Chapter
Change Management
Perspectives
Learning objectives
Bytheendofthischapteryoushou-dbeab-eto:
医さ団園 Understandandidentifythefactorsthatcancausechangetofaiー,
E雨 四墨 塾 Assessthestrengthsandiimitationsofcheck1istsformana9ingchangeeffectively.
「LQ--蟹副 Evaluatetheadvantagesofstage modelsofchange managennent.
匝IE至重軍司 Assessthetheoreticalandpracticaーva-ueoftheprocessPerspectiveonchange.
「Lof輔園Understandandapp-ycontingencyapproachestochange management.
”了hequest′on′sがrw力os
go′ngro/erme/′r’swho
′sgomgtostopme.”
AynRand,writerandphilosopher
319
320
ChaPterlO
C/7の堰e崩超′mgの??emβのPecr和郎
optionsfor Managing Change
Chnngt,1~ Dim,ptiv,二,一Liv(, with.t - - 一-…
soatoppotyoftheorgazaon.Thisis
not
something
that
can
be
third
orfourth
down
in
the
CEO’s
list
ofthings
he
or
she
must
do.VVe
viewthose
characteristics
as
beingnecessaryco‐travellerstodeliveringa
truetransformationofthecompany・(Bucyetal,,2017a,pp.2-3).
Atruetransformationisdisruptive.ltdoesn’t
justwork withtheexisting9overnance,the
existingprocesses,theexistingbudgetingcy-
cle,theexistingwaysofdoingthings.ltisgo-
ing
to
disrupt, And
it’s
going
to create
challengeandtensionandfriction
intheor-
ganization.Because
it
is
so disruptive,it’s
TheperspeCtivesdiscussedinthischapterinc1udechange managementChecMists,stage
models,andprocessandcontingencytheories,They o掻eradvice on managingchange,butmakeno mentionofthepersonalstylesandpre危rencesofindividualchange manag-
ers.Letusfirst6‐1lthisgap,
The Directorand Navigatorlmages ofChange Management
1iwoofourskimagesofchange managementareparticularlyrelevanttotheapproaches
exploredinthischapter.TheαZreczorimageunderpinsthechangemanagementapproaches
associatedwiththeworkoflargeconsultingcompanies,andalsoofacademicswho work
aschangeconsultantsinthisfield,Those who adoptsuch approachestake astrategic
view,adopting a pragmatic, managerialistapproachto
achievinglasting organizational
change. The
chec*山sts
and
stage modelsthat we
explore 魚1lintothis
category. They
suggestthatchangecanbe managedandcontrolledinapredictable manneraslongas
the
correctsteps
aretaken,in moreorlessthecorrectsequence, However,giventhe
numberofdi錐erentsetsofrecipesand丘ameworksthatareavailable,itisnotalwaysclear
whichtoadopt,orthecriteriaon whichthechoiceshouldbemade.
Contingencyframeworkscanalsobeseenasconsistentwiththeメケecわri血age.Rather
thanclaimingtohavediscovered“theonebestapproach,”however,these丘ameworksargue
that“itdepends“on anumberofcontext 魚ctors,such asthescaleand urgencyofthe
proposedchanges.Fore×ample,oneofthesecont無gencyframeworks,thechangekaleido-
scope(BalogunetaL,2016)doesnoto爺erPrescriptiveadviceonhowtoimplementchange
inparticularcontexts,That丘ameworkinsteadhighlights免rthechange managerthecon-
textualissuesto consider whenreaching aninあrmedjudgmentwithregardto change
implementationdesignoptions,Thisapproachisalsoconsistenttosomeextentwiththe
′7αyZg防げimageofchange management,Changecanbecontrolledinpart,butexternal
魚ctors(contextualenablersandconstraints,competinginterests)can generateemergent
andunintendedoutcomesoverwhichthechange managerhaslittleornoinfluence.
The
idea
ofestablishing“fit” between
changeimplementation
and organizational
contextisnotconsistentwithaprocessualview ofchange.Processtheoriesseechange
unあldingovertimeina messyanditerative wayandthusrelyontheimageofchange
manageras“の’Zgのor.Here,thechangeoutcomesareshapedbyacombinationoffactors
ChaPterlO
C方の増ど崩‘”〃”ge′77e用弁eなlpeメルes
321
includingthepast,present,andfuturecの7rexzinwhichtheorganizationfunctions;the
sz心“α打ceofthechange;theimP1ementation〃mcesg刀o/mcq/わeんαvzor,insideand out-
side
the
organization; and
the
interactions
between
these
魚ctors (Dawson
and
んDdriopoulos,2017),Theroleofthechange managerisnotto direct,buttoidenti尊
options,accumulateresources, monitor progress,andto′mwgqre
a paththroughthe
complexity.
ltistherefbreimportantforchange managerstobeawareof,and perhapson many
occasionsto putto
one
side,theirpre発rredimage
ofchange management.ltis
also
importantthatmanagersarecomあrtablewiththeiractions,withregardtobothpersonal
capabilityandhowactionsareperceivedtofitwiththecontext,However,implementation
designdecisionsshouldideallybemoreheavilyinfluencedbythecontext魚ctorsthatwe
exploreinthischapterthanbypersonalconsiderations.
