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Immigration Enforcement and the Redistribution of Political Trust
Author(s): Rene R. Rocha, Benjamin R. Knoll and Robert D. Wrinkle
Source: The Journal of Politics , Vol. 77, No. 4 (October 2015), pp. 901-913
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/681810
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Immigration Enforcement and the
Redistribution of Political Trust
Rene R. Rocha, University of Iowa
Benjamin R. Knoll, Centre College
Robert D. Wrinkle, University of Texas–Pan American
Social construction theory argues that public policy creates powerful feedback effects and that groups burdened by policy feel alienated. We reevaluate this argument by examining how immigration enforcement policies affect Latino immigrants, native-born Latinos, and Anglos. Using data from a 2012 survey of Texas residents and government statistics
on the Secure Communities program, we find that higher removal rates, especially among noncriminal populations, are
associated with negative political orientations among native- and foreign-born Latinos. We also extend social construction theory by arguing that the attitudes of individuals outside the target group are affected by enforcement. Our
findings show that Anglos living in high-enforcement contexts are the most trusting of government and externally efficacious. We conclude that immigration policy enforcement redistributes trust in government from resource-deprived
immigrants to Anglos. Enforcement practices thus perpetuate existing political inequalities.
I
n 2008, the Bush administration began the Secure Communities program, an immigration enforcement initiative.
The Obama administration expanded the program before
replacing it with the largely similar Priority Enforcement
Program (PEP) in 2015. Now when an offender is booked in
a US prison, his or her fingerprints are automatically crossreferenced with an immigration database operated by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE uses this
process to identify, apprehend, and sometimes deport unauthorized immigrants. ICE prioritizes the removal of criminals
and those who have committed multiple immigration violations (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012).
From its inception through August of 2012, ICE received
nearly 20 million sets of fingerprints and removed more than
220,000 individuals from the United States through Secure
Communities. More than 75% of deportees were convicted
criminals. Approximately a quarter of these criminals were
convicted of serious crimes, such as homicide, robbery, and
kidnapping (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
2012). After a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests, ICE released detailed data about Secure Communities enforcement. These data contain information on enforcement patterns across political jurisdictions, and ICE has
never released similar identifiers alongside general enforcement data.
The number of deportations is higher today than ever
before and a source of controversy.1 Concerns include the mistaken arrest and removal of American citizens and recent efforts
by some state and local governments to opt out of localfederal partnerships. A 2011 report by a task force on Secure Communities offered another worry: “The program
[has] eroded public trust by leading to the detention of many
immigrants who had not committed serious crimes, after
officials said its aim was to remove ‘the worst of the worst’
immigrant criminals from the United States” (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2011). Immigrant interest groups
Rene R. Rocha ([email protected]) is associate professor of political science at the University of Iowa. He studies Latino politics and immigration policy. Benjamin R. Knoll ([email protected]) is an assistant professor in the politics program at Centre College in Danville, Kentucky. His research covers
American public opinion and voting behavior, with an emphasis on race and politics and religion and politics. Robert D. Wrinkle ([email protected]) is
professor emeritus at the University of Texas–Pan American. His interests include public policy, political behavior, and Latino politics.
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the paper are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard
.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/681810.
1. The number of removals peaked in 2013, and ICE has not released official figures for 2014 (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2014).
The Journal of Politics, volume 77, number 4. Published online July 7, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/681810
q 2015 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2015/7704-0002$10.00
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901
902 / Immigration Enforcement and Trust Rene R. Rocha, Benjamin R. Knoll, and Robert D. Wrinkle
have echoed this concern. Several public statements by these
organizations express profound disappointment with President Obama for pursuing such an aggressive and punitive
deportation program in the first few years of his presidency.
What has been the effect of this immigration policy enforcement campaign? In this article, we examine whether
Secure Communities has affected trust in government and
political efficacy among Latino immigrants, native-born Latinos, and Anglos (non-Hispanic whites). Below, we discuss
what scholars already know about immigration politics and
policy. We then sketch out a theory of how immigration
policy enforcement affects political behavior and analyze data
from a survey of Texas residents. The results show that immigration enforcement affects political orientations within
each subgroup.
IMMIGRATION POLICY ENFORCEMENT
AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Current literature tells us much about what factors affect
immigration policy attitudes. Residential context (Hood and
Morris 1997; Hopkins 2010), cultural and economic threat
(Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin and Sides 2008; Paxton and
Mughan 2006), implicit attitudes (Ayers et al. 2009; Brader,
Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010;
Perez 2010), media framing (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina
2013), and demographic characteristics (Binder, Polinard,
and Wrinkle 1997; Fetzer 2000; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and
Shortle 2011; Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006) all shape
preferences.
