ChinaandAmerica.pdf

Foreign Policy Association

China and America

Author(s): David M. Lampton

Source: Great Decisions , 2018, (2018), pp. 35-46

Published by: Foreign Policy Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26593695

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms

Foreign Policy Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Great Decisions

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Xi, Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Vic-tory in Building a Moderately Prosper-ous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” The Great Hall of the People of Beijing, October 18, 2017. Available free online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm>. In this speech, delivered to over 2,000 Communist Party members at the 19th Party Congress, Chinese President Xi Jin-ping lays out plans for Chinese economic and political development by 2050.

China and America: the new geopolitical equation

by David M. Lampton

DAVID M. LAMPTON is Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins University—SAIS in Wash-ington, DC. He is current Chairman of The Asia Foundation, and past President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and his most recent book is: Following the Lead-er: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Uni-versity of California Press, 2014). With two colleagues, he is writing a book on Beijing’s railway building effort aimed at connecting southern China to Southeast Asia. The views expressed are his own and he wishes to thank Jill Huang and Ji Zhaojin for their research assistance.

The U.S. and China were on an increasingly friction-laden path even before China’s President Xi Jinping took office five years ago. Problems have grown

since. Developments following the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump have compounded uncertainties and risks, though two presidential summits in 2017 had a pa-tina of cooperation. For the last decade and a half, China has implemented an expansive strategy of economic outreach and growth of national capacities, including of military and diplomatic power. What are the challenges and opportunities for the U.S. in its relations with China? What can be done to improve prospects for productively managing differences, as the tectonic plates of global power shift?

During the 71 years spanning 1945–2016, the U.S. used its dominant economic, military and ideological power, along with that of its allies, to conceive of, build and support global institutions, alliances and regimes that have contrib-uted to international growth and tolerable peace. Ironically,

in so doing, the U.S. fostered the emergence of other power centers. Predictably, these increasingly capable countries now have growing ambitions and ability to pursue their interests. China is notable in this regard as a geopolitical, economic and security competitor with whom the U.S. will increasingly have to negotiate cooperation. Still, Beijing is not Washington’s biggest threat, and there are many potential gains to be had from collaboration.

U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands at a joint news conference held after their meeting in Beijing on November 9, 2017. (ARTYOM IVANOV/TASS/GETTY IMAGES)

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

G R E A T D E C I S I O N S  2 0 1 8

Before you read, download the compan-ion Glossary that includes definitions and a guide to acronyms and abbreviations used in the article. Go to www.great decisions.org and select a topic in the Resources section on the right-hand side of the page.

Power is relative, not absolute. In 2013, China’s global share of gross do-mestic product (GDP) exceeded that of the U.S. for the first time, as measured by the World Bank. As late as 1990, the U.S. could act more unilaterally than it can today. At that time, it commanded almost 21% of global GDP, compared to today’s approximately 15.5%; Chi-na, by contrast, possessed less than 4% of global GDP compared to today’s nearly 18% and growing.

External perceptions of power and strength are also germane, particularly in periods of crisis and transition. A spring 2017 poll by the Pew Research Center found that although more coun-tries globally still name the U.S. as “the world’s leading economic power” over China, the gap is narrowing. Mean-while, perceptions of U.S. economic power have declined among most key allies and trading partners, and a major-ity of EU countries surveyed put the U.S. in second place after China. Aus-tralians believed that “China leads the U.S. by a two-to-one margin.”

After years of protracted and cost-ly entanglements all over the world, there is evidently a dwindling supply of political will in the U.S. for a global leadership role. Nonetheless, the U.S. possesses unique strengths, potential and resilience that many Chinese pop-ulists and nationalists underestimate. Considering the U.S.’s modestly sized population (about 323 million, com-pared to China’s nearly 1.4 billion), the country controls a remarkably out-sized share of global GDP. In per capita GDP terms (reflecting standard of liv-ing for average citizens) the U.S. leads China by a very considerable margin. Moreover, as Arthur Kroeber, manag-ing director of the global economic research firm Gavekal Dragonomics, points out, “In terms of [technology] licensing value…the U.S. tech sector is 60 times stronger than China’s.”

The image of China as an unstoppable leviathan is overstated, and Beijing’s leaders run the risk of overestimating their own strength. Security anxieties among China’s neighbors, engendered by Beijing’s growing power, further diminish the country’s economic in-

fluence. Washington’s challenge now is to maintain its power share and play its cards shrewdly. The wisest path forward is for both countries to ne-gotiate cooperation. The first step for the U.S. is to get its domestic house in order.

The state of play in WashingtonSoon after taking office in January

2017, President Trump backed off several elements of his campaign rhetoric, at least temporarily, includ-ing: protectionism expressed as threats of dramatic tariff hikes; an inclination to alter the long-standing “One China” policy, by which the U.S. recognizes Beijing as the official government of China, rather than Taiwan’s govern-ment, over which Beijing claims sov-ereignty; and impulses toward conflict in the South China Sea, where regional states maintain competing territo-rial claims. In addition, though Trump continues to call for greater security contributions from U.S. allies, he has

conveyed reassurances to partners that Washington still values its alliances, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganization (NATO).