圏園圏麗 W′hy Change Fails
ルリノの?ew加 加瀞?仰げ mαdeqmな放たe 加s“everかたdのりノ効力7g″gMノ. (A1bertEinstein)
方房雄お『庇方rsrsreprollノqrds蔵/超re. (Homersimpson)
lnthischapter,weexploreapproachestoimLP1ementingorganizationalchangeeがectively,drawing on
arangeofchange management,processual,and
contingency perspectives.First,however,wewillexplorewhychange態ils,lfweunderstandthecommon mistakes,perhapswecanavoidthem.
Askagroup ofmanagerstoreflectontheirexperienceandtoidentifywhattodoto
makeorganizationalchange 魚il.Theirresponseusuallycomesintwostages.First,theylaugh.Second,theygeneratewithoutdifficultyalistofpracticalactionstoguaranteethat
aninitiativewillnotbesuccessful.Tablelo,lillustratesthetypicalresultsofsuchadis‐cussion,Thissuggeststwoconclusions.First,ensurmgthatchange魚ils-shouldonewishtodothat-isnotdi甘icult.Therearemanytoolsatone’sdisposal,involvingacombination
ofactionsandinactions.Second,ifwehavesuch agoodunderstandingofwhatcango
wrong,thengettingitrightshouldbeeasy.justturnthenegativesaround:clearvlslon,
TABLEIO.IHowtoハ4ake
chooSethemoStexpenSiVewaytodoit
CommitmentWith0utーeaderShipSupp0rt
ChangeFail:A
Demotivatethegroup
Donotrecognizethepoweroftheteam
ハ4anagement
Distortthevision
DivertattentionandresourcesView
Don,tbuyintotheprocess
Don’tfollowtheprocess
トlighlightpastfailures
トlighlightthenegatives
Lackofhonesty
Nocommunication
Politicalgames
Setupsilos
下eamupwithothers
下oomanypoliciesandprocedures
322
ChaPte「1O
C/m′7ge脳久のmgeme′7rReな刀ecr′1’es
commitmentandleadershipsupport,honestco]mmLunication,simplicity,breakdoWnthe
snos,highlightsuccessesand positives.-andsoon.Sadly,whilethisapproachishelpful,
“gettingitright”isnotthiseasy.
From hisresearchintooverloocompanies(mostbutnotanAmerican),John Kotter
(2007;2012a)arguesthattransあrmationalchangeso貴en 魚ilbecauseofthe mistakesthat
areidentifiedintable
lo,2.Understandingwhatnotto do, Kotterturnsthese mistakes
intoapositivemodelofsuccessfultransit)rmation,Thatinvolvescarefulplanning,Worldng
throughtheseissuesmoreorlessinsequence,andnotmissingorrushinganyofthem-
whichtakestime,However,giventherapidpaceofcontelnporarychange, many organl-
zationsperhapstrytotaketoo manyshortcuts,toputchangeinplacequic]=ly,andgetit
wrongasaresult.
亙thoughit maybean oversimplificationtoclaim thatsuccessfulchangejustmeans
avoidingthese mistakes,theyshouldbeavoidednevertheless,ltisalsoimportanttorec‐
ognizethatthereare manyofthese mistakes,andthatinanyparticularsetting,several
ofthose 魚ctors maybecombiningtoensurethatthechangeprogram 魚ils.Successor
魚ilurecanrarelybeexplainedwithre定rencetoonlyasingle 魚ctor,VVhatarethecosts
involvedinavoidingthese mistakes?AI1mostalltheremediesarecost‐neutral,involving
changesinleadership
and managementstyle
andin organizationalpolicies
and proce-
dures,lnshort,whileensuringthatchangewill魚ilinvolveslittleornocost,mostofthe
actionsrequiredto”getitright
’’areaISO 丘ee.
TABLEIO.2W〆hyT1ans節rmationE掻ortsFail☆
Mistakes
NatureandRemedy
~ourgency
ーfemployeesdon’tseetheneed,thentheyWillnotbemotivatedtoChange;
【nへ【ヘバ^ n〔(h十
hh”ぐ+
hr′、つ+‘[、q
o′r、hごと
r、f
=r〔とュn′.・′
tocelebrate;managementshouーdcreateandrewardshort‐term wlns.
Premoru「ev′crory
Thejobisnotdonewhenimprovementsappear;itisamistaketo“declare
ChaPte「1O
Cメ7の増eル超′70gの77の7rRersPecr印弧
323
園園園圃 Change by Checklist
勤ereなαcerrq!′?〆効け′′7欲の7gどの’の?豹α!gねZzbe方om 彰〆lollりなeノαs/ 卿ve珍zmdかdye/-
/′′?gZ〃”srqge‐の僻ん ”な 堺renqcom脆ァrro靴扉o′7es脚立『/m mメムe虜“なed/′?′?ewp超ces,
(Washingtonlrving)
Thelandscapeofpracticaladviceあrthechange managerisdominatedbysimplecheck
lists.Thesehavealsobeendescribedas“〃-steprecipes,” where〃isthenumberofitems
onthelist,Thisapproachisopentothecriticismthatitoversim‐plifiesacomplexprocess.
