurgencyCivil WarEmerging concepts, i.e., unrestricted warfare

IRREGULAR CATASTROPHIC

Lower vulnerability Higher vulnerability

Less

like

lyM

ore

likel

y

DISRUPTIVETRADITIONAL

Those seeking to erode U.S. influence and power by employing unconventional methods, such as:

Those seeking to paralyze U.S. leadership and power by employing WMD or WMD-like effects in surprise attacks on symbolic, critical or other high-value targets, such as:

Likelihood: very highVulnerability: moderate, if not effectively checked

9-11 (11 September 2001)Terrorist use of WMDRogue missile attack

Likelihood: moderate & increasingVulnerability: unacceptable; single event could alter American way of life

Those seeking to challenge U.S. power by military operations, such as:

Conventional air, sea, and land attacksNuclear forces of established nuclear powers

Likelihood: decreasing (absent pre-emption) due to historic capability-overmatch and expanding qualitative lead Vulnerability: low, if transformation is balanced

Likelihood: low, but time works against U.S.Vulnerability: unknown; strategic surprise puts US security at risk

Those seeking to usurp U.S. power and influence by acquiring breakthrough capabilities, such as:

Cyber-operationsSensorsBiotechnologyMiniaturization on the molecular levelSpaceDirected-energy and other emerging fields

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 30 Dec 2004

DoD CI must be capable of operating throughout the entire spectrDoD CI must be capable of operating throughout the entire spectrum…um…Source: National Defense Strategy (March 2005)

• The National Defense Strategy emphasizes “the importance of influencing events before

challenges become more dangerous and less manageable” — CI provides a critical operational capability in influencing desired strategic outcomes

24

• The key players in defense counterintelligence —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

OSD (USD/I) provides policy, planning guidance, and oversight

Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA)… established 2002– CI Program Management, analytical services & CI integration – DoD focal point for National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)– Consolidates many DoD-level CI activities under one umbrella…

e.g., JCAG, JCITA, DoDPI, FPRG, DCIIS Program Office, etc.

Military Departments– Army (INSCOM & 650th MI)… intelligence approach — reports to Army G2 – Air Force (OSI)… law enforcement approach — reports to USAF IG– Navy (NCIS)… law enforcement approach — reports to SECNAV * – USMC (Tactical CI)… intelligence approach — reports to Dir of Intelligence

Defense Agencies/DoD Components with internal CI resources – NGA, NSA, NRO, DIA, Joint Staff (J2-CI), DTRA, DSS, and MDA

Combatant Commands… CISOs are the CI focal point

DoD CounterintelligenceThe Players…DoD CounterintelligenceThe Players…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 May2002Updated 1 June 2005

DoD Counterintelligence DoD Counterintelligence –– Global FootprintGlobal Footprint* CI Policy issues through Dir of Naval Intelligence IAW SECNAVINST 5520.3B

CISO = Counterintelligence Staff Officer • Current structure and organization of defense counterintelligence —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

• Advise & Assist DUSD (CI & S) on CI Matters

• Monitor & Evaluate CI Functional Areas and CI Support Functions

• Review & Evaluate reforms within DoD CI

DoDI 5240.10

TFCICA

J2X

• PACOM• EUCOM• SOCOM• JFCOM

• NORTHCOM• SOUTHCOM• TRANSCOM• CENTCOM• STRATCOM *

Combatant CommandsSECDEF

USD-Intel

Army

• FCIP & JMIP Program Management• Defense CI Transformation & Integration • Common Operating Picture• Counterintelligence Campaigns• CI Training & Professional Development

NavyAir Force USMCDAMI-CDCINSCOM650th MIGTactical CI~ CI – Intel

NCIS~ CI & Law Enf

AFOSI~ CI & Law Enf

USMC CI~ CI – Intel

Services

Defense Agencies (with organic CI capabilities)

DoDD 5105.67

Commanders

J2

CISO(CI Staff Officer)

JTF

Joint Pub 2-01.2

Counterintelligence CommunityDepartment of Defense…Counterintelligence CommunityDepartment of Defense…

Command & ControlCI Coordination

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 11 Nov 2002Updated 16 April 2004

DIA/CI NSA/CI NRO/CI NGA/CI DTRA/CI MDA/CI DSS/CIDIA NSA NRO DTRANGA MDA DSS

DUSDCI & Security

DoD CI Community

G2 (HQDA)

at Corp/Division

Defense Agencies do

not necessarily report

directly to SECDEF

DoDD 5240.2

J2X PACOMEUCOMJFCOM

J2/CI J2X

J2 CJCS

CI Directorate CIFADefense CI Board

* Note: CISO (CS551) not under J2

Centralized ManagementDecentralized Execution

SOCOMCENTCOMSOUTHCOM

Under Marine Corps Intel Command

25

• As defined by EO 12333, counterintelligence is “information” and “activities conducted” …hence DoD counterintelligence is both knowledge and action —

o Knowledge of adversaries’ intelligence activities and related threats o Action to hinder, frustrate, and exploit those activities

• Aligning with PDD-75, DoD counterintelligence transitioned from a functions-based to a

mission-based approach… four core mission areas (see Appendix B) —

o CI Support to Force Protection (FP), includes Combating Terrorism (CbT) o CI Support to Research & Technology Protection (RTP) o CI Support to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) o CI Support to Information & Capabilities Protection (ICP), includes

Countering Clandestine & Covert Threats (C3T) • C3T often referred to as “classic counterintelligence” includes counterespionage (CE)

activities… C3T today is more inclusive than previous notions of CE

Counterespionage that aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities

— Joint Pub 1-02 (30 Nov 2004) • Defense Counterintelligence Core Mission Areas & Counterintelligence Functions —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Support to Critical Infrastructure Protection

CI Support toForce Protection (FP)

CI Support to Research& Technology Protection

CI Support to Information& Capabilities Protection (ICP) *

DoD CounterintelligenceMission Areas & Functions — CI Matrix…DoD CounterintelligenceMission Areas & Functions — CI Matrix…

CI Functions

Forward Presence…

Forward Presence…

…Global Reach

…Global Reach

DoD Counterintelligence will develop, implement and maintain seamless, proactive capability and mechanisms to identify, understand, anticipate and prioritize threats within all four CI mission areas and to plan & execute integrated offensive & defensive CI activities that prevent, deter, neutralize, or exploit those threats

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 Dec 2002Updated 1 March 2005

* Includes countering clandestine and covert threats (C3T), including classic counterintelligence — countering espionage (deter & catch spies)Note: definitions for CI Mission Areas and CI Functions at Appendix A & B

Inve

stiga

tions

Colle

ction

Opera

tions

Anal

ysis

& Pr

oduc

tion

CI S

ervic

es

See Appendix A for additional information on the CI functions

26

• High level view of defense counterintelligence —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Mission Areas

Ad hoc Tasking / RFIs

CollectionOperationsInvestigationsFunc Svcs

DoD CI… High Level ViewDoD CI… High Level View

STAK

EHO

LDER

S –DEC

ISION

MA

KER

S –CU

STOM

ERS –U

SERS

CI Functions• Investigations• Collection• Operations• Analysis & Production• CI Functional Services

CI Functions• Investigations• Collection• Operations• Analysis & Production• CI Functional Services

ClientsSECDEFDep SECDEFUSD-IDUSD (CI&S)Cbt CmdsJoint StaffMilitary Svcs• Army• USAF• Navy• USMCDef AgenciesJTFsCIFA

DNINCIXCIAFBIDoJDHSDoSNSCCongress

Field Agents

Counterintelligence (CI)Information gathered and activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities

— EO 12333 (4 Dec 1981)

PDD 75

National CI Strategy

DoD CI MissionDetect, identify, assess, exploit, or counteract the current andfuture threats to DoD personnel, information, research, technology,assets, and other U.S. national security interests IAW EO 12333and as defined by the SECDEF and in support of the DNI

DoD CI Strategy

Event DrivenRequirement Driven

CollectionOperationsInvestigationsFunc Svcs

Prepared by Mark L Reagan, 12 Feb 2004Updated 11 Jun 2005

COPCommon Operating Picture

Understand the MeaningStructure Judgment

ActionableIntelligence

Strategic Goals • Support SECDEF, Combatant Commander, Service & DNI priorities & missions

• Proactively mitigate adversaries & competitors• Maintain DoD advantages• Avoid strategic surprise• Achieve horizontal & vertical integration • Respond to the emergence of developing threats

Strategic Goals • Support SECDEF, Combatant Commander, Service & DNI priorities & missions

• Proactively mitigate adversaries & competitors• Maintain DoD advantages• Avoid strategic surprise• Achieve horizontal & vertical integration • Respond to the emergence of developing threats

Formal Requirements

CI Spt to Force Protection

CI Support to RTP

CI Support to CIP

CI Support to ICP / C3T*

* ICP = Information & Capabilities Protection / C3T = Countering Clandestine and Covert Threats

• Timely• Tailored• Digestible• Clear

• Timely• Tailored• Digestible• Clear

Global Focus

• National Defense Strategy (NDS)• National Military Strategy (NMS)• Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)• DoD Directive 5240.1• DoD Directive 5240.2• DoD Directive 5240.6• DoD Directive 5240.10• DoD Directive 5200.39

• National Security Strategy (NSS)• Nat’l Strategy for Combating Terrorism• Nat’l Strategy for Homeland Security• Nat’l Strategy for Physical Protection

of Critical Infrastructure & Key Assets• Nat’l Strategy to Secure Cyberspace• Nat’l Strategy to Combat WMD

Mission – Based Approach

“Astute analysis is the critical enabler foreffective CI investigations, operations,collection, and most of the functional services…” — DoD CI Strategy

DoD Counterintelligence… more integrated, agile, and effective tDoD Counterintelligence… more integrated, agile, and effective than ever beforehan ever before

MANAGEMENT

INTEGRATED

Detecting & disrupting existing & emerging threats to DoD…

Transnational terroristsForeign Intel & Security SvcsLoss of critical technologies

Insider threatsProliferation of WMDEmerging threats…

• Defense CI works closely with its national security partners… the FBI and CIA —

“The Secretary of Defense will conduct counterintelligence activities in support of DoD components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the SECDEF and the Attorney General.” — Executive Order 12333

• DoD CI executes its global mission throughout the spectrum of conflict… peace, crisis,

pre-hostilities, war, and post-hostilities

• Defense CI… timely, responsive, and effective CI support to the warfighters is paramount • DoD decision makers increasingly rely on and demand full-spectrum counterintelligence

capabilities… counterintelligence is a key component of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) • CI a unique and critical capability for the successful execution of DoD’s national security

mission… an operational capability for defense decision makers and the warfighters

_______________

“DoD Counterintelligence is a strategic capability, a weapon and a profession that is transforming to meet the complex threats of the 21st century” 38

________________________

38 Roy L. Reed and Anthony D. McIvor, “Making the Case: Counterintelligence as a Strategic Asset,” American Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer 2004), pg. 52.

27

Closing Thoughts… • Need to think the unthinkable —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Most fundamental to counterintelligence — as true today as ever –is the need to ‘think the unthinkable.’ Yet this is one of the most difficult attitudes to instill and maintain because it runs contrary to human nature, especially in open societies like the United States. … thinking the unthinkable is not easier, but it is just as critical to our national security.

As we proceed to face the counterintelligence threat of the 21st century, we are faced with a host of challenges: some new, others ancient and deeply rooted in human weakness, and some not yet even invented.

— Honorable Richard Shelby (18 May 2001)Chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Counterintelligence In closing…Counterintelligence In closing…

Source: “Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st Century,” May 18, 2001, Heritage Lectures (No. 705), The Heritage Foundation

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 8 May 2003

• In summary —

Counterintelligence, then, is a strategic instrument available to states to protect themselves and advance their interests in the struggle for power, wealth, and influence. …But the end product, the mission of counterintelligence, is action—action to protect against foreigners and action to manipulate foreigners in the service of national goals. Few counterintelligence practitioners get a chance to develop and implement plans to neutralize a whole [foreign intelligence] service, whether in a given area or worldwide. It takes vision, leadership, commitment, knowledge, and patience from the top of the counterintelligence establishment to do more than just arrest spies or run double-agent operations. Disrupting, neutralizing, or manipulating a foreign service does not bring counterintelligence practitioners public acclaim or even short-term private satisfaction, since it takes time, even years, to run its course… Nevertheless, this is the mission—to understand the total foreign intelligence threat rather than fragments of it, and to exploit that knowledge to undermine foreign intelligence operatives for advantage. …Counterintelligence, in all its aspects, is essential to the symbiosis that makes for first-class intelligence. 39 — Roy Godson (1995)

________________________ 39 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence, Brassey’s,

Washington (1995), pp. 238-240.

28

• Early view as valid then as it is today —

_______________

Counterintelligence — a strategic enabler and a national asset

“Counterintelligence is a never-ending necessity…”

— James Hansen, former CIA & DIA (2004)

Counterintelligence A word from the wise…

BBee ggeenneerroouuss wwiitthh ccoouunntteerriinntteelllliiggeennccee

—- SSuunn TTzzuu cciirrccaa 550000 BB..CC..

Quote cited by Angelo Codevilla in Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century

29

Appendix A – The Traditional Counterintelligence Functions

Introduction

• Investigations… catching traitors who spy for foreign intelligence services, or assist international terrorists, or commit other national security crimes

• Operations… wide range of actions to hinder, frustrate, and exploit foreign intelligence

efforts and other foreign clandestine and covert activities damaging to national security • Collection… obtaining information about foreign intelligence services, other clandestine

and covert activities, as well as international terrorist groups/networks • Analysis & Production… assimilating, evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating

information of CI relevancy – a critical enabler providing insights into the threat • CI Functional Services… other CI activities that support other intelligence or operational

activities, including specialized defensive CI services such as Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM),40 polygraph/credibility assessment services, behavioral sciences, and cyber services, e.g., digital forensics, cyber vulnerability assessments, etc.

An overview of CI Investigations, Operations, Collection, and Analysis follows.

__________________________

CI functions are interrelated — operations can spawn espionage investigations; espionage investigations support collection and analysis activities;

and collection and analysis are essential to the development of CI operations

________________ 40 TSCM are specialized techniques and measures to detect and nullify a wide variety of technologies used to obtain unauthorized

national security information; protects against technical surveillance efforts — the use of electronic or mechanical monitoring devices or systems to obtain sensitive information without the knowledge or consent of the parties concerned.

Adversary intelligence

activities and other

clandestine & covert threats

Investigations

CI Functional Services

Operations

Collection

Analysis & Production

CI Full array of active and passive (offensive & defensive) measures to protect friendly activities from adversary exploitation and manipulation

30

Counterintelligence Investigations

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI InvestigationsDefined…CI InvestigationsDefined…

Investigations includes inquiries and other activities undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power for espionage, treason, spying, sedition, subversion, sabotage, assassinations, international terrorist activities, and action to neutralize such activities.