The first summit between President Trump and President Xi was held in April 2017 at Trump’s private Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida. The two lead-ers rejiggered the Barack Obama-era (2009–17) Strategic and Economic Dialogue by agreeing to establish four parallel consultation mechanisms fo-cusing on core economic, diplomatic, security, cyber, and cultural and hu-man rights frictions. A 100-day nego-tiation period was initiated to address economic disputes in finance and trade

SOURCE: World Bank, International Comparison Program database *as measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)

15%

10%

20%

YEARS

SHAR

E OF G

LOBA

L GD

P* (IN TR

ILLI

S US D

OLL

ARS)

China vs. US Percentage of Global GDP

’90 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98 ’00 ’02 ’04 ’06 ’08 ’10 ’12 ’14 ’16

2016:17.83%

2016:15.46%

US share of GDP

2016 World GDP:$120.139 trillion

China share of GDP

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

C H I N A A N D A M E R I C A 3

under the framework of the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, and the presidents made efforts to establish personal rapport and direct communication.

There were less positive develop-ments as well. Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (the massive trade pact negotiations be-tween the U.S. and 11 other Pacific Rim countries) three days after being sworn into office, and his stated intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agree-ment, frayed the U.S.’s mantle as leader on international institution-building and interdependence issues. Washing-ton’s partners in the TPP negotiations, notably Japan, were left high and dry, having made domestically painful concessions to meet U.S. demands that Washington then scuttled. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (2006–07; 2012–present) soon sought to resurrect the TPP without Washington, and major progress in this direction was made in a meeting of trade ministers in November 2017 in Danang, Vietnam, at which the U.S. was not represented. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel (2005–pres-ent) has sought to forge trade and other relationships not based in U.S. central-ity. In May 2017, following a Group of Seven (G-7) summit, Merkel told one audience that: “The era in which we [Europeans] could fully rely on others is over to some extent.”

In short, abundant chances to en-hance China’s international leadership have fallen into Beijing’s lap. President Xi has already moved into the void to champion economic globalization and ecological responsibility. This was evi-dent in a headline-grabbing speech at the World Economic Forum in January 2017, in which he emphasized com-mitment to “growing an open global economy,” and noted that “no one will emerge as a winner in a trade war.” In his lengthy speech to China’s 19th Na-tional Party Congress of the Communist Party (hereafter, the Party Congress) in October, he reaffirmed dedication to environmental issues and a model of sustainable development guided by “harmonious co-existence between man and nature.”

The North Korea problem

When he left office in January 2017, President Obama told President-elect Trump that the most pressing national security challenge he would face would be North Korea’s efforts to advance its nuclear and missile programs and to threaten Asia-Pacific allies, U.S. re-gional bases and even the continental U.S. Moreover, this effort could ener-gize a new round of nuclear prolifera-tion in Asia, perhaps featuring the ac-quisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea. This would multiply the number of such weapons, foster an arms race and compound instabilities.

Pyongyang’s nuclear effort became highly visible during the Bill Clinton administration (1993–2001), continued through the George W. Bush (2001–09) and Obama periods, and landed in the lap of President Trump. Not even a year into Trump’s presidency, North Korea has already tested missiles over Japan and conducted its sixth nuclear test, in September 2017. Over the last two decades, there has been an unceas-ing stream of conferences, multilateral sanctions, interim deals, threats and joint military exercises involving vari-ous countries, but none of these efforts, including periodic shows of disapprov-al from Beijing, have deflected North

Korea from its chosen course. The rul-ing Kim dynasty has demonstrated an unshakeable commitment to acquiring weapons of mass destruction, believing that this is its “insurance policy” against forcible removal from power. There have been occasional glimmers of hope that some formula for denuclearization might be found and faithfully imple-mented, but these efforts have failed to get off the figurative launch pad, or have blown up shortly after lift-off.

President Trump has communicated that he believes his White House pre-decessors were right to press Beijing to ramp up pressure on North Korea, and correct in their assessment that Beijing had sufficient means to do so. Howev-er, Trump also came into office feeling strongly that past administrations had not taken a sufficiently transactional ap-proach with Beijing. He therefore sug-gested that Washington would give Bei-jing concessions in other areas—trade and Taiwan among them—in exchange for cooperation on North Korea. In one post on the social media platform Twit-ter, he wrote: “The United States is con-sidering, in addition to other options, stopping all trade with any country do-ing business with North Korea.”

Presidents Trump and Xi initially labored to reach economic accommo-dations and cooperate on North Korean

(AMMER/WIENER ZEITUNG/VIENNA, AUSTRIA)

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

G R E A T D E C I S I O N S  2 0 1 8

denuclearization, but the burden of accumulating frictions soon weighed more heavily. In June 2017, Washing-ton sold Taiwan weapons and equip-ment valued at $1.4 billion. The U.S. Department of State’s 2017 Traffick-ing in Persons Report “downgraded” China (in human rights terms) and the U.S. slapped secondary economic sanctions on Chinese trading and cer-tain financial entities (and individuals) for directly or indirectly aiding North Korean weapons programs. China’s ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai, responded: “[Attempts] to create le-verage against China on the Korean nuclear issue by challenging China on Taiwan and the South China Sea are equally destructive.” The ambassador went on to say that “secondary sanc-tions imposed by the U.S. on Chinese entities and individuals according to U.S. domestic laws are also not ac-ceptable.” In both Congress and the executive branch, moves were made and are now underway to subject Chi-nese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. to more scrutiny, to constrain

technology flows to China and to fight forced technology transfer provisions imposed on U.S. firms seeking market access in China. The White House has called on the U.S. Trade Representa-tive to “investigate” China’s practices in these regards. In August 2017, more secondary sanctions were imposed on Beijing with respect to North Korea. In early September, the United Na-tions (UN) Security Council (UNSC) imposed additional sanctions on North Korea with the backing of China and Russia, though they watered down U.S. proposals before agreeing.