Howeversimplified,itisprobablyaccurateto claim that,in mostcases,ifthechange
managerdoesnotあ11OW mostoftheadviceinthesechecklists,thenthechangeprogram
couldrunintotrouble.
Checklistapproachesto change managementassumethattheprocessislogicaland
linearandcantherelt)rebecontrolledbyplanningandthen長)1lowingthecorrectsetof
steps.This“rationallinear” modelofchangehasbeen widelycriticized,butitremains
popularwithpro花ssionalbodiesand managementconsultancies.Thisisprobablybecause
thesechecklistsorrecipescodifywhatisusuallya messyanditerativeprocessandthus
oぼerthebusy change
manager
straightfbrward
advice
on whatto
dotoimprovethe
chancesofsuccess.lnthissection,wewillconsiderthreetypicalchecklistsandconsider
howthechangeagentshouldchoosebetweenthem.
The Boston Consultin9 Group’s D-CE ModeI
D【anagementconsultingcompaniestyPicallydeveloptheirownrecipes,o仕en withamem-orableacronym.TheDICE modeldevelopedbytheBoston ConsultingGroup,食)rexam-
pie,identifies化’ur 魚ctorsthatdetermine whethera changeprogram will“flyordie”:Duration,lntegrity,Commitment,andE鎖ort.These化’ur魚ctorsareoutHnedintableio.3
(Sirkinetai.,2005).
TABLEIO.3
pーcEFactor
MeaningDICE÷“/aIYour
Changepr。gram
DUro”on
Thedurationoftimeuntiltheprogramiscompletedifithasashortlife
F・yorDie?
span;ifnotshort,theamountoftimebetweenrevjewsormilestones
′〃fegr#y
Theprojectteam’sperformanceintegrity;jtsabiーitytocompletethe
initiativeontime,whichdependsonmembers’sk旧sre-ativetothe
projecrsrequirements
commたmen士
Thecommitmentdisplayedbytopmanagementandemployeeswho
areaffected
E航or『
TheeffortrequiredthatisoVerandabovetheusualdemandson
employees
Program
oftimeshort,thea
team’sper
time,whic
quirements
Theprojectt
initiativeont
projecでsreq
BasedonsirkinetaL,2005
Changemanagersareadvisedtocalculatescoresあreachofthe DICE 魚ctors.Forexam-
Pie,DurationscoreshighlyiftheoveranPrqect前rilescaleisshortwithfrequentreviewsbut
getsalowscoreifreviewsaremorethaneightmonthsaPart.lntegrityscoreswellifaskiUed
and‐motivatedPrQiectteam hasacaPableandresPectedleaderandscoresbadlyifthose
324
ChaPterlO
C′70′7ge脳超′mgie′77gmReなz7此方-’es
発aturesareabsent.Adethosewhow皿 beal胃ectedbythechangeenthusiasticandsuPPortive
(high Co凹面tmentscore),oraretheyconcerned andobstructive(lowscore)?Doesthe
prqiectrequireasmaUamountofadditionalwork(highE餓ortscore)oralotofeXtrae掻ort
ontopofanalleadyheavyload(lowscore)?ThecombinedscoresreveaIWhetherapr ect
ismtheレvZ′7Zの7色thetノげび Zの7色 orthelyoezの7e.Knowing wherethe weaknessesare,
managementcandeveloPanactionP1anto movethechange中tothew/′7zの2e,
ReducingthetasktoFourdimens1onsprovidesreassurancethat,inspiteoftheuncer-
taintiesand untidiness,changecanbecontro11ed and工エーanagede”コective1yina moreor
lesslogicalandpredictablemanner.AIIS0,havingtohandlesuchasmallnumberofissues
appearstolessenthescaleofthechallengethatthechange managerhasto 魚ce.Success
appearstobeprettymuchguaranteed,
Prosci’s ADKAR ModeI
TheADKARchangemodelwasdevelopedbytheconsultingcompanyProsci(Hiatt,2004;2006;Hiattand Creasey,2012),Theacronym isbased onfiveelements: Awareness,Desire,Knowledge,Ability,and Rein貴)rcement,公4anycommentatorshaveobservedthat
organizationschangebychangingonepersonatatime(e,g,,MCFarlandand Goldsworthy,
2013).Followingthatpremise,the あcusoftheADKAR‐modellieswiththeカメZVZメヱ臓声
who Willbeinvolvedinanda]mectedbychange,ln other words,thechange manageris
advisedtoconcentrateonindividuaIAwareness,individuaIDesire,individuaIKnowledge,individuaIAbility,andtheextentto which Rein食)rcementis meaningfulandrelevantto
theindividual,TheA[軽く一ARelementsaredescribedmtable
lo.4,
TABLEIO.4
ADKARE-ements
FactorslnfluencingChangeSuccessADKAR‐Five
E1e】mーents
Aworeness
lndividualviewsofthecurrentStateandProblems
.nnuencing
oftheneedforchange
Credibi-ityofthoseSendingtheawarenessmessages
ChangeSuccess
Circulationofrumorsormisinformation
Contestabilityofthereasonsforchange
behaviorS
Timeavailabletodeveloptherequiredski”s
Availabiーityofresourcestosupportskillsdevelopment
Re′〃fi。rcemenr
MeaningfulandspecifictothePersonaffected
tosustainthechange
LinkWithdemonstrableProgress
NonegativeconsequenCes
Accountabilitysystemtocontinual-yreinforcethechange
Source:Hiatt,J.2006.