— DoDD 5240.2

The systematic collection of information regarding a person or group which is, or may be, engaged in espionage or other clandestine intelligence activity, sabotage, or international terrorist activities conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign powers, organizations, or persons. — CI Community Lexicon, NACIC, June 2000

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 May 2003

Operations

Collection

Analysis

CI FunctionsInvestigations

CI investigations seek to identify spies & others who commit natCI investigations seek to identify spies & others who commit national security crimes…ional security crimes…

“The thankless and exhausting task of tracking down a traitor always seems much easier in retrospect than in prospect. The clues always seem so obvious — but only after the hunt has caught its prey.” — Markus Wolf, Former Director HVA (‘58-’87) East German Intelligence Service (Stasi)

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI InvestigationsCI Investigations

“Counterintelligence doesn’t end with uncovering and finally catching the foreign spy [or] the US traitor. It ends only

when there is enough hard evidence to arrest, successfully prosecute and convict the spy — or turn him (or her) into a

double agent working against his foreign handlers.”

— S. Eugene Poteat, CIA (Retired)

Source: S. Eugene Poteat, “Counterintelligence Spy vs. Spy, Traitor vs. Traitor,” American Intelligence Journal, Winter 2000-2001 (p. 57)

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 28 Jan 2004

31

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

DoD CI Investigations… High LevelDoD CI Investigations… High Level

PolicyStrategy

Counterintelligence to the EdgeCounterintelligence to the EdgePrepared by Mark L Reagan – 22 April 2004

Supports 4 core mission areas

• CI Support to FP• CI Support to RTP

DecisionMakers

DecisionMakers

Event

EO 12333PDD 24 & PDD 75DoDD 5240.2 & DoDI 5240.4DCID 5/1 & CIA/DoD MOAFBI/DoD MOU

TypeSource

Create CI KnowledgeCI

KnowledgeBase

• INCIDENT• SUBJECT• UNSUB

Coordination

• Stop the Rupture• Identify the Threat• Exploit and/or

Neutralize the Threat• Preserve Evidence

CASE

MGMT

Inv GoalsInv Priority

• Access of SUBJECT• Impact on DoD operations,

critical technologies & FP• Ongoing vs. Terminated Activity• Known vs. Unknown Subject• Certainty of FIS or Int’l

Terrorist Involvement• Resources: unforeseen

contingency requirements

CI Investigative Results Contribute to:

• CI Support to CIP• CI Support to ICP/C3T

Feedback

PreliminaryInquiry Open

Case

Activities undertaken to include inquiries to determine whether a particular person is acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power for espionage, treason, spying, sedition, subversion, sabotage, assassinations, international terrorist activities, and action to neutralize such activities.

National Security Investigationsunder DoD CI jurisdiction & authority

— DoD Directive 5240.2

DetermineJurisdiction

EspionageTreasonSpyingSeditionSubversionSabotageAssassinationsInt’l Terrorist

ActivitiesCI aspects of –• Illegal Tech

Transfer• Security Issues

incl UnauthorizedDisclosures

• Cyber Issues & Computer Intrusions

Develop IPDevelop IP Execute IPExecute IP

Consult/Coordinate w/ Servicing JudgeAdvocate/Legal CounselCoordinate w/FBI, CIA, CIFA,et al, as requiredDetermine ResourcesRequirementsAssign Lead InvestigatorCoordinate for AnalyticalSupport (assign to team or external support)

Resolve AllegationPass adequate info to responsible officials for determining judicial, non-judicial, administrative, or policy actions; and/orCase Mgmt/Control Officetransfers, suspends, terminates or closes case

———————————Support ProsecutionSupport Damage Assessment

Conduct InvestigationRecords ChecksInterviewsNational Security LettersSpecial Inv Techniques– Search & Seizure– Physical Surveillance– Electronic Surveillance– Uncover Operations

Develop Probative EvidencePolygraph ExaminationInvestigative ReportsApprehension/Arrest

ArchiveArchiveEnd InvEnd Inv

Finalize ROILessons LearnedIIRs as appropriateTransfer recordsto archives / records repository

Investigative Plan (IP)

Gather information to prove/disprove allegations and/or to support initiation of CE activities

ReferralsSensitive Sources Operations Other InvestigationsCE ProjectsIncident Reports (SAEDA)Polygraph ReferralsSuspicious Activity ReportsCall-In (Spy Hot Line)

Enhance

National Security

FeedbackIdentification & elimination of security vulnerabilitiesAssessment of damage to DoD & National SecurityImprovement of overall DoD security posture

CIFAInvestigations

CIFAInvestigations

• DoD focal point for receiving info and monitoring significant CI activities and instances of espionage Defense-wide

• Inform Senior DoD Leadershipon significant CI activities

• Maintain robust dialog, liaison& coordination w/ FBI & CIA

• Host DoD Integrated Mgmt Group – Investigations (IMG-I)

COPCommon Operating Picture

CIA FBI

National Security StrategyNat’l Strategy for Cbt TerrorismNational Military StrategyNational CI StrategyDoD CI Strategy

Process

See “Execute Investigative Plan” for next level drill down…

Process

“You don’t catch spies by thinking like lawyers.”

— Mark Hulkower, Assistant U.S. Attorney General (circa 1995) Aldrich Ames Prosecution Team

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Espionage is a crime almost devoid of evidence…Espionage is a crime almost devoid of evidence…

— Peter Wright, Former Asst Director MI5

ESPIONAGE ??

ESPIONAGE ??

? ?

???

CI InvestigationsCI Investigations

extraordinarilyextraordinarilycomplex missioncomplex mission

Detecting, exploiting and defeating espionageDetecting, exploiting and defeating espionage

* As quoted in Spy Catcher by Peter Wright (1987) Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 May 2003

32

Counterintelligence Operations

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI OperationsDefined…CI OperationsDefined…

Actions taken against foreign intelligence services to counter espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities damaging to national security

Actions taken to “…to negate, confuse, deceive, subvert, monitor, or control the clandestine collection operations of foreign governments or agencies”

— DoDD 5240.2

— CI Community LexiconNACIC, June 2000

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 May 2003

Operations

Collection

Analysis

CI FunctionsInvestigations

Activities taken to hinder multidisciplinary activities of foreign intelligence and security services, and to cause FIS to doubt the validity of its own analysis

— AR 381-20

Counterintelligence Special Operations: direct engagement with known or suspected FIS through human source or technical efforts; includes offensive counterintelligence operations, counterespionage projects, defensive source programs, and investigative special techniques.

Counterintelligence Special Operations: direct engagement with known or suspected FIS through human source or technical efforts; includes offensive counterintelligence operations, counterespionage projects, defensive source programs, and investigative special techniques.

— AR 381-20

Focus of offensive counterintelligence is disruption of the adveFocus of offensive counterintelligence is disruption of the adversary service…rsary service…

————————

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Proactive activities designed to identify, exploit, neutralize, or deter foreign intelligence collection and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense (DOD).

CI Operations are conducted to:

• Manipulate, disrupt, neutralize, and/or destroy the effectiveness of foreign intelligence activities; • Recruit or induce defection of foreign intelligence officers and personnel; • Collect threat information on foreign intelligence operations, modus operandi, intelligence

requirements, targeting, objectives, personalities, communications, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities;

• Provide information and operations databases to support decision makers; • Provide counterintelligence support to clandestine human intelligence operations; • Identify post, ongoing, or planned espionage; • Support force protection, operations other than war, and peacekeeping; • Acquire foreign intelligence espionage equipment for analysis and countermeasures development; • Develop operational data, threat data, and espionage leads for future CI operations, investigations,

and projects and develop the potential of these leads to enhance DoD security overall; and • Support specific Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD, and national plans.

CI OperationsAs defined in JP 1-02…CI OperationsAs defined in JP 1-02…

Source: Joint Pub 1-02Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 5 October 2004

Operations

Collection

Analysis

CI FunctionsInvestigations

— DoD Dictionary (Joint Pub 1-02)

33

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Counterintelligence operations consist of obtaining and analyzing information on the adversary and then using it against him in accordance with the requirements of the situation and in light of our knowledge of his practices and psychological outlook.

An ideal counterintelligence system anticipates the enemy’s move, notionally satisfies his needs, and indeed operates a notional intelligence service for him.

CI OperationsAn early view… CI OperationsAn early view…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 26 March 2005

Operations

Collection

Analysis

CI FunctionsInvestigations

— “Countersabotage—A Counterintelligence Function” by Eric W. Timm, Studies in Intelligence, V7: 2 (Spring 1963), pg. 67

—————————

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

The use of double agents… a time-honored method both of deception and of counterespionage.

The use of double agents… a time-honored method both of deception and of counterespionage.

The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945by J.C. Masterman, Yale University Press (1972)

CI OperationsOne type…CI OperationsOne type…

Double Agent: an agent who is cooperating with an intelligence service of one government on behalf of and under the control of an intelligence or security service of another government, and is manipulated by [the former] to the detriment of the [latter].

— Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions (1978)issued by the Intelligence Community Staff, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 5 April 2004

Double agents “can serve as excellent channels through which misleading information can flow to the enemy. So double agents serve both as collectors of positive intelligence and channels for deception.”

— Senate Report 94~755 *

* Source: “Foreign and Military Intelligence – Book I, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities United States Senate (26 April 1976), p. 169

_____________ For additionally information on double agents see “Observations on the Double Agent” by John P. Dimmer, Jr., Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1962), pp. 57-72; declassified (originally classified Secret); available on line at http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/Default.htm.

34

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945by J.C. Masterman, Yale University Press (1972) p.8

CI OperationsSample of DA Objectives…CI OperationsSample of DA Objectives…

• Control adversary espionage and by doing so, in effect make them work for you

• Identify, neutralize, or suppress new agents and spies• Secure information on the personnel and methods of

the adversary service• Secure access to adversary codes and ciphers• Secure indication of the adversary's intentions• Lead, divert, or direct the enemy’s intentions• Use DAs systematically as deception channels

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 5 April 2004

Double agent Double agent –– a condoned channel of communication with the enemya condoned channel of communication with the enemy

————————–

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Through the use of double agents, the U.S. intelligence community is able to identify hostile intelligence services’:

• operatives and agents, • “tradecraft”,• electronic and photography eavesdropping capabilities, and• sources and methods of operations.

In some cases, double agent operations have resulted the arrest of hostile intelligence officers….

Another goal… is to discourage hostile intelligence agencies from accepting “walk-ins”, who come to them offering their services.

— Naval Investigative Service Command *

CI OperationsSample of DA Goals…CI OperationsSample of DA Goals…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 5 April 2004

Source: Espionage, Naval Investigative Service Command pamphlet, undated (circa 1989), Department of the Navy, p. 24

* Currently known as the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)

35

• Access Agents — “another method of identifying and keeping track of suspected intelligence personnel is to recruit people close to suspects”

[CI] operators can seek out secretaries, janitors, chauffeurs, interpreters, neighbors, or friends and request that they pass on information about the target’s predilections and behavior.41 — Roy Godson

• Penetration Operations42 are conducted to penetrate adversary intelligence services to —

o Gain direct knowledge of operations against oneself, as well as to o Gain insights into the foreign intelligence services’ policy and other activities

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI OperationsAnother type… CI OperationsAnother type…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 March 2005

Conducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting iConducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the darkn the dark

…counterespionage has one purpose which transcends all others in importance: penetration. …The only way to be sure that an enemy has been contained is to know his plans in advance and in detail. Moreover, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated. …Conducting CE with penetrations is like shooting fish in a barrel. The famous case of Col. Oleg Penkovskiy… illustrates the great value of penetrations. There can never be enough of them.

— “Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence” by Austin B. Matschulat, Studies in Intelligence, V13: 2 (Spring 1969), pg. 29-30

Penetration: the recruitment of agents within or the infiltration of agents, or the introduction of technical monitoring devices into an organization, group, physical facility for the purpose of acquiring information or influencing its activities.

[One of the most effective is known as a] Recruitment in Place (RIP): an official who overtly continues to work for his government and clandestinely provides information of intelligence value to a foreign government. …[most often] connected with a foreign government’s intelligence service.

— Counterintelligence Community Lexicon, NACIC, June 2000

_________________

Penetration… a time-honored espionage practice

Oh what a tangled web we weave…

_____________ 41 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence, Brassey’s, Washington

(1995), pp. 218-219. 42 For open source information on penetrations see “Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence” by Austin B.

Matschulat, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 25-36; declassified (originally classified Secret); available on line at http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/Default.htm.

36

Counterintelligence Collection

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI CollectionDefined…CI CollectionDefined…

The systemic acquisition of information concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and related foreign activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities, organizations, or persons and that are directed against or threaten DoD interests.

— DoDD 5240.2 (27 May 1997)

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 May 2003Updated 5 May 2004

Operations

Collection

Analysis

CI FunctionsInvestigations

CI collection feeds analysis and is used to formulate force protCI collection feeds analysis and is used to formulate force protection and security policy, plans, ection and security policy, plans, & procedures, as well as assists intel collection operations and& procedures, as well as assists intel collection operations and CI investigations & operationsCI investigations & operations

Activities designed to acquire / collect / assimilate information on foreign intelligence services, terrorism, and related security threats. Information is collected from open sources, from liaison contacts, from indigenous sources, and from personal observation.

— An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide, DIA, 1994 edition, page 38

• CI collection is the systematic acquisition of intelligence information using CI resources to answer validated CI collection requirements

• Collection is a continuous process driven by validated requirements

• Two key components of CI collection are collection requirements management (CRM)

and collection operations management (COM)… two distinct but interrelated processes

o The CRM process determines what will be collected and by which discipline o The COM process determines how a requirement will be answered and the

execution of the collection activity

• CI collection is critical in addressing gaps in developing and updating a common operating picture (COP) on foreign intelligence threats and related activities

• CI collection supports operational planning, policy-making, decision-making, intelligence

production, and the maintaining & updating of counterintelligence databases

37

Counterintelligence Analysis

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Analysis Defined…CI Analysis Defined…

CI analysis is the function of assimilating, evaluating, and interpreting information pertaining to areas of counterintelligence proponency and responsibility. Information derived from all sources is considered and integrated in the analytical process.

CI analysis is the function of assimilating, evaluating, and interpreting information pertaining to areas of counterintelligence proponency and responsibility. Information derived from all sources is considered and integrated in the analytical process.

— Joint Pub 2-01.2 & DIA Reg 51-12

Identify the “threat” so decision makers can act decisivelyIdentify the “threat” so decision makers can act decisivelyPrepared by Mark L Reagan – 7 May 2003

Updated 27 Jan 2004

Operations

Collection

Analysis

CI FunctionsInvestigations

—————————

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI AnalysisCI’s Critical Component…CI AnalysisCI’s Critical Component…

CI analysis a critical enabler for Defense CI…CI analysis a critical enabler for Defense CI…Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 28 Jan 2004

Strategic analysis allows DoD CI to understand today’s risk environment. Long term analysis yields the requisite insights to

predict threats to DoD assets in the mid term and distant future and relies on integrating the CI functions to “connect the dots.” A strategic

analytical capability allows the Department to learn and use an adversary’s pressure points to influence its actions.

— DoD Counterintelligence Strategy FY 2004 (16 Dec 2003)

38

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Kb

PolicyStrategy

Requirements

DoD CI AnalysisHigh Level View…DoD CI AnalysisHigh Level View…

Prepared by Mark L Reagan ~ 5 Jan 2004Updated 16 June 2004

Clients

Process

Create CI KnowledgeCreate CI Knowledge

Supports 4 CoreMission Areas

• CI Support to FP• CI Support to RTP• CI Support to CIP• CI Support to ICP/C3T

Analyst

Technology /IT Capabilities

TASK

MGMT

DecisionMakers

DecisionMakers

Event

Ad hoc Taskings / RFIse.g., 8 Standing CI Collection Requirements

Formal…

TA

SK

MG

MT

Analytical Process

Right information, in the right context,to the right user, at the right time…

enhancing national security

CI analysis is the function of assimilating, evaluating, and interpreting information pertaining to areas of counterintelligence proponency and responsibility. Information derived from all sources is considered and integrated in the analytical process.

— Joint Pub 2-01.2 & DIA Reg 51-12

COPCommon Operating Picture

ActionableIntelligenceActionableIntelligence

• Timely• Tailored• Digestible• Clear

• Timely• Tailored• Digestible• Clear

See “Analysis – Synthesis Modeling Process” for next level drill down…

Data

EO 12333PDD 24 & PDD 75DoDD 5240.2 & DoDI 5240.4DCID 5/1 & CIA/DoD MOAFBI/DoD MOU

National Security StrategyNat’l Strategy Cbt TerrorismNational Military StrategyNational CI StrategyDoD CI Strategy

• Assimilate Information• Analyze/Synthesize Info

(understand the meaning)

• Collaborate• Apply Judgment — Assemble hypotheses

— Identify reasonable alternatives– Test against available evidence– Explore implications– Structure argumentation– Seek add’tl evidence to: confirm / reinforce / eliminate– Evaluate & Interpret

Data Acquire & Ingest Organize & Fuse

Clear, digestible explanation with evidence

ActionableIntelligenceActionableIntelligence

• CI Collection• CI Investigations• CI Operations• CI Functional Svcs

—————————–

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

AnalysisWorkflow interactions…AnalysisWorkflow interactions…

CIkb

Interactive Analytical

Tools

QUERY

NeedsIssues

HypothesisModel – Simulation

PROBLEM ORGANIZE

All SourceData

CREATE / DECIDE

VIEW FOCUS

Raw Data

EXPLORECREATERETRIEVE

SET UP

DECIDE

refinerefine

DecisionModels

AnalyticJudgments

PublishResults

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 6 May 2004

• Frame problem• Identify information sources• Define explicit query,

question and search terms• Collect & store data• Organize & index

• Link relevant data (evidence)• Correlate & combine data• Set automated reasoning parameters• View correlated data• Induce new patterns• Deduce known patterns

• Create possible meanings• Synthesize hypotheses –• immerse in explicit models • and simulations• Explore implications• Commit to analytical judgments

wide variety of analytic tools to compare and combine data elements to identify relationships and marshal evidence against hypotheses

Auto DataFusion & Mining

automated data combination services — process high-volume data to bring detections of known patterns and discoveries of interesting patterns

EXPLORATIONEXPLORATION REASONINGREASONING SENSEMAKINGSENSEMAKING DECISION / JUDGMENTDECISION / JUDGMENTSearch, navigate, query, organize, and explore (browse) data

Query for knowledge, create & structure hypothesis arguments; test hypothesis against data

Explore, evaluate, and compare alternative hypotheses; assign meaning

Evaluate course of actions and consequences of decisions; weigh decision alternatives; determine risk

Decision Makers&

CI Users

TOOLS

TOOLS

• Ontology creation• Extraction (content,

concepts, & relationships• Conversion (content translation)• Data /text clustering• Summarize, abstract, &

categorize• Search, filter, monitor db

or web site changes

• Data /text mining (pattern discovery)• Data /text fusion (pattern detection

and content tracking)• Change detection • Link analysis• Problem-solving knowledge retrieval• Temporal-Spatial mapping & analysis

changes

• Modeling & simulation forimmersion & exploration

• Trend & forecast analysis• Structure argumentation• Alternative hypothesis

comparison• Creativity support; promotes

inductive discovery

• Modeling & simulation for COAand consequence comparison

• Risk analysis• Utility analysis• Alternative decision comparison

Adapted from Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise by Ed Waltz (2003) with permission

______________

Astute analysis is a critical enabler for effective CI investigations, operations, collection, and most of the functional services…

— Defense Counterintelligence Strategy

39

Appendix B – Four Core Defense Counterintelligence Mission Areas

• Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection, includes Combating Terrorism (CbT) —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Mission Areas

CI Support to Force Protection (FP) CI Support to Force Protection (FP)

FOCUS: CI activities that contribute to the protection of DoD personnel and their families from acts of terrorism, sabotage, and assassination. CI support extends to forces in CONUS and those stationed, deployed, or in transit abroad.

PRIMARY CONCERN: combating terrorism (CbT), to include the activities that precede and support terrorist attacks—the activities of Foreign Intelligence & Security Services (FISS) in aiding or abetting terrorists are of particular concern. Also includes –– activities to detect & prevent impending sabotage & assassination against DoD personnel/assets;– activities related to the identification and mitigation of threats posed by organized criminal groups,

illicit weapons dealers, and drug traffickers.

EMPLOYS: full range of CI activities to identify and thwart clandestine and covert foreign elements that seek to harm US forces. It incorporates a significant portion of the base CI program, primarily at the field level.

INTEGRATION: DoD CI activities in this mission area are integrated and synchronized with other efforts across the U.S. Government that contribute to FP and CbT, including physical and operational security, personal protective services, and intelligence activities.

CI Spt to Force ProtectionCI Support to RTP

CI Support to CIP

CI Support to ICP / C3T

Preserves DoD capabilities by preventing losses, providing inforPreserves DoD capabilities by preventing losses, providing information to focus mation to focus security efforts, and defeating or neutralizing clandestine FP tsecurity efforts, and defeating or neutralizing clandestine FP threats hreats

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 30 March 2004Updated 2 Jan 2005

• Counterintelligence Support to Research and Technology Protection —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Support to Research and Technology Protection (RTP)CI Support to Research and Technology Protection (RTP)

FOCUS: CI efforts to protect highly technical information, know-how, weaponry, and manufacturing processes associated with DoD research, development, technology, and evaluation (RDT&E) and designated acquisition programs; also includes CI activities to protect sensitive technical information and technologies on fielded systems.

PRIMARY CONCERN: preventing the loss of critical program information (CPI) or materiel that could be exploited to degrade US combat effectiveness or technical superiority, achieve technological surprise, or damage US economic competitiveness.

EMPLOYS: full range of CI activities to identify and counter foreign elements, insiders, and criminal elements that seek to acquire and exploit sensitive information or materiel associated with protected US defense technologies.

INTEGRATION: CI activities in this mission area are executed in close cooperation with acquisition program managers, RDT&E site directors, the defense industrial community, and site security elements.

CI Mission AreasCI Spt to Force Protection

CI Support to RTP

CI Support to CIP

CI Support to ICP / C3T

Preserves DoD advanced technology capabilities from adversary coPreserves DoD advanced technology capabilities from adversary collection and exploitation llection and exploitation Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 30 March 2004

Updated 2 Jan 2005

40

• Counterintelligence Support to Critical Infrastructure Protection —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Support to Critical InfrastructureProtection (CIP) CI Support to Critical InfrastructureProtection (CIP)

FOCUS: CI efforts to protect infrastructures that DoD designates as critical to DoD mission success; includes physical and cyber components, within CONUS and OCONUS, and aligned with the Combatant Command responsibilities.

PRIMARY CONCERNS: terrorism, cyber attack, sabotage, espionage, and related criminal activity directed against infrastructure elements critical to the accomplishment of US national security objectives.

EMPLOYS: all aspects of CI to identify & counter foreign and domestic elements that seek to:1) acquire sensitive information concerning the critical infrastructures upon which DoD depends;2) exploit that information to disrupt the functions of that infrastructure.

INTEGRATION: CI activities in this mission area are executed in cooperation with facility managers; industry, military and site security elements; and local, state & federal law enforcement.

CI Mission AreasCI Spt to Force Protection

CI Support to RTP

CI Support to CIP

CI Support to ICP / C3T

Preserves DoD’s critical infrastructurePreserves DoD’s critical infrastructurePrepared by Mark L Reagan – 30 March 2004

Updated 2 Jan 2005

• Counterintelligence Support to Information Capabilities Protection (ICP), includes Countering Clandestine and Covert Threats (C3T) —

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

CI Support to Information & Capabilities Protection / Countering Clandestine & Covert Threats

CI Support to Information & Capabilities Protection / Countering Clandestine & Covert Threats

FOCUS: CI activities most closely associated with “classic counterintelligence” as noted in the 1999 Mission Area Analysis of DoD Counterintelligence. – In the past often referred to as “Counterespionage” or “CE” — this mission area is today more

inclusive than previous notions of counterespionage. – Includes countering denial & deception and influencing the actions of adversaries & allies.

PRIMARY CONCERN: protection of US military capabilities (including intelligence & CI capabilities/activities), plans, and operations from espionage and insider threats.

EMPLOYS: integrated CI campaigns, centrally coordinated sets of collection, analysis, investigations, and operations focused on defeating global activities of designated Foreign Intelligence & Security Services (FISS) and/or terrorist groups & networks. Includes counter-espionage, investigations of anomalies, and the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

INTEGRATION: this mission area includes much of the CI base program activity at the strategic and operational levels within the DoD CI community. Incorporates majority of the investigative and operational activity of Defense CI unless or until a linkage to another mission area is clearly established and may incorporate efforts related to FP, RTP, and CIP.

CI Mission AreasCI Spt to Force Protection

CI Support to RTP

CI Support to CIP

CI Support to ICP / C3T

Preserves force capabilities by preventing the compromise of natPreserves force capabilities by preventing the compromise of national ional security information or minimizing the extent and duration of cosecurity information or minimizing the extent and duration of compromisesmpromises

Prepared by Mark L Reagan – 31 March 2004Updated 2 Jan 2005

41

“People who think we don’t need to be vigilant about counterintelligence… are wrong”

— George Tenet, Former DCI

____________ “A wilderness of mirrors,” description of CI attributed to James J. Angleton. It comes from T.S. Eliot’s poem “Gerontion” (1920); available on line at http://www.camdenfamily.com/thunder/framer.cfm?frame=http://www.bartleby.com/199/13.html. Also is the title of a 1980 book about CIA counterintelligence by David C. Martin.

…the practical criticism of ambiguity.

Counterintelligence One final perspective…

— James Jesus Angleton CIA’s Chief of Counterintelligence 1954 to 1974

CCoouunntteerriinntteelllliiggeennccee…… aa wwiillddeerrnneessss ooff mmiirrrroorrss

error: Content is protected !!