One reason for this seesaw in rela-tions with Beijing is that the Trump administration effectively attempted to outsource its North Korea policy to China. The fundamental obstacle to this approach remains that China opposes actions that would destabi-lize, much less topple, the regime in Pyongyang. Beijing has consistently shown that two principles govern its North Korea policy. First, it oppos-es North Korea becoming a nuclear weapons-capable country. Second,

it will not put sufficient pressure on Pyongyang to risk North Korea’s col-lapse. Beijing does not want unrest in North Korea spilling into northeast China. It wants a buffer state between itself and South Korea (and U.S. forc-es there), and leverage over Washing-ton. Successive Chinese leaders have adhered to these priorities despite periodic slaps in the face by the Kim dynasty. Beijing sustained this posture during the November 2017 Trump-Xi summit: Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang told reporters that China wanted to “maintain [note: not in-crease] pressure regarding the nuclear activities” of North Korea and “pro-mote peaceful resolution of the issue through dialogue and negotiation.”

While Beijing did in fact interrupt North Korean currency-earning coal exports to China in the first quarter of 2017, its overall trade with Pyongyang grew 37.4% over the same period in 2016. Though Beijing joined the other four members of the UNSC in impos-ing new sanctions, it carefully avoided affecting its ongoing deals and exports to Pyongyang. China’s northeastern provinces have interests in North Ko-rea and resist shutting down their trade there. Shipping through Hong Kong to North Korea continues to be an impor-tant hole in the sanctions dike.

In short, China is doing just enough to avoid rupture with Washington, without doing so much as to endanger North Korea’s survival. With the limits to China’s will and capacity to change North Korea’s behavior revealed, what will the White House do? What hap-pens if Beijing comes to be seen by Washington as proactively undermin-ing U.S. efforts?

In a remarkable June 2017 tweet, the U.S. president conceded that de-pending on China to bring North Ko-rea to heel had not worked: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of Presi-dent Xi & China to help with North Korea,” he wrote, “it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!” U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson put a more hopeful cast on things, saying: “We have not given up hope” and ex-pressing the intention of the U.S. to

Sea ofJapan

YellowSea

PACIFICOCEAN

Amur

RUSSIA

SOUTHKOREA

NORTH KOREA JAPAN

CHINA

Hokkaido

Honshu

Kyushu

Shikoku

Sakhalin

shanxi

innermongolia

hebei

heilongjiang

jilin

jiangsu

anhuihenan

tianjin

liaonin

shandong

TokyoYokohama

KyotoOsaka

PyongyangHamhung

Jixi

Kaesong

Mokpo

Harbin

Vladivostok

Sapporo

Kita-Kyushu

Qidihar

ChangchungJilin

Pusan

Seoul

Shenyang

BenxiJinzhou

Tianjin

Shijiazhuang

Jinan

Zhangjiakou

ZhengzhouXuzhou

Qingdao

Husiyin

Beijing

Fuxin

lucidity information design, llc

200 Mil0

200 Km0

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

C H I N A A N D A M E R I C A 3

wage a “peaceful pressure campaign [on North Korea].” Shortly thereafter, the president ratcheted up pressure. “I am very disappointed in China,” he tweeted. “Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet they do NOTHING for us with North Korea…We will no longer al-low this to continue.” During Presi-dent Trump’s first trip to China in No-vember 2017, he took a more concil-iatory tone, proclaiming the “mutual commitment” of the two presidents to the denuclearization of North Korea.

Of the numerous reasons that Trump’s approach has not borne fruit, three are dominant. First, Pyongyang is able to resist potentially lethal pres-sure from China. Second, for Beijing, a nuclearized peace on the Korean Pen-insula is preferable to war there. And third, while President Trump has gy-rated on whether the U.S. approach to Pyongyang should rely on force or dia-logue, the Chinese have never wavered in their aversion to the use of force to denuclearize North Korea.

Consequently, the current U.S. ad-ministration is left with the same stark choices as its predecessors, except that Trump has staked even more on the issue and North Korea is further down its deliverable nuclear weapons path. Washington has never attacked a nuclear-capable country. The U.S.’s options—none of them ideal—fall into three categories:n 1. Implicitly or explicitly accept that North Korea has nuclear weapons and deter Pyongyang from using them, as was done with the Soviet Union and China. This approach has two variants: One is to seek to negotiate a freeze in North Korean warhead and missile levels and testing (with verification), and negotiate a peace agreement. The second option is simply to establish a deterrent relationship without official agreements—just the promise of cer-tain destruction if weapons are used or proliferated.n 2. Persist in a policy of tightening sanctions, knowing that there are lim-its to the pressure China will apply on North Korea and that North Korea has

a seemingly endless capacity to endure such punitive measures. In this scenar-io, Pyongyang continues to build more warheads and develop their means of delivery.n 3. Use force to try to destroy North Korea’s nuclear capacity (or the regime entirely), knowing that Pyongyang’s death throes could take hundreds of thousands (possibly millions) of South Korean and other lives with it.

It is time for Washington, in close consultation with its South Korean and Japanese allies, to seriously consider either explicitly or implicitly acknowl-edging that North Korea has a modest nuclear deterrent, and to prevent North Korea’s use of these capabilities (and proliferation) just as Washington did with the Soviet Union and China. The wisdom of such a policy partially hing-es on whether or not one conceives of North Korean leaders as rational; that is, whether one believes that their instinct for survival outweighs their impulsive-ness. A principal downside to adopting an overt approach of deterrence is that it would likely encourage others in Asia (not least South Korea and Japan) to obtain their own “deterrent,” thereby multiplying regional nuclear actors and the attendant dangers. Of course this would also stimulate Beijing to further boost its capacities, thereby fueling a regional arms race.

In sum, President Trump initially put other contentious issues with China

on the back burner, hoping to achieve his primary goal—North Korea’s de-nuclearization. When that failed, the front burner of the U.S.-China relation-ship became crowded with previously repressed issues: U.S. freedom of navi-gation operations in the South China Sea, talk of steel and aluminum tariffs, weapons sales to Taiwan, the threat of tightened restrictions on technology and investment flows, and second-ary sanctions on Chinese institutions and individuals. Some of these threats have been pursued, others downplayed or delayed, and still others seemingly abandoned, leaving Beijing, Washing-ton’s allies and many others confused. This brings us to executive branch decision-making.

Executive branch decision-making

White House personnel, not least those involved in national security, have been in continual flux since Inauguration Day. Deep divisions on trade policy persist among the president’s senior ad-visors. Across all agencies, nomination and confirmation of officials has been painstakingly slow. As of mid-Novem-ber 2017, only 469 out of over 600 key positions requiring Senate confirma-tion had been nominated—249 had been confirmed and 144 posts still had no nominee. In the State Department, only 56 out of 152 slots had been filled; at the Defense Department, 26 out of

(KAL/THE ECONOMIST/LONDON, ENGLAND)

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

G R E A T D E C I S I O N S  2 0 1 8

354; and, at the Commerce Department, 10 out of 21. This leaves key agen-cies staffed with politically insecure (“acting”) personnel. Although many of these individuals are very capable, foreign governments do not know with whom they can engage with confi-dence, and the risks of ill-considered policy, spotty implementation and in-action increase.

President Trump initially gave mem-bers of his own family notable roles in dealing with Beijing: His son-in-law Jared Kushner and daughter Ivanka liaised with the Chinese and advised the president. This blurred lines with the State Department and other agen-

cies and dimmed what should have been a bright line between family and national interests. In the run-up to the president’s November trip to Beijing, family members became less involved as far as China was concerned, at least publicly.

Looking ahead, the U.S. Congress is already moving into campaign mode for the pivotal 2018 midterm elections. The upcoming struggle for Capitol Hill is unlikely to improve the climate for dispassionate debate about China policy. Alternatively, Congress may become so preoccupied with domestic politics that it does not focus on China at all.

The state of play in BeijingThe driving consideration in Chi-

nese political life for Xi Jinping’s first term (2012–17) was the 19th Party Congress (October 18–24, 2017). The Party Congress is held only once ev-ery five years, and is used to set the party’s foreign and domestic policy agendas and select its leadership. Prior to this conclave, President Xi—who also serves as general secretary of the Communist Party (CCP) and chair-man of the Central Military Commis-sion—had two desires, each in ten-sion with the other. First, he sought to cultivate stable relations with the Obama administration and thereafter the Trump administration, looking to keep U.S.-China relations on an even keel. At home, however, he wanted to appear tough on the U.S: Xi remains determined to be seen domestically as a staunch guardian of China’s equities: Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, North Korea, economic interests and “national dignity.” He stated his driv-ing aspiration succinctly when he first took office: “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

In April 2017, at the Mar-a-La-go summit, Xi therefore held out to Trump the prospect of the aforemen-tioned 100-day negotiation aimed at producing quick, politically satisfy-ing and visible trade gains. Yet when the first Comprehensive Economic Dialogue discussions in Washington

rolled around 100 days later, Beijing gave very little. Xi’s principal conces-sion was U.S. beef exports—dear to ranchers in the American West, but not a game changer. In short, Xi was pre-occupied with consolidating power up until the conclusion of the 19th Party Congress. Being soft on the U.S. was inconsistent with the logic of building his nationalistic coalition at home.

Domestically, Xi has restored key aspects of strongman politics and moved the CCP to center stage in society and governance. The 19th Party Congress was less a pro forma reappointment than a coronation. Xi augmented his already considerable power by building a more pliable seven-person Standing Committee of the Politburo. He put a close confidant in charge of anti-corruption work (Li Zhanshu), disposed of opponents and potential competitors (Sun Zhengcai), weakened competitive factional net-works (the Communist Youth League), embedded his “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” in the CCP Constitution—as only Chairman Mao Zedong, China’s revo-lutionary communist leader (1949–76) and paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (1978–92) had done before—and made possible (though not inevitable) his re-tention of power beyond his second five-year term, heretofore an evolv-ing retirement norm in Beijing. Even

before the recent Party Congress, Xi had achieved the exalted status of “core leader.”

Despite his political achievements, however, President Xi faces constraints and is deeply insecure about the forces roiling below the surface in Chinese so-ciety. Ministries, provinces, localities, corrupt individuals and interest groups cannot be counted on to comply with orders from the top. The sweeping anti-corruption campaign that Xi launched at the close of the 18th Party Congress in 2012 has won him popular support, but also created enemies among its ac-tual and potential targets. Demographi-cally, China’s median age is increas-ing rapidly, as is the dependency ratio, meaning that health and retirement costs associated with an aging popu-lation will grow and the working-age population will decline.

The Chinese economy is awash in corporate debt (though it has huge fi-nancial assets), and there is a shadow banking and irregular financial sector creating enormous uncertainties. Eco-nomic efficiency (total factor produc-tivity) in the state-owned enterprise sector has been declining for years. Ex-cess production capacity in key sectors weakens the economy, requiring end-less central subsidies. It also motivates dumping products abroad. All this, in combination with political uncertain-ties, periodically stimulates large-scale capital movements from China abroad. These are sometimes so large that Bei-jing imposes capital controls, as was done in 2015–16. Tightened capital controls, in turn, slow Chinese foreign investments. Most fundamentally, Xi must worry that the growing middle class and already disaffected intellec-tuals may not remain quiescent forever.

Xi’s foreign policyWhen it comes to national strategy and dealing with the U.S., President Xi is in charge. Washington will be dealing with him as the leader of an increasing-ly capable China for the foreseeable fu-ture. Some issues to consider include: What can we expect the contours of Xi’s future foreign policy to be? How can Washington influence them and

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

C H I N A A N D A M E R I C A 3

how should it respond? And, most fun-damentally, how can the U.S. increase its own comprehensive power?

Under Xi, Beijing has become progressively more assertive in safe-guarding national interests and winning more say for China abroad. Beijing views Washington as simultaneously gridlocked at home and increasingly alienated from its traditional friends in the international arena. As a former Chinese vice-minister of foreign af-fairs wrote recently: “We have entered a `Post-American Era,’ meaning that the so-called `Pax Americana’ and the American century is over…The most obvious characteristic of a Post-Amer-ican Era is a reconfiguration of the global power balance, with developing nations gaining strength year by year.” This assessment reinforces Beijing’s current course. Americans should be concerned when People’s Daily, the of-ficial newspaper of the CCP, carries a

piece ridiculing Trump’s Washington as “a bizarre soap opera,” and saying that “U.S. foreign policy is in total disarray, and world regard for the U.S. has plummeted.” The piece goes on to say, “China cannot afford to play such political games. As a country with 1.4 billion people, China must focus on economic development, and a strong central leadership is needed.” Broad-minded Chinese who see a progressive and successful U.S. as being advanta-geous to China’s political reform and long-term interests are alarmed at de-velopments in the U.S.

Xi has expansively asserted sover-eignty in the South China Sea, pres-sured India on its shared border in the Himalayas, pushed along the median line separating Japan and China in the East China Sea and punished South Korea economically over defensive missile deployments. This muscular trend is also evident in Xi’s July 2017

announcement of a “red line” for dis-sidents in Hong Kong who are pushing for more autonomy and electoral re-form, as well as his warning to outsid-ers not to seek to “infiltrate” and “sabo-tage” the mainland from Hong Kong. Xi has ratcheted up political, economic and surveillance pressures on Taiwan since the independence-leaning Demo-cratic Progressive Party formed a gov-ernment there in May 2016.

Xi’s muscularity is also a reflec-tion of China’s more than three-decade trend of modernization in its military structure, operations and equipment—particularly its naval, air force, missile, space and cyber components. A major reorganization of the military launched in 2015 signals accelerated efforts to boost capacities and Xi’s personal control over the armed forces. China’s civilian R&D and manufacturing in-dustries are making increasing con-tributions to the People’s Liberation

SouthChina Sea

Sea ofJapan

East ChinaSea

PACIFICOCEAN

Yellow Sea

Bay ofBengal

Mekong

L. Baykal

Ganges

Yangtze

Huang

RUSS IA

CHINA

MONGOLIA

KAZAKHSTAN

INDIA BANGLA-DESH

MYANMAR VIETNAM

KYRGYZSTAN

BHUTAN

LAOS

PHILIPPINES

SOUTHKOREA

NORTHKOREA

JAPAN

NEPAL

guangdongyunnan

sichuan

shandongshanxi

innermongolia

liaoning

guangxi

gansu

xizang

xinjiang

hubei

hunanguizhou

hebei

henan

heilongjiang

fujian

qinghai

jilin

jiangsu

jiangxi

zhejiang

anhui

taiwan

hainan

shaa

nxi

ningxia

Taipei

Pyongyang

Seoul

Ulaanbaatar

Golmud

Hami

Yumen

Xian

Zhengzhou

Yinchuan

XiningJinan

Taiyuan

HohhotBeijing

Shijiazhuang

Jilin

Shanghai

Tianjin

Shantou

Wenzhou

Fuzhou

Hong Kong

Nanchang

Hangzhou

HefeiNanjing

Shenyang

Changchung

Harbin

(Calcutta)Kolkata

Chongqing

Nanning

Haikou

KunmingGuiyang

Changsha

WuhanChengdu

Dhaka

Kathmandu�imbu

Hotan

Karamay

Kashi

Korla

Lhasa

UrumqiBishkek

Hanoi

Qingdao

lucidity information design, llc

300 Mi0

300 Km0

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

G R E A T D E C I S I O N S  2 0 1 8

Army’s (PLA) arsenal, and in the pro-cess growing the military-industrial complex. The Pentagon’s 2017 report to Congress concluded that, “China’s military modernization is targeting capabilities with the potential to de-grade core U.S. military-technological advantages.” In late July 2017, on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the PLA founding, Xi reviewed a huge military parade in Inner Mongolia at which 40% of the weapons displayed had not been seen before. All of these were domestically produced.

Under Xi there has been progres-sively closer alignment with Putin’s Russia, though important frictions re-main between Moscow and Beijing. Growing cooperation is evident with respect to Syria and North Korea, and to UN voting. In July 2017, Beijing announced joint naval exercises in the Baltic Sea with Moscow—exercises focusing on “strengthening Sino-Rus-sia naval combat and coordinating ca-pabilities.” China Daily, China’s most widely circulated English-language newspaper, observed: “This is the first time the Chinese navy is conducting exercises at NATO’s doorstep.” En-

hanced sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on both Russian and Chi-nese entities and individuals may serve to drive the two countries even closer.

Geostrategically, Beijing is making very sizable international infrastructure investments in ports, transportation and power grids through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This nominally $1 trillion effort aims to make China

a connectivity hub for the region and beyond. The BRI’s projects combine the wish lists of almost every Chinese bureaucracy, locality and enterprise, as well as the aspirations of recipient countries. Beijing hopes BRI projects will absorb its substantial excess do-mestic production.

To be sure, there are enormous chal-lenges facing Beijing in this effort. Some of these include: problematic financing and debt loads in developing countries; insufficient revenue flows for planned projects; inappropriate technology; substandard construction; corruption; and local backlash against Chinese intrusion and land acquisition. In addition, China’s assertiveness with respect to sovereignty disputes makes some of its neighbors reluctant to par-ticipate in BRI, including Vietnam and India (the latter boycotted the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum). Even in Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, the local populace is concerned about a planned high-speed railroad that would run directly from China into the heart of the city, because Chinese law enforcement would come with it.

Nonetheless, BRI represents the prospect of increased geo-economic and geostrategic clout. In 2016, China was the leading trade partner of 124 countries, compared to the U.S.’s 76—almost a complete reversal from just

Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews the armed forces as part of the commemorations to mark the 90th founding anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army at Zhurihe military training base in north China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, July 30, 2017. (XINHUA/LI GANG/GETTY IMAGES)

Chinese company digging a tunnel in Laos for high-speed rail project, in June 2017. (DAVID M. LAMPTON)

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

C H I N A A N D A M E R I C A 3

ten years earlier. Washington would be making a strategic error in assum-ing that China’s outward thrust is des-tined to fail. It is almost certain that a modern, high(er)-speed, Chinese-constructed rail line will be completed from Kunming in southwestern China to Bangkok, Thailand and beyond well before a decade has passed. This will orient 600 million emerging consum-ers in Southeast Asia with growing pur-chasing power toward China. Beijing is also developing several other economic corridors around its periphery. This connectivity push is a developmentally and strategically sound policy direc-tion; indeed, BRI was even enshrined in the CCP Constitution at the 19th Party Congress.

Geopolitically, Beijing seeks to drive wedges between the U.S. and its allies and close friends [notably South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Aus-tralia, Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)], and to establish multilateral organiza-tions that provide Beijing with new regional and global platforms for ac-tion and influence. Beijing hopes to diminish post-World War II (WWII) U.S. sway, without destroying the in-ternational structure that helped China get where it is today. This ambition is reflected in Beijing’s central role in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian secu-rity grouping involving Central Asia, Russia and others as observers; the BRICS grouping (of five major emerg-ing economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and BRICS Bank; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with an im-pressive list of 80 members, including China’s neighbors and all G-7 mem-bers, except the U.S. and Japan. All this is occurring as Beijing boosts its clout in established organizations such as the World Bank and the International Mon-etary Fund (IMF).

Some of this is good news for a world order that has been deeply in-fluenced by U.S. policies since WWII. Increasing China’s role in the global trade system, boosting its voting share in multilateral institutions such as the

World Bank and the IMF, and encour-aging China to provide international public goods have been features of U.S. policy for decades. However, China also uses its growing strength to press sensitive issues in its relations with the U.S. and with its neighbors—Hong Kong, Taiwan and countries with interests in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, Beijing no longer ac-quiesces to U.S. military domination of its periphery. Its disquiet with “close-in” U.S. maritime and air surveillance is apparent. The gradual placement of U.S. and allied anti-ballistic missile defenses in East Asia to guard against

North Korean intimidation is another raw spot. Consequently, there are peri-odic Chinese air and sea challenges to U.S. naval and air forces that elevate the risks of accidents and miscalcula-tions. Beijing steadily builds cyber, space and strategic deterrent and de-fense capabilities, further energizing an action-reaction spiral among China, its neighbors and the U.S. Of course, looked at from Beijing’s perspective, the U.S. is striving to maintain or in-crease its technological lead across the full range of military power. Gross U.S. military spending is about two and a half times that of China.

Issues and approaches

The above developments give rise to two key policy questions (set-

ting aside the issue of North Korea, treated above): how to foster an eco-nomic balance of power in Asia and how to achieve more reciprocity in re-lations with China.

Fostering a balance of economic power

Comprehensive national power has three components: the capacities to co-erce, materially induce and persuade. The U.S.’s regional and global role throughout the post-WWII period has been underpinned by its large and bal-anced portfolio of these three power instruments.

Moving into the new millennium, however, U.S. missteps, global de-velopments and intelligent moves by others have combined to diminish the U.S.’s relative strength. Factors in-clude: the combined weight of post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan; the 2008–09 global financial crisis (which hit the U.S. harder than China); China’s impressive economic growth combined with Beijing’s “going global policy” initiated in the early 2000s to encourage domestic firms to invest abroad; the 2011 Obama administra-tion “pivot to Asia,” which sought to rebalance U.S. interests away from Eu-rope and the Middle East and toward Asia, but over-emphasized U.S. mili-

tary power, alienating China to no posi-tive effect; Washington’s policy bias against infrastructure construction in its World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Export-Import Bank and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs; domestic gover-nance problems in the U.S. itself; and counterproductive opposition to initia-tives such as the AIIB and the TPP. The shortening economic leg of U.S. power in Asia weakens U.S. capacity to main-tain balance.

How might Washington lengthen that leg, beyond getting back into the regional trade agreement game and concluding a bilateral investment agreement with Beijing? A central part of Xi Jinping’s geo-economic vi-sion is to expand regional links and promote urbanization and economic growth on China’s periphery, making China the central node for the region. In East, Southeast and South Asia this means north-south connectivity; that is, creating goods and services sup-ply chains that originate in China and extend to the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, the Andaman Sea, the Bay of Bengal and beyond. In order to maintain influence, the U.S. will need to become more involved in the con-struction of regional infrastructure and collaborate to foster linkages that are not just north-south, but also east-west (which would involve links from In-

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

G R E A T D E C I S I O N S  2 0 1 8

SOURCE: China General Administration of Customs; The Wall Street Journal

02006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

200

300

400

500

100

600

IN BI

LLIO

NS (

US D

OLL

ARS)

China’s Global Trade Surplusdia to Vietnam, through Burma, Thai-land, Cambodia and on to Japan and the wider Pacific, including the U.S.). This would involve participation from U.S. companies, foreign aid and de-velopment agencies, allies, and mul-tilateral development agencies. Bal-anced connectivity between China and the U.S. would help avoid spheres of influence that give rise to resentment and conflict.

Achieving more reciprocity

Prior to the 2000s, China was preoc-cupied with its own development, be-ing neither a major exporter nor a sig-nificant source of outward investment. Once China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, its trade and investment abroad grew enormous-ly, as did its global trade surplus and the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China.

Beijing soon had the technology, capital and capacity to take advantage of opportunities abroad without simul-taneously providing commensurate ac-cess to China for the U.S. and others, particularly in the services, IT and ag-riculture sectors. China’s global trade surplus exploded, creating huge cash reserves that needed to be kept abroad in order to avoid generating domestic inflation. Beijing bought U.S. Trea-sury securities in enormous quantities to soak up the cash, but soon sought higher returns by buying tangible for-eign assets. As has been widely report-ed, China has conspicuously expanded its outward FDI, purchasing factories, property, resources, R&D facilities, etc. China’s outward foreign invest-ment exceeded its inward FDI for the first time in 2014; its FDI in the U.S. grew rapidly.

Compounding all this, from about 2008 on, the pace of domestic econom-ic, financial and foreign trade liberal-ization in China slowed. While Xi Jin-ping’s accession to power in 2012–13 initially promised to energize market-based reforms, the ensuing years have revealed his determination to pursue a wide range of muscular industrial poli-cies, known as “Made in China 2025.” Consequently, the issues of “reciproc-SOURCE: US Census Bureau

350

250

200

150

100

300

IN BI

LLIO

NS (

US D

OLL

ARS)

US – China Trade De�cit: from near zero to over$350 billion in nearly 20 years

’90 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98 ’00 ’02 ’04 ’06 ’08 ’10 ’12 ’14 ’16

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

C H I N A A N D A M E R I C A 3

ity” and “fairness” have moved front and center in U.S.-China relations. There is enough blame to go around, but some analysts in the U.S. believe that U.S. trade negotiators at the time of China’s WTO entry “dropped the ball” on pushing for access to China for U.S. service providers.

It is one thing to identify inequities and another to find remedies that don’t disproportionately hurt U.S. interests and innocent bystanders. Limiting Chi-nese investment into U.S. employment-generating firms diminishes domestic U.S. job opportunities. An example of

perverse results from retaliation can be found in the Trump administration’s threatened tariffs on imported steel from China and other suppliers. That threat, made in 2017, led to a surge in U.S. steel imports in anticipation of price rises, while also raising the spec-ter of higher costs for U.S. steel users and public consumers. So, while feel-ings of resentment mount in the U.S., finding ways to enhance reciprocity that don’t injure everyone is hard. On the other hand, ignoring the problem invites extremist proposals at home and contempt from Beijing.

President Trump’s November 2017 trip to China attempted to address in-equities on the trade front. Beijing and Washington collaborated on bundling an assortment of already agreed-upon transactions, memoranda of under-standing, letters of intent and new deals, to produce a huge headline figure ($253.5 billion) for benefits bestowed on the U.S. as a “result” of the presi-dent’s trip. But the actual transactions in the package did little to address the fundamental issue of the tilted field on which U.S.-China trading and invest-ment is played out.

Negotiating cooperation

The U.S. today faces policy choices in its relationship with China the

magnitude of which it has not confront-ed in Asia since the earliest days of the Cold War. In terms of economic en-gagement with Asia and China, Ameri-cans must ask themselves how to pro-ceed. The U.S. can continue to advance its interests through multilateral trade arrangements, or it can do so through bilateral trade arrangements, negotiat-ed one by one between Washington and individual countries, as advocated thus far by the Trump administration. With respect to a more level playing field between China and the U.S., the U.S. must consider what points of leverage it has to extract reciprocity from Bei-jing without unduly hurting itself and innocent bystanders. What tools does the U.S. need to develop to be more effective in its economic engagement with Asia? For instance, should the Export-Import Bank be strengthened? And should U.S. infrastructure devel-opment and foreign assistance funds be increased or reduced?

Turning to security issues, the U.S. must consider a host of policy alterna-tives. Washington must decide whether to strive for balance in Asia or to seek to maintain its primacy in the region. In doing so, it must consider what primacy looks like in an age of interdependence. Relatedly, the U.S. might choose to prioritize its five security alliances in

Asia (with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia), or alternatively to work gradually with Beijing and others to develop security structures that include both powers. In seeking to balance China’s strength, would it be a feasible strategy to de-velop a coalition of China’s neighbors, including India, or would this ignite a regional arms race? Finally, the U.S. faces difficult choices in North Korea. It can accept the fact that Pyongyang already has nuclear weapons and seek

to deter their use, proceed along the course of gradually tightening pressure on North Korea, or pursue a third path that involves the use of force.

Each one of these policy choices has ramifications throughout the regional and global systems. Beijing and Wash-ington must manage the challenges and prioritize the key tasks that, if handled well, will lay the foundation for mutual benefit and peace. The U.S. is no longer in a position to compel cooperation; co-operation must be negotiated.

Vietnamese cheer as the convoy transporting U.S. President Donald Trump passes by on Nguyen Van Linh Road on November 10, 2017, in Danang, Vietnam. President Trump, who was on a 12-day Asia trip, took part in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)summit hosted by Vietnam. The APEC meeting aims to promote free trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region. (LINH PHAM/GETTY IMAGES)

This content downloaded from ��208.95.48.49 on Tue, 09 Mar 2021 06:21:35 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

C H I N A A N D A M E R I C A

discussion questions

Useful Links That Will Help You Around

Link to new order https://studentsolutionsusa.com/orders/stud/new

link to login page https://studentsolutionsusa.com/orders/login

New user registration link https://studentsolutionsusa.com/orders/register

Forgot Password https://studentsolutionsusa.com/orders/forgot/password

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Question: How does this work?

Answer: Good Question. We are a group of a freelance board of students and professional essay writers. At our website, you may get help with any type of academic assignments: essay, coursework, term paper, business plan, case study, article review, research paper, presentation, and speech. Top writers can help with complex assignments such as dissertations, thesis papers, etc. All of them are professionals possessing excellent knowledge in their field of expertise, perfect writing skills, quality, and speed. When you place an order on our website, we assign it to the best writer. Once the writer finishes the work, the paper is submitted to our quality assurance desk who go through it and ensure it is unique and plagiarism free and that the instructions were followed to the detail. After this step we upload the paper in your account, we also send a copy to the email that you used to register the account with. we can guarantee you that the paper will be 100% plagiarism free. Besides, our services are 100% private and confidential

Question: How do I place an Order after getting to the order page

Answer: There are three major steps in the ordering process

Step 1 ....................................................paper details In this step, you will fill in the instructions of your paper; you can upload any materials that you feel will make your assignment a success. Besides, you can also email us at [email protected] Remember to specify the correct academic level. Please note that sources mean the number of references.

Step 2...................................................... Price calculation Kindly specify the number of pages, type of spacing and the correct deadline. This step will give you the estimated cost minus discount -- you may add the extra features if you wish.

Step 3 ....................................................discount and payment Use the discount code HAPPY2018 to enjoy up to 30% discount of your total cost After this step, proceed to safe payment; you can checkout using your card or PayPal Please note we will send the complete paper to the email you will provide while registering. A copy will also be uploaded to your account

Question: How will I know when my paper is complete? or How will I get the complete Paper?

Answer: Once we are done with the paper, we will be uploaded to your account. A copy will also be sent to the email you registered with. We can guarantee you the following:- 1. Our service is private and confidential; we don't spam or share your contacts with anyone 2. The final paper will be plagiarism free. We will send a Turnitin Report to the email you registered with 3. At our company, willing to do free unlimited revisions until you are satisfied with your paper

Question:- Am a new client, How can I get the guarantee that the paper will be completed and sent to me before my deadline?

Answer: Thank you for expressing your concerns. We would love to have you as our loyal customer. We are certain if we do good work, you will come back for me. Besides, you will give us referrals to your friends and family. For that reason, we can’t fail to deliver your paper within your specified time frame. We will ensure we submit the paper on time so that you can have enough time to go through it, if you have problems with the paper delivered, you can request a free revision. You are entitled to as many revisions as you would wish until you get a paper that satisfies you

ChinaandAmerica.pdf

Useful Links That Will Help You Around

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Question: How does this work?

Question: How do I place an Order after getting to the order page

Question: How will I know when my paper is complete? or How will I get the complete Paper?

Question:- Am a new client, How can I get the guarantee that the paper will be completed and sent to me before my deadline?

Useful Links That Will Help You Around

Contact Us