ChaPte「1O
Cメ7α′7ge崩‘”′mgの77emReなPecrかes
325
ASWith DICE,thechange managercan useAJ)KAR asadiagn○stican‐d p1anningtool,toidentifyareasofPotentialresistance,todeveloPcommunicationandsta茸 devel-
oPment
strategies,andto
strengthen
changeimP1ementation byaddressinggaps
and
problems,PayingcloseattentiontoindividuaIPerceptions,strengths,and weaknessesisastrengthoftheAL1)※]ARapproach,Particu1ar1ywithregardtogeneratingenthusiasm,overcom・ngresistance,and
develoPing new skills.lnaddition,thisis
one
ofthe 免wmodelsthatexplicitlyaddresstheissueofsustainingchange(which wewillexploreinchaPterll).However,ADK‐AR payslessattentiontothenatureandilrlplicationsofthewiderorganizationalcontextandtheProcessofchange一触ctorsthatareemPhasizedinother models.
Stouten’s Evidence‐Based Approach
Notingthatthe魚ilurerateofplannedorganizationalchangeishigh,Stoutenetal.(2018)suggestthatmanagersshouldnotusetheavailableresearchevidence when ma]bLngdeci-sionsaboutproposedchangesto organizationalpractices.Theyarguethatan evidence‐
basedapproachismoreapProPriate.Theirreview ofthatevidence,父)cusingonpractical
guidelinesandunderlyingtheory,identifies
l0stePsthatthechange managerisadvisedto賃)1loW:
1, Diagnosis(1):Gatherthe魚ctsconcerningthenatureoftheProblem.
2, Diagnosis(2):Assesstheorganization’sreadiness あrchange.
3.ldenti尊solutions:lmplementevidencebasedchangeinterventions.
4. DeveloPe爺ectivechangeleadershipthroughouttheorganization.
5. Developandco]mmーunicateaco]mPellingchangev・s1on.
6・\yorkwithsocialnetworks,andusetheirinfluence,
7. UseenablingPractices一goalsetting,learning,employeeParticipation,andtransitional
structures-tosuPportimP1ementationthatshouldalsobe魚irandjust.8.Encouragesmall‐scaleinitiativesandexPerimentation,toallowlocaladjustmentsto
broadchangeplans,
9. AssesschangeProgressandoutcomesovertime.
10.1nstitutionalizethechangetosustainitse”ヨectiveness.
Thisgeneraladvicehastobeadaptedtospecificlocalcircumstances,buttheresearch‐
ersarguethatanaPproachthat貸)1lowstheevidencecarefullyismorelikelytosucceed
than onethatdoesnot.ltisinterestingtonotethatthisapproachisbroadlyconsistent
withotherguidelines,suchas,危rexample,thosefrom Kotter(2012a):Establishtheneed
andreadinessForchange,communicateacompellingvls1on,assessProgress,institution‐
alizeorembedthechange.
Checkingthe Check1ists
Therearemany“howto”checklistsincirculation.Howshouldthechangemanagerchoose
betweenthem?Theircontentsaresimilar,buttheyeachhighlightdifierentissues.DICE
(Sirkinetal.,2005)asksthechange managertocalculatescores 危rthechangetiming,team,commitment,and demandsonsta茸.ADKAR(Hiatt,2006)危cusesonindividual
326
CI1aPterlO
C′74′7ge脳α′70geme′7『H窃即ec輸’es
perceptions,motivations,andcapabilities.Stoutenetal,(2018)wantthechange manager
to貴)1loWtheresearchevidenceaCross
losteps,
oneresponseconcerns”云it“;someaPProachesaremoreapproPriatethanotherstoa
givencontext.Thisdependsonthesizeoftheorganization,thenature,scaleandurgency
ofchange,theproblemsto be
solved,numbers
a畳当ected,the
organization’s historyof
change,andso on,lfchangetimingand demands
on sta甘 arekeyconcerns,andthe
organizationalculturehasapre舵rence貴)rquantifiedmethods,theDICE modelmaybe
appropriate,TheA”)KuRapproach mayapplyinsituationsWhereindividualconcerns
areseenascentraltothesuccessofchange,Theevidence‐basedapproachofStoutenetal,
(2018) maycontributetothecredibilityofthechange managerinorganizationalcultures
Wherechangesthemselveshavetobeseentobesupportedbyevidence,suchasengineer‐
ing,researchanddevelopment,andhealthcaresettings,
ltmayseem obvioustoarguethatchangesneed
to
be
adequately
resourced,With
funds,people,andotherappropriatesupport,iftheyaretohave
any
chance
of
success,Research
suggests
the
opposite,
Weidne「etal.(2017)wereinterestedinthesup-
portprovidedfororganizationalchanges,asinade-
quate 「esourcing
i
s
often
used
to
e×plain
や「
excuse}fai-ure.Confidenceinandcommitmentto
change,and
experimentation
with
different
op-
tions,canbeencouragedbyhavingaccesstothe
rightfinancial
and
human
resources.Experience
shows,however,thatthesuccessofmajorchanges
isnotguaranteedevenwheresignificantresources
aremadeavailable,
Theresearchersstudiedlinksbetweenavailable
resourcesandthesuccessofchangeinthreehealth-
caresettingsintheUKNationa-HeaーthService(NHS),These
involved
hospital
services,communitycare,andmenta-healthservices.TheNHShadbeenunder
pressuretocutcosts,whilemaintainingquaーity,ata
time
when
demand
for
hea1thca「e
was
r-s1ng.Changestothehospital
and
communitycare
prac‐
ticeswe「efelttobestrate9icpriorities,sotheywe「e
wellresourced,andtheirchangeagentshada-otof
freedom,-ncontrast,mentalhealthse~iceswe「enot
seen
as
a
priority,and
budget
and
administrative
supportresourcesfortheseserviceswerecut.The
researchers
gathered
information
overfouryears,
usingacombinationofobservation,inte~iews,anda
widerangeoforganizationaldocuments,
W′hich
servicesexperiencedthe
mostprofound
changes,andwhy?Weidneretal.(2017)found:
・
Despitebeingverywe--resourced,hospitaーand
communitycareserviceswerelargelyunchanged
overtheperiodofthisstudy.
・
Mentalhealthserviceschangedandimprovedto
suchadegreethattheybecamealocalandna-
tionalshowpieceforstrategicchangeinitiatives.
・
Thoseworkingin mental
healthbenefittedfrom
thelackofinterestinwhattheyweredoing,as
thisa=owedthemtoimplementchangesquick-y,
without
becoming
involved
inlengthy
debates
andnegotiations.
Theinitiativesthatwereprioritizedand we-l
re‐
sourced
attractedtheattention
ofa wide
rangeof
powerful
stakeho1ders.As
a
result,thesechanges
came
under
more
intense
scrutinyand
challenge.Changeagentshadtodevotemoretimetomanag-
ingtheneedsanddemandsofa‘ltheinterestedpar-
ties
and
spent
less
time
imp1ementing
theactual
changes.
Contraryto
mostchange
managementadvice,this
evidence
suggeststhat,ifyou wanta
depart‐
ment,service,or
unitto
make
dramatic
changes,considergivingitinadequateresourcestodoso.
ChaPterlO
C
t乃の7geル仏α′7αge′77g川野ぞ裕Pedzves
327
Aぬother
answerto “how to
choose?” m‐aysimply be-doesit matter? As
long
as
adviceinthisfbrmisused asastructuredstarting point,thenthedetailsandissues
thatarerelevanttoaspecificchangeinaparticularorganizationshouldemergeinthe
discussion andtheplanning.Afinalresponseis-whychoose? W′hynotworkthrough
more
than
one
ofthese
approaches
and
assess
their value
in
use?
Two
or
more
approachesappliedtothesamechangeprogram maysuggestsimilar-orwidelydiぼer-
ent-implications云orpractice,Thesimilaritiescanbereassuring.Thedifferencesmay
trigger
further
insights
and
investigation
and
contribute
to better
implementation
planning.
Thesemodelsare”high-level“guides,notdetailed“bestpractice“road maps.Theyare
usefulaslong astheyareusedinthatway.Unlikearecipeinyourkitchen cookbook,
theseguidelineslisttheingredients withoutexplaininghowto makethedish.Youhave
toworkthatoutあryourself.Thiscanbe丑ustratingforchangemanagersseekingconcrete
adviceon“whatworksand whatdoesn’t,”Checklistsjustidenti尊 態ctorsthatneedtobe
addressed;thechallengeisto constructachangeimplementation processthatfitsthe
organizationalconte×t.Thatisthehardpart. Changeflom thisperspectiveistosome
extentatechnicalexercise,understandingtheissuestoconsider,butalsorequiresablend
oflocalblowledge,in恥rmedjudgment,andcreative”aロ.
rL万国副 Stage Models
豹e″z/‘羽/e.占泥ryo′7e/oyes〃?叩か力7gあeg粥川′?≧gsα′?メカαP即ノ釧{霞“gsゴ”Sルs”左g′”/ddをs豹の粥vo/ye 如rdwo戒, (Kanter,2009)
Changecanbeseen,notjustasachecklistofto‐dos,butasaseriesofstagesunあldingovertime,fromillitiation,throughimplementation,to conclusion.Thisstageapproach
doesnotnecessarilydisquali尊thechecklistsandrecipes.However,stage modelssuggest
theactionsthatthechange managerisadvisedtotakewillvaryovertheimplementation
cycle.ThestepsnecessarytoinitiatechangethuswillbediHヨerentfrom thoserequired
duringtheinnーplementationstage,anddi航erentactionsagainwiubenecessarytoconclude
andsustainthechange.Stage modelscanthuscomplementthechecklistapproachbyintroducingthistemporaldin[lenslon.
Lewin’s Three‐Stage Model
oneofthebest‐known modelsofchange wasdevelopedby KurtLewin(1951),who
argued食)rtheneedtoz殉膨ezethecurrentstateofaffairs,to′“。vetoadesirednew
state,andthentor弓かeezeandstabilizethosechanges(Burnes,2020;Cummingset
al.,2016):
Changeattitudesbyma]bLngpeople発eluncom長)rtableaboutthe way
thingsarebecausetheycouldbeimproved,andsoestablishthemotive
tochange・
328
ChaPterlO
C’7q′7ge崩敵′7αge′77g′7rHersPecr′yes
lmplementthechangeto mーovetothedesirednewstate.
EmbedorinstitutionaUzethenew behaviors,topreventPeoP1e登omdri宣ingbacktopreviouswaysofdoingthings.
Eachofthesestages makesdiがerentdelmlandSonthechange manager.First,convincing
those who willbeinvolvedoftheneedtochange.Second,puttingthechangeinplace.
Third,redesigningroles,systems,andprocedurestodiscourageareturntopastpractice.oneimportant。bservati。nofthism。delisthat,ifpeoplearehappywiththewaythings
are,theywillbereluctanttochange,Thechange manager’sfirsttaskinthisapproach,
therejR)re,istomakepeopleunhappy,Butthisisa“positivedissatis魚ction,
”whichencour-
agespeopletobelievethat“wecandobetter,”
Findonybu方ube,“Unfreezin9ChangeasthreestePs;RethinkingKurtl‐eWin’slegacyforchangemanagement”
(2019,7:36minutes).
Lewm’ssecondstage-mo光一caninvoke Kanter’slaW(seethebox”Kanter’sLaW),Which
sEwsthatchange。貴enlooksm(eafa江ureinthemiddle,Sc土田eiderandGoldwasser(1998),whoP1otted
“theclassicchangecurve,”capl旗redthislaw(seeFi罫jrelo.1).加themiddleof
thecurveSitsthe”vaneyofdespa立,“Those whoarea爺ectedstarttorealizethatthiscould
meanlossandpa無 恥rthem.Scr血eiderandGoldwasser(1998,p,42)arg瓢lethatthisispr。ID
ablymevitable,butthatitisusellilt。beawareofthisandto weakentheiIPpactifpossible:
A1eaderofchangemustanticipateemployees’reactions,anotherkey魚ctorintheProcess,
Asshown[Figurelo.1],thesereactionsoccuralonga”changecurve,“ThebluelinereP‐
resentswhatis,unあrtunately,typical,Unrealisticallyhighexpectationsattheoutsetofa
programmeleadtoarelativelydeep‘‘valleyofdespair”whenchangedoes口tcomeas
quicklyoreasilyasanticipated.overtime,employeesdoseea‘‘lightattheendofthe
tunnel”andthechangeeventuallyProducessomepositiveresults.Theredlineillustrates
whatispossiblewithe掻ectivechangemanagement:alesstraumaticvisittothevalleyand
greaterresultsastheprogrammereachescompletion.Canyouavoidthe”valleyofdespair”
altogether?Probablynot.AJ1changeprogrammesinvolvesomeloss,Thebestapproachis
toacknowledgethatelmーployeeswillmournthelossofbusinessasusual,muchaspeople
experiencestagesofgrievingwhentraumainvadestheirpersonallives.
Kotter’s Eight‐Stage ModeI
Probablythemostwidelycited,andwidelyapp”ed,stagemodelofchangeistheonedeveloped
byiotlnKotter(2007;2012a),mentionedea川erinthischapter,Kotter’Smodelissummarized
mtablelo,5,ltiss。met鱈nespresentedasanothercheck旦St,butthisisatmsrepresentation.rotehow hiseight‐stageapproachtotransit)rmationalchangeopenswith“createasenseof
urgencコメ(un仕eeze),passest虚。ugh“empowerpeopletoact”(move),andendswith“institu-
ti。na比とenewapproaches”(re丘eeze).Lew血’sechocanbeheardinthis model,too.
Kotteradvisesthechange managerto workthroughthoseeightstagesmoreorlessin
sequence.rForush ort。 missout。n any。ftheStagesincreasesthechanceof魚ilure,
H[owever, Kotter alsorecognizesthatthiSis
an “ideal” perspective,aschangeis
o貴en
untidyanditerative.Aswiththechecklists,thismodelcodifiesthestagesofchangeina
clearandeasilyunderstood manner,However,thechange managerstillhastocombine
ChaPterlO
C乃α′7ge脳毎′mgemβ′7「Per卸ec”1を.y
329
FIGUREIO.ITheC1assicChangeCurve
High
〉麗
THECLAss1c cHANGECURVE Muchbetter
expectations
l謹灘 thanbefore
Realizationof
effortand
ComP1exity
Despalr
〆#
Lightatt
〆
ofthetu
圃圏麹 Typicalprogram
梱
榔
圏Effectiveprogram
Source:Schneider,D,~1りandGoldwasser,C,1998,
localknowledgewithcreativethin姫ngtotranslatethisadviceintoPracticalactionsthat
areappropriatetotheorganizationalcontextandtothenatureofthechangesthatare
beingProPosed.Therearemanyways,食)rexamP1e,inwhichto“createasenseofurgency“
orto”commーunicatethevision”orto“institutionalizenewapProaches.”Aswithchecklists,
these
stage
models
are
also “high
level” guides,ratherthan
detailed “best
Practice”
丘ameworks.
APPelbaum etaL(2012)reviewed the evidence relating tothe e掻ectiveness
of
Kotter’s modeland あundsupPort あr mostoftheindividualstePs. However,despite
Kotter’sargumentaboutintegratingtheeightstages,nostudieshadevaluatedtheframe-
workasa whole,ontheotherhand,there wasnoevidencetochallengethePractical
valueoftheaPproach,whichremainsPOPular.Theauthorsarguethat“Kotter’schange
management modelaPPearsto
deriveits
POPularity more 登om its
directand usable
恥rmatthan 登om anyscientificconsensusontheresults”(Appelbaum etal.,2012,P.764).Theyconclude,therefbre,that Kotter’s modelisuse鏡linchangeimplementation
P1anningbutshouldbecomP1ementedbyothertoolsto adaPtthe change processto
localconditions.
Kotter(2012b,p,52)subsequentlyrevisedhis丘amework,arguingthatthecomPonents
identifiedintablelo,5shouldbeseenas”changeaccelerators“tospeedupchange,Thenew argumenthasthreeaspects.First, Kotterarguesthattheaccelerators mustoPerate
concurrently,ratherthaninsequence.Second,change mustnotrelyonasmallpowerful
330
ChaPterlO
C
t770′7ge脳超′mgの77e/7′Re窟¥)ecr′yes
TABLEIO.5 stage
VVhatls1nvolvedKotter’s霊ight‐
ExaminemarketandcompetitiVerealities.Stagewl。del。f
l.E繁Qb′′shosenseofurgenCy.
,dentifyanddiscusscr-sesandopportunities.TransformーationaI
Change
2,Form oPOWer打u/9u′d′n9
Assemb-eagrouPWithPoWertoleadthechange,
coo〃”on.
Encouradethisclrouptoworktodetherasateam.
thinking.
6.P/onfiorqndcreore
Pianforvisibleperformance1mprovements.
shorr‐te““ w′ns.
RewardemP1oyeesinvolvedinimProvements,
ChaPterlO
C力α′?ge羽q′7αge“7e′”βe′1Ped′1ぞs
331
that question has been anSWered,the changecan pr○ceedt○the nextStage.ThefiveStagesare:
Assess
Arc胡red
球′heredowewanttogo?
Howreadyare wetog。there?
W〆hatmustwed。togetthere?
Howdowemanagethejourney?
Howdowecontinuetoimprove?
Thismodelo爺ersguidelines長)rmanagingboththehardPerlt)rmanceandsofthealthisSues.Thefiveguidelines云or managingperlbrmanceare:
1.Szm肥厚co勿ecz/yes鰹叩かe」,CreateacomPellinglongterm changevlslon,Setmidterm
asPirationsalongthepath,andguardagainstbiasesintheProcess.
2.S顔/ムsezre秘密e′“ems 魚ssessノ.Forecastdemand 危rs顔1IS,andunderstandtheirSuPP1y
dynamics;thendecidehowtoclosegaPS.
3.βα〃卿鰯eP厄〃 〃効力ecリ.DefinethePort危lioofinitiativesthatwillrealizeyourstra‐
tegic o廟ectives,and meetyourskillrequirements;then sequence youractions and
reallocateresourcesaccordingly.
4. のり“er嘘字 mode/@cリ.EstabliShstronggovernance,decidehowtoscaleyourchange
initiatives, monitor
their
Progress, and
dynamically
adjust
them
throughout
implementation.
5.乙e鯖′?!〃g″折口szr肥れぽerodyの7ceノ.lnstitutionalizeProcessesand exPertiseS0thatthe
organizationshareSknowledge,constantlyimproves,andcontinuallylearnshowtod。
newthings(KellerandSchaninger,2019a,P.8).
The行veguidelinesあrmanaginghealthare:
1. 嵐eの物gm応 超功能ノ.0醇ectivelycheckyourorganization’Shealth,choosewheretobe
exceptional,andtargetareaSthatneedimmediateimprovement.
2.MZ〃ぬezsね諺s 彰ssessノ.PinPointhelpingand hinderingbehaviors 危r Priorityhealth
areaS,e×P1oretheunderlying mindsetdrivers,and prioritizeacritical 免w “丘om-to”
mindsetshi賃s.3.加卵“e〃ce/eyeな にたた!『ecリ.Use危urleverstoreshapetheworkenvir。nment:role mod‐
embog,understandmgandconviction,rein危rcementmechamsms,andcon6‐dence-build血g
e甜orts.ThenensurethatPerformanceinitiativesareengineeredtopromotetheneces-
sary mindsetandbehavioralshi仕s.4. Ge〃eだのZo〃 げe〃e′割ノ@cリ.Mobilizeinfluenceleaders, makethechangepersonal危r
emP1oyees,and maintain high‐impact,two‐waycommunication.
5.乙eqde都月彰 〆αceme′”‘”dyの7ceノ.Prioritizeongoingrolesbytheirpotentialto create
value, matchthe mostinnPortant。nest。thebesttalent,and makethetalent‐match
Processbusinessasusual(KellerandSchaninger,2019a,P,8).
EvenifthishighlydetailedprescriPtioniS危1lowedcare鏡1ly,trans危rmation canstilldisaPPoint.AccordingtoN[CKinseyresearch,adoPtinga”
Pipeline”analogy,Problemso賃en
ariSethrough“leakage,
”whichmayexP1ainthe70PercentfailurerateofP1annedchange:
332
ChaPterlO
C乃α′7ge脳”′?αg1e′77g′7rReri¥)ecr′}’郷
lt’sallaboutavoidingleakage.SoattheasPirationstage,長)lksdon’tgo長)rtheir和1IPoten-
tial.Theygo化)rsevenoutoftenofit.AねdthenintheP1anningandexecution,theylet
somethingss1ide,Theydon’tseesomethingsallthewaythrough.Aねdtheydosevenout
oftenofit.Then,finally,theydon’tbuildinthechangesthatarenecessary貴)rtheinitia-
tivetobesustained.Theygetitsevenoutoftenright,\Mell,ifyou multiplythattogether,
thosesevensoutoftens,youquicl紅ygettoabouta30Percentsuccessrate.That’swhat
we’veseen,agamandagain.Youhaveto,ateachstepoftheprocess,goforthe
looper‐
centandbeabletorealizethefulIPotentialofthebusinessinorder化)rthetransit)rmation
tobesuccess位1,(Bucyetal,2o17a,p.3)
Bucyetal.(2017b)oぼerthree Piecesofadvice 危rkeepingthePipelineintactand
transft)rlnationalchangeontarget,First,berg/e刀″ess,assumingthat mostinitiativesWill
deliverlessthantheypromiseatthestart.Aぬdensurethattimeisallocatedtosmaller
initiatives,Torein貴)rcethispoint,theyuseaninteresting“boulders,pebbles,andsand”
analogy.“Boulders”areinitiativesthatareeachexpectedtocontributeatleast5percent
ofthe
program’s
total
value,“Pebbles” are
expected
to
contribute
between
o.5
and
5Percent,AJ1initiativesexpectedto contributelessthano.5percentofthetotalvalue
are“sand.”N[CKinseyresearchsuggeststhat50percentofthetotalvalueofmanytrans‐
あrmationprogramstypicallycomes丘omsand.FocusingefGortontheboulders-thelarge,
high‐profileinitiatives-isthere危rerisky.lnaddition,itisusuallyquickerand easierto
implementthe”sand,” which mayinvolve 元werlayersofapprovalandlesscumbersome
coordination.
second,たα/sresoz/rce品 anddonotexpectyourbestchange managerstorun more
thanthreeinitiativesatthesametime,APdcontrolthenumberofmetricsand milestones,
manyofwhichareneverusedandbecomeunnecessaryburdens,Third,〃/の7の?ααdqpr;
expectsomepr(ガectstobedelayed,and managethiswith week1yactionsforinitiative
ovvners,
AppraisingtheStage Models
Stagemodelscomplementthechecklistapproachbyhighlightingthewayinwhichchange
un云oldsovertime.ThisleadstotheM【cKinseyobservationthatchanges 態ilto deliver
theirpromises
dueto “leakageinthepipeline“
as
changeun危lds.As we have noted,
changeislikelyto makedi都erentdemandsonthechange manager-and onthose who
areafiectedbychange-ateach ofthediぼerentstages.AJthough changeisrarelytidy,kllowingtheprobable
sequence
ofevents,and how that maybe
disrupted,allowsthe
change managertoanticipateandprepare 危rpotentialdi賃iculties,
Stage modelsareopentothreecriticisms.First,despitetheemphasisoneventsunfold-
ingovertime,these modelsrarelyre免rto whathasgonebeおrethecurrentintervention,
W′hathashappenedinthepast,however,withregardto previouschangeattempts,will
influenceresponsestocurrentproposals,Consider,危rexample,thechange management
actionsthatmayberequiredto“createasenseofurgency”in an organizationthathas
seen manypreviousunsuccessfulchangesthatseniormanagementdrovewith”asenseof
urgency”and wheretopteamcredibilityisnowlow.Contrastthiswiththeorganization
wheretheopportunityorthreatiscleartoallstaぜ members,who,onthebasisofrecent
experienceofchange,placeahighdegreeoftrustinthetopteam,ltmaythuso賃enbe
help鏡ltoextendthetimelinebackwardandtoidenti勾(andifnecessary,tocompensate
fbr)previouseventsandoutcomesthat m卸influencetoday’saction plans,
Chapterl〇
C力α′7ge凡毎′?αge′??e′汀ReなPecr′ves
333
Second,itローayalsobeheIPfulto e×tendthetimeline化)rward,beyond”consolidate”
and
”institutionalize.” Even
changes
that
are
successful will
eventually decay without
aPProPriