?Early Chinese Thought? Course Readings
(R. Eno)

PLATO?S ?EUTHYPHRO?

This version of the Euthyphro is, of course, not my translation. It was composed
in 1986 by comparing and modifying for readability a number of published
translations, whose authors should be credited. However, the record of which
translations were used was long ago lost.

When teaching courses in early Chinese thought, I used the Euthyphro to create a
vastly oversimplified, but very useful portrait of salient features of the analytic
approach that Greek thought made foundational to what I called the
?mainstream? Western tradition. I contrasted this with styles of thought in early
China (in the case of Mohism, there were more parallels than contrasts) to
highlight aspects that may seem, from the standpoint of analytic Western
traditions, relatively unfamiliar, at least in their emphasis.

The way this worked in a classroom setting may be discernable through the
PowerPoint slides that I used in later years.

I. Socra tes a nd Euthyphro meet a t the Porch of King Archon

EUTH. What has happened, Socrates, to make you leave your accustomed pastimes

in the Lyceum and spend your time here today at the King?s Porch? You can
hardly have a suit pending before the King, as I do.

SOC. In Athens, Euthyphro, it is not called a suit, but an indictment.

EUTH. Really? Someone must have indicted you. For I will not suspect you of

indicting someone else.

SOC. Certainly not.

EUTH. But someone you?

SOC. Yes.

EUTH. Who is he?

SOC. I do not know the man well, Euthyphro. It appears he is young and not

prominent. His name, I think, is Meletus. He belongs to the deme of Pitthus,
if you recall a Pitthean Meletus with lanky hair and not much beard, but a
hooked nose.

EUTH. I have not noticed him, Socrates. But what is the charge?

SOC. Charge? One that does him credit, I think. It is no small thing for him, young

as he is, to be knowledgeable in so great a matter, for he says he knows how
the youth are being corrupted and who is corrupting them. No doubt he is

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wise, and realizing that, in my ignorance, I corrupt his comrades, he comes to
the City as to a mother to accuse me. He alone seems to me to have begun his
political career correctly, for the right way to begin is to look after the young
men of the City first so that they will be as good as possible, just as a good
farmer naturally looks after his young plants first and the rest later. So too
with Meletus. He will perhaps first weed out those of us who blight the young
shoots, as he claims, and afterwards he will obviously look after their elders
and become responsible for many great blessings to the City, the natural result
of so fine a beginning.

EUTH. I would hope so, Socrates, but I fear lest the opposite may happen. He seems

to me to have started by injuring the City at its very hearth in undertaking to
wrong you. But tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the youth?

SOC. It sounds a bit strange at first hearing, my friend. He says I am a maker of

gods, and because I make new ones and do not worship the old ones, he
indicted me on their accounts, he says.

EUTH. I see, Socrates. It is because you say the divine sign comes to you from time

to time. So he indicts you for making innovations in religious matters and
hales you into court to slander you, knowing full well how easily such things
are misrepresented to the multitude. Why I, even me, when I speak about
religious matters in the Assembly and foretell the future, why, they laugh at me
as though I were mad. And yet nothing I ever predicted has failed to come
true. Still, they are jealous of people like us. We must not worry about them,
but face them boldly.

SOC. My dear Euthyphro, being laughed at is perhaps a thing of little moment. The

Athenians, it seems to me, do not much mind if they think a man is clever as
long as they do not suspect him of teaching his cleverness to others. But if
they think he makes others like himself they become angry, whether out of
jealousy as you suggest, or for some other reason.

EUTH. On that point I am not very anxious to test their attitude toward me.

SOC. Perhaps they think you give yourself sparingly, that you are unwilling to teach

your wisdom. But I fear my own generosity is such that they think I am willing
to pour myself out in speech to any man–not only without pay, but glad to
pay myself if only someone will listen. So as I just said, if they laugh at me as
you say they do at you, it would not be unpleasant to pass the time in court
laughing and joking. But if they are in earnest, how it will then turn out is
unclear–except to you prophets.

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EUTH. Perhaps it will not amount to much, Socrates: Perhaps you will settle your

case satisfactorily, as I think I will mine.

SOC. What about that, Euthyphro? Are you plaintiff or defendant?

EUTH. Plaintiff.

SOC. Against whom?

EUTH. Someone I am again thought mad to prosecute.

SOC. Really? Has he taken flight?

EUTH. He is far from flying. As a matter of fact, he is well along in years.

SOC. Who is he?

EUTH. My father.

SOC. Your father, dear friend?

EUTH. Yes, indeed.

SOC. But what is the charge? What is the reason for the suit?

EUTH. Murder, Socrates.

SOC. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, the majority of people must be ignorant of what

is right. Not just anyone would undertake a thing like that. It must require
someone quite far gone in wisdom.

EUTH. Very far indeed, Socrates.

SOC. Was the man your father killed a relative? But, of course, he must have been-

you would not be prosecuting him for murder in behalf of a stranger.

EUTH. It is laughable, Socrates, your thinking it makes a difference whether or not

the man was a relative, and not this, and this alone: whether his slayer was
justified. If so, let him off. If not prosecute him, even if he shares your hearth
and table. For if you knowingly associate with a man like that and do not
cleanse both yourself and him by bringing action at law, the pollution is equal
for you both. Now as a matter of fact, the dead man was a day-laborer of mine,
and when we were farming in Naxos he worked for us for hire. Well, he got
drunk and flew into a rage with one of our slaves and cut his throat. So my

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father bound him hand and foot, threw him in a ditch, and sent a man here to
Athens to consult the religious adviser as to what should be done. In the
meantime, my father paid no attention to the man he had bound; he neglected
him because he was a murderer and it made no difference if he died. Which is
just what he did. Before the messenger got back he died of hunger and cold
and his bonds. But even so, my father and the rest of my relatives are angry at
me for prosecuting my father for murder in behalf of a murderer. He did not
kill him, they claim, and even if he did, still, the fellow was a murderer, and it
is wrong to be concerned in behalf of a man like that–and anyway, it is unholy
for a son to prosecute his father for murder. They little know, Socrates, how
things stand in religious matters regarding the holy and the unholy.

SOC. But in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think you yourself know so

accurately how matters stand respecting divine law, and things holy and
unholy, that with the facts as you declare you can prosecute your own father
without fear that it is you, on the contrary, who are doing an unholy thing?

EUTH. I would not be much use, Socrates, nor would Euthyphro differ in any way

from the majority of men, if I did not know all such things as this with strict
accuracy.

SOC. Well then, my gifted friend, I had best become your pupil. Before the action

with Meletus begins I will challenge him on these very grounds. I will say that
even in former times I was much concerned to learn about religious matters,
but that now, in view of his claiming that I am guilty of loose speech and
innovation in these things, I have become your pupil. ?And if, Meletus,? I
shall say, ?if you agree that Euthyphro is wise in such things, then assume that
I worship correctly and drop the case. But if you do not agree, then obtain
permission to indict my teacher here in my place for corrupting the old–me
and his own father–by teaching me, and by chastising and punishing him.?
And if I cannot persuade him to drop charges or to indict you in place of me,
may I not then say the same thing in court that I said in my challenge?

EUTH. By Zeus, if he tried to indict me, I would find his weak spot, I think, and the

discussion in court would concern him long before it concerned me.

II. Socra tes requests a definition of the holy.

SOC. I realize that, my friend. That is why I want to become your pupil. I know that

this fellow Meletus and no doubt other people too pretend not even to notice
you, but he saw through me so keenly and easily that he indicted me for
impiety. So now in Zeus?s name, tell me what you confidently claimed just
now that you knew: what sort of thing do you say the pious and impious are,

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with respect to murder and other things as well? Or is not the holy, just by
itself, the same in every action? And the unholy, in turn, the opposite of all the
holy–is it not like itself, and does not everything which is to be unholy have a
certain single character with respect to unholiness?

EUTH. No doubt, Socrates.

SOC. Then tell me, what do you say the holy is? And what is the unholy?

EUTH. Well, I say that the holy is what I am doing now, prosecuting murder and

temple theft and everything of the sort, whether father or mother or anyone
else is guilty of it. And not prosecuting is unholy. Now, Socrates, examine the
proof I give you that this is a dictate of divine law. I have offered it before to
other people to show that it is established right not to let off someone guilty
of impiety, no matter who he happens to be. For these same people worship
Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods. They agree that he put his
own father in bonds for unjustly swallowing his children; yes, and that that
father had in his turn castrated his father for similar reasons. Yet me they are
angry at for indicting my father for his injustice. So they contradict themselves:
they say one thing about the gods and another about me!

SOC. I wonder if this is why I am being prosecuted, Euthyphro, because when

anyone says such things about the gods, I somehow find it difficult to accept?
Perhaps this is why people claim I transgress. But as it is, if even you who
know such things so well accept them, people like me must apparently
concede. What indeed are we to say, we who ourselves agree that we know
nothing of them. But in the name of Zeus, the God of Friendship, tell me: do
you truly believe that these things happened so?

EUTH. Yes, and things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, things the

multitude does not know.

SOC. Do you believe there is really war among the gods, and terrible enmities and

battles, and other sorts of things our poets tell, which embellish other things
sacred to us through the work of our capable painters, but especially the robe
covered with embroidery that is carried to the Acropolis at the Great
Panathenaea? Are we, Euthyphro, to say those things are so?

EUTH. Not only those, Socrates. As I just said, I shall explain many other things

about religion to you if you wish, and you may rest assured that what you hear
will amaze you.

SOC. I should not be surprised. But explain them another time at your leisure. Right

now, try to answer more clearly the question I just asked. For, my friend, you

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did not sufficiently teach me before, when I asked you what the holy is; you
said that the thing you are doing now is holy, prosecuting your father for
murder.

EUTH. Yes, and I told the truth, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, are there not many other things you say are holy too?

EUTH. Of course there are.

SOC. Do you recall that I did not ask you to teach me about some one or two of the

many things which are holy, but about that characteristic itself by which all
holy things are holy? For you agreed, I think, that it is by one character that
unholy things are unholy and holy things holy. Or do you not recall?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Then teach me what this very character is, so that I may look to it and use it as

a standard by which, should those things which you or someone else may do
be of that sort, I may affirm them to be holy, but should they not be of that
sort, deny it.

EUTH. Well if you wish it so, Socrates, I shall tell you.

III. Euthyphro?s first definition: the holy is wha t is loved by the g ods

EUTH. Then what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.

SOC. Excellent, Euthyphro. You have now answered as I asked. Whether correctly,

I do not yet know–but clearly you will now go on to teach me in addition that
what you say is true.

EUTH. Of course.

SOC. Come then, let us examine what it is we are saying. The thing and the person

dear to the gods is holy; the thing and the person hateful to the gods is unholy;
and the holy is not the same as the unholy, but its utter opposite. Is that what
we are saying?

EUTH. It is.

SOC. Yes, and it appears to be well said?

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EUTH. I think so, Socrates.

SOC. Now, Euthyphro, we also said, did we not, that the gods quarrel and disagree

with one another and that there is enmity among them?

EUTH. We did.

SOC. But what is that disagreement which causes enmity and anger about, my friend?

Look at it this way: If you and I disagreed about a question of number, about
which of two sums is greater, would our disagreement cause us to become
angry with each other and make us enemies? Or would we take to counting in
a case like that, and quickly settle our dispute?

EUTH. Of course we would.

SOC. So too, if we disagreed about a question of the larger or smaller, we would

take to measurement and put an end to our disagreement quickly?

EUTH. True.

SOC. And go to the balance, I imagine, to settle a dispute about heavier and lighter?

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. But what sort of thing would make us enemies, angry at each other, if we

disagree about it and are unable to arrive at a decision? Perhaps you cannot
say offhand, but I suggest you consider whether it would not be the just and
unjust, beautiful and ugly, good and evil. Are not these the things, when we
disagree about them and cannot reach a satisfactory decision, concerning
which we on occasion become enemies–you, and I, and all other men?

EUTH. Yes, Socrates. This kind of disagreement has its source there.

SOC. What about the gods, Euthyphro? If they were to disagree, would they not

disagree for the same reasons?

EUTH. Necessarily.

SOC. Then by your account, my noble friend, different gods must believe that

different things are just–and beautiful and ugly, good and evil. For surely they
would not quarrel unless they disagreed on this. True?

EUTH. You are right.

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SOC. Now, what each of them believes to be beautiful and good and just they also

love, and the opposites of those things they hate?

EUTH. Of course.

SOC. Yes, but the same things, you say, are thought by some gods to be just and by

others unjust. Those are the things concerning which disagreement causes
them to quarrel and make war on one another. True?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Then the same things, it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved by the

gods, and would be both dear to the gods and hateful to the gods.

EUTH. It seems so.

SOC. Then by this account, Euthyphro, the same things would be both holy and

unholy.

EUTH. I suppose so.

SOC. Then you have not answered my question, my friend. I did not ask you what

same thing happens to be both holy and unholy; yet what is dear to the gods is
hateful to the gods, it seems. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if
what you are now doing in punishing your father were dear to Zeus, but
hateful to Cronos and Uranus, and loved by Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera,
and if any of the other gods disagree about it, the same will be true of them
too.

IV. Interlude: The ba ses of disa g reement.

EUTH But Socrates, surely none of the gods disagree about this, that he who kills
another man unjustly should answer for it.

SOC. Really, Euthyphro? Have you ever heard it argued among men that he who

kills unjustly or does anything else unjustly should not answer for it?

EUTH. Why, people never stop arguing things like that, especially in the law courts.

They do a host of wrongs and then say and do everything to get off.

SOC. Yes, but do they admit the wrong, Euthyphro, and admitting it, nevertheless

claim they should not answer for it?

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EUTH. No, they certainly do not do that.

SOC. Then they do not do and say everything: for they do not, I think, dare to

contend or debate the point that if they in fact did wrong they should not
answer for it. Rather, I think, they deny they did wrong. Well?

EUTH. True.

SOC. So they do not contend that those who do wrong should not answer for it, but

rather, perhaps, about who it is that did the wrong, and what he did, and when.

EUTH. True.

SOC. Now is it not also the same with the gods, if as your account has it, they

quarrel about what is just and unjust, and some claim that others do wrong
and some deny it? Presumably no one, god or man, would dare to claim that
he who does a wrong should not answer for it.

EUTH. Yes, on the whole what you say is true, Socrates.

SOC. But I imagine that those who disagree–both men and gods, if indeed the gods

do disagree–disagree about particular things which have been done. They
differ over given actions, some claiming they were done justly and others
unjustly. True?

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Come now, my friend, teach me and make me wiser. Where is your proof that

all gods believe that a man has been unjustly killed who was hired as a laborer,
became a murderer, was bound by the master of the dead slave, and died of
his bonds before the man who bound him could learn from the religious
advisers what to do? Where is your proof that it is right for a son to indict and
prosecute his father for murder on behalf of a man like that? Come, try to
show me clearly that all the gods genuinely believe this action right. if you
succeed, I shall praise you for your wisdom and never stop.

EUTH. Well, I can certainly do it, Socrates, but it is perhaps not a small task.

SOC. I see. You think I am harder to teach than the judges, for you will certainly

make it clear to them that actions such as your father?s are wrong, and that all
the gods hate them.

EUTH. Very clear indeed, Socrates, if they listen to what I say.

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V. Second definition: the holy is wha t is loved by a ll the g ods

SOC. They will listen, if you seem to speak well. But here is something that occurred

to me while you were talking. I asked myself, ?If Euthyphro were to teach me
beyond any question that all the gods believe a death of this sort wrong, what
more have I learned from Euthyphro about what the holy and unholy are?
The death, it seems, would be hateful to the gods, but what is holy and what is
not holy do not prove to be marked off by this, for what was hateful to the
gods proved dear to the gods as well.? So I let you off on that point,
Euthyphro. If you wish, let all the gods believe your father?s action wrong and
let all of them hate it. But is this the correction we are now to make in your
account, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what all the gods love is
holy, but what some love and some hate is neither or both? Do you mean for
us now to mark off the holy and the unholy in that way?

EUTH. What is to prevent it, Socrates?

SOC. Nothing, at least as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro. But examine your

account to see whether if you assume this, you will most easily teach me what
you promised.

EUTH. But I would certainly say that the holy is what all the gods love, and that he

opposite, what all the gods hate is unholy.

SOC. Well, Euthyphro, should we examine this in turn to see if it is true? Or should

we let it go, accept it from ourselves or anyone else without more ado, and
agree that a thing is so if only someone says it is? Or should we examine what
a person means when he says something?

EUTH. Of course. I believe, though, that this time what I say is true.

SOC. Perhaps we shall learn better, my friend. For consider: is the holy loved by the

gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

EUTH. I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

SOC. Then I will try to put it more clearly. We speak of carrying and being carried,

of leading and being led, of seeing and being seen. And you understand in
such cases, do you not, that they differ from each other, and how they differ?

EUTH. I think I do.

SOC. Now, is there such a thing as being loved, and is it different from loving?

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EUTH. Of course.

SOC. Then tell me: if a thing is being carried, is it being carried in consequence of

the carrying, or for some other reason?

EUTH. No, for that reason.

SOC. And if a thing is being led, it is being led in consequence of the leading? And if

being seen, being seen in consequence of the seeing?

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Then it is not because a thing is being seen that the seeing exists; on the

contrary, it is in consequence of the seeing that it is being seen. Nor is it
because a thing is being led that the leading exists; it is in consequence of the
leading that it is being led. Nor is it because a thing is being carried that the
carrying exists; it is in consequence of the carrying that it is being carried. Is
what I mean quite clear, Euthyphro? I mean this: if something comes to be or
something is affected, it is not because it is a thing which is coming to be that
the process of coming to be exists, but rather, in consequence of the process
of coming to be it is a thing which is coming to be; and it is not because it is
affected that the affecting exits, but in consequence of the affecting, the thing
is affected. Do you agree?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Now, what is being loved is either a thing coming to be something or a

something affected by something.

EUTH. Of course.

SOC. And so it is as true here as it was before: it is not because a thing is being

loved that there is loving by those who love it; it is in consequence of the
loving that is being loved.

EUTH. Necessarily.

SOC. Then what are we to say about the holy, Euthyphro? Is it loved by all the gods,

as your account has it?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Because it is holy? Or for some other reason?

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EUTH. No, for that reason.

SOC. Then it is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

EUTH. It seems so.

SOC. Moreover, what is loved and dear to the gods is loved because of their loving.

EUTH. Of course.

SOC. Then what is dear to the gods is not the same as holy, Euthyphro, nor is the

holy the same as dear to the gods, as you claim: the two are different.

EUTH. But why, Socrates?

SOC. Because we agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy, not holy because it

is loved.

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. But what is dear to the gods is, because it is loved by the gods, dear to the

gods by reason of this same loving; it is not loved because it is dear to the
gods.

EUTH. True.

SOC. But if in fact what is dear to the gods and the holy were the same, my friend,

then, if the holy were loved because it is holy, what is dear to the gods would
be loved because it is dear to the gods; but if what is dear to the gods were
dear to the gods because the gods love it, the holy would be holy because it is
loved. But as it is, you see, the opposite is true, and the two are completely
different. For the one (what is dear to the gods) is of the sort to be loved
because it is loved; the other (the holy), because it is of the sort to be loved,
therefore is loved. It would seem, Euthyphro, that when you asked what the
holy is, you did not mean to make its nature and reality clear to me; you
mentioned a mere affection of it–the holy has been so affected as to be loved
by all the gods. But what it really is, you have not yet said. So if you please,
Euthyphro, do not conceal things from me! Start again from the beginning
and tell me what sort of thing the holy is. We will not quarrel over whether it
is loved by the gods, or whether it is affected in other ways. Tell me in earnest:
what is the holy and unholy?

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VI. Second interlude: Socra tes a nd Da eda lus

EUTH. But, Socrates, I do not know how to tell you what I mean. Somehow

everything I propose goes round in circles on us and will not stand still.

SOC. Your words are like the words of my ancestor, Daedalus. If I had offered

them, if I had put them forward, you would perhaps have laughed at me
because my kinship to him makes my words run away and refuse to stay put.
But as things are, it is you who put them forward and we must find another
joke. It is for you that they refuse to stand still, as you yourself agree.

EUTH. But, Socrates, the joke, I think, still tells. It is not I who makes them move

around and not stay put. I think you are the Daedalus. If it had been up to me,
they would have stayed where they were!

SOC. Then apparently, my friend, I am even more skillful than my venerated
ancestor, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, it seems,
not only make my own move but other people?s too. And certainly the most
subtle feature of my art is that I am skilled against my will. For I really want
arguments to stand still, to stand fixed and immovable. I want that more than
the wealth of Tantalus and the skill of Daedalus combined. But enough of this.
Since you seem to be lazy and soft, I will come to your aid and help you teach
me about the holy. Don?t give up; consider whether you do not think that all
the holy is necessarily just.

EUTH. I do.

VII. On requirements for definitions

SOC. Then is all the just holy? Or is all the holy just, but not all the just holy–part of

it holy, part something else?

EUTH. I don?t follow you, Socrates.

SOC. And yet you are as much wiser than I am as you are younger. As I said, you

are lazy and soft because of you wealth of wisdom. My friend, extend yourself:
what I mean is not hard to understand. I mean exactly the opposite of what
the poet meant when he said that he was ?unwilling to insult Zeus, the Creator,
who made all things; for where there is fear there is also reverence.? I disagree
with him. Shall I tell you why?

EUTH. Yes, certainly.

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SOC. I do not think that ?where there is fear there is also reverence.? I think people

fear disease and poverty and other such things–fear them, but have no
reverence for what they fear. Do you agree?

EUTH. Yes, certainly.

SOC. Where there is reverence, however, there is also fear. For if anyone stands in

reverence and awe of something, does he not at the same time fear and dread
the imputation of wickedness?

EUTH. Yes, he does.

SOC. Then it is not true that ?where there is fear there is also reverence,? but rather

where there is reverence there is also fear, even though reverence is not
everywhere that fear is: fear is broader that reverence. Reverence is part of fear
just as odd is part of number, so that it is not true that where there is number
there is odd, but where there is odd there is number. Surely you follow me
now?

EUTH. Yes, I do.

SOC. Well then, that is the sort of thing I had in mind when I asked if, where there

is just, there is also holy. Or is it rather that where there is holy there is also
just, but holy is not everywhere just is, since the holy is part of the just. Shall
we say that, or do you think differently?

EUTH. No, I think you are right.

SOC. Then consider the next point. If the holy is part of the just, it would seem that

we must find out what part of the just the holy is. Now, to take an example we
used a moment ago, if you were to ask what part of number the even is, and
what kind of number it is, I would say there it is number with equal rather
than unequal sides (i.e. divisible by two). Do you agree?

EUTH. Yes, I do.

SOC. Then try in the same way to teach me what part of the just is holy, so that I

may tell Meletus to wrong me no longer and not to indict me for impiety,
since I have already learned from you what things are pious and holy and what
are not.

VIII. Third definition: the holy is m inistry to the g ods

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EUTH. Well, Socrates, I think that part of the just which is pious and holy is about

ministering to the gods, and the remaining part of the just is about ministering
to men.

SOC. That appears excellently put, Euthyphro. But there is still one small point left;

I do not yet understand what you mean by ?ministering.? You surely do not
mean that ministering to the gods is like ministering to other things, though I
suppose we do talk that way, as when we say that it is not everyone who
knows how ?