We also know why lawmakers support reforms to current immigration policy. Constituency demographics, such
as Latino and immigrant population size, matter (Casellas
2010; Fetzer 2006; Hero and Tolbert 1995). The characteristics of the legislators themselves, such as their race/ethnicity or partisanship, also predict positions on immigrationrelated legislation (Bratton 2006; Kerr and Miller 1997; Welch
and Hibbing 1984). Studies of state and local politics emphasize that policy outcomes reflect citizen ideology (Hero and
Preuhs 2007) and the power of industries that rely on immigrant labor (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011).
In short, we have a good understanding of public perceptions toward immigrants, how elected officials represent
those attitudes, and what kinds of policies eventually are
adopted. This leaves one important gap: how policy, once
implemented, affects politics. Is there a feedback effect? The
social construction of policy design theory (Schneider and
Ingram 1993) provides strong theoretical support for the
belief that political orientations, specifically trust in government and political efficacy, are associated with immigration
policy enforcement.
The social construction of policy design theory (SCPDT)
argues that groups are socially constructed to be associated
with either positive or negative evaluations. Groups also have
different amounts of power and can be classified as “advantaged” (high power 1 positive construction), “contenders” (high power 1 negative construction), “dependents”
(low power 1 positive construction), or “deviants” (low
power 1 negative construction).2
SCPDT predicts that groups with positive constructions
will receive more government benefits than those with negative constructions. We thus see elites regularly and visibly
advocating for policies such as veterans’ benefits, small business tax cuts, and government-mandated accommodations
for the disabled and elderly. Those with positive social constructions internalize signals, which leads to higher levels
of political efficacy, greater trust in government, and generally more positive attitudes toward politics and society. Members of negatively constructed groups internalize cues too. Deviants, SCPDT argues, are therefore the most likely to express
feelings of alienation (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 342).
The possible spillover consequences of social construction–
based policy decisions are not well understood. We want to
know whether policy outcomes affect individuals outside of
the target group. SCPDT predicts that political attitudes among
foreign-born Latinos are affected by immigration enforcement
because punitive practices send cues about the value of immigrants. But enforcement practices also send signals to those
outside of the target population about whether the government is willing to allocate burdens onto a negatively constructed out-group. Seeing negatively constructed out-groups
punished can reinforce faith in the political system. Perceiving
the government as unable to penalize “deviants” may jeopardize trust.
The implications are important. Previous research has
demonstrated that Latino immigrants come to the United
States feeling more efficacious and trusting of government
than native-born residents (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Michelson 2003; Wenzel 2006). Trust in government is a key
indicator of general support for or alienation from the political system (Miller 1974). Both trust and efficacy predict
political participation (Easton and Dennis 1967; Pateman
1976; Pollock 1983). Possessing these psychological resources
can compensate for common disadvantages Latino immigrants face, such as lower levels of income, education, and
political mobilization (Barreto 2005; Leal 2002; Michelson
2005).
2. For a detailed explanation of this classification system, see Schneider
and Ingram (1993).
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Volume 77
Secure Communities has changed the way immigration
law is enforced. Perhaps it has changed the way people who
care about immigration feel about politics. If it has, one of
the few resources immigrants have at their disposal—positive psychological orientations—is likely eroding. As the
voice of the Latino immigrant community becomes soft,
political inequality in America grows.
HYPOTHESES
We leverage the unusually detailed data on Secure Communities supplied by ICE to study whether enforcement
has affected political attitudes among foreign-born Latinos,
native-born Latinos, and Anglos. Specifically, we ask whether
deportations initiated as part of the program are related to
trust in federal and local government as well as political efficacy, both internal and external.
Foreign-born Latinos
Our first prediction is that foreign-born Latinos who live
in communities with high levels of Secure Communities enforcement will have less trust in government and less political efficacy. This is because intense enforcement reinforces
the negative social construction of immigrants. If foreignborn Latinos perceive that American society considers immigrants to be “deviant,” they will likely feel politically
alienated.
H1. Foreign-born Latinos who live in communities
with high levels of immigration enforcement are
more likely to express negative feelings toward the
political system than those who live in communities
with low levels of enforcement.
No study has examined how policy outcomes affect immigrants’ political orientations, but Massey and Sanchez
(2010) believe ethnic identity among immigrants is sensitive to policy outcomes. Immigration enforcement and social discrimination “promote the formation of a reactive identity that explicitly rejects self-identification as American” (2).
This relationship may be an example of a broader trend because blacks express a stronger sense of racial identity in areas
where they are most disadvantaged (Gay 2004; Welch et al.
2001). Our argument, therefore, fits with the broader literature
on residential context and attitudes.
Number 4
October 2015 / 903
connected to the fate, success, and interests of a wider
group (Dawson 1994). According to the 2006 Latino National Survey, the majority of native Latinos report that
their “doing well” depends at least “some” or “a lot” on
other Latinos doing well (Fraga et al. 2006).
Non-Latinos may treat native- and foreign-born Latinos
similarly (Rocha et al. 2011). If the native-born Latinos
experience worse interactions with political institutions in
anti-immigrant environments, their attitudes may also
change. However, we predict that the effect will be smaller
than that observed for foreign-born Latinos. This is because
the social networks of native-born immigrants are less
likely to be directly affected by immigration enforcement
(Fix and Zimmerman 2001), making perceptions of enforcement less closely aligned with actual removal rates.3
This leads us to our second hypothesis:
H2. Native-born Latinos who live in communities with
high levels of immigration enforcement are more likely
to express negative feelings toward the political system
than those who live in communities with low levels of
enforcement, but this effect will be smaller in magnitude
than what is observed for foreign-born Latinos.
Anglos
Removals, we argue, make Latinos less trusting and efficacious, but they should make Anglos feel positive. People
support punishing negatively constructed groups with
policy-induced burdens. Because Anglos are more likely to
negatively construct unauthorized immigrants (Rocha et al.
2011), high enforcement rates should increase Anglo faith
in the policy process. Social construction theorists have not
fully explored group-based differences in policy feedback,
and most empirical studies document effects among target
populations (Mettler and SoRelle 2014). This argument
helps expand our understanding of how policy feedback
forces penetrate many parts of American society.
H3. Anglos who live in communities with high levels
of immigration enforcement are more likely to express
positive feelings toward the political system than those
who live in communities with low levels of enforcement.
Hypothesis 3 is compatible with other theories. We could
arrive at the same hypothesis via racial threat theory by as-
Native-born Latinos
Although not directly subject to immigration enforcement,
native-born Latinos still may be affected by policy feedback
because of linked fate or group consciousness. Linked fate is
the perception that one’s fate and self-interest are strongly
3. Unfortunately, our survey data do not allow us to distinguish between second- and third-generation Latinos. We suspect that the negative
effect of enforcement on trust and efficacy would be smallest among thirdgeneration Latinos.
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904 / Immigration Enforcement and Trust Rene R. Rocha, Benjamin R. Knoll, and Robert D. Wrinkle
suming a link between policy enforcement and Anglo perceptions of immigrant group size. High levels of Secure
Communities enforcement in their areas may lead Anglos to
infer that the proportion of foreign-born Latinos is large or
on the rise. Latino population size and growth predict attitudes and policy preferences (Newman 2013). The result
may be increased support for a government that is perceived
to be actively enforcing immigration law.
In either case, there are significant normative ramifications.
Cynicism toward government among native- and foreignborn Latinos is a possible and undesirable consequence of
immigration enforcement. Immigrants enjoy few political
advantages, and this relationship threatens valuable psychological resources. But what if enforcement also increases these
same psychological resources among Anglos, a group that
enjoys numerous political advantages relative to Latinos? The
effect of enforcement would be to redistribute psychological
resources from an already-disadvantaged group (Latino immigrants) to an already-advantaged group (Anglos).
DATA AND METHOD
We test our hypotheses using data from a public opinion
survey conducted by the Center for Survey Research at the
University of Texas–Pan American. This survey was in the
field during the summer of 2012 and used random digit
dialing, including cell phone numbers, to sample Latinos
and Anglos living in Texas. The response rate, computed
using the AAPOR RR3 method, was 8%. Spanish translations of the instrument were available, and native Spanish
speakers administered Spanish surveys. Quota sampling was
used to ensure an adequate number of Latino respondents.
Latinos made up 31% of our final sample and Anglos comprised 69%. The total number of respondents was 470. A
small number of non-Latinos and non-Anglos were sampled
(27 blacks, 4 Asian Americans, and 4 American Indians),
and we exclude these groups from our analysis. Although the
data were collected exclusively from Texas residents, we
argue that the sample is well suited for studying the effect of
immigration enforcement on political orientations among
Latinos and Anglos. Texas has the third-largest immigrant
population in the United States, ranking only behind New
York and California. Furthermore, ICE officials implementing Secure Communities have been more active in Texas
than in all but two states: California and Florida (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2012). Still, we replicated our analysis with the 2012 American National Election
Study (ANES) and unofficial estimates of immigrant removals. We describe this check in more detail at the end of our
write-up.
Our dependent variables measure political orientations.
We rely on four questions that separately capture trust in
different levels of government, external efficacy, and internal efficacy. They are:
1. How often can you trust local government to do
what is right? (Never, Some of the Time, Most of the
Time, Always)
2. How often can you trust government in Washington
to do what is right? (Never, Some of the Time, Most
of the Time, Always)
3. Public officials don’t care much what people like me
think. (Disagree Strongly, Disagree Somewhat, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree Somewhat, Agree
Strongly)
4. Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand
what’s going on. (Disagree Strongly, Disagree Somewhat, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree Somewhat,
Agree Strongly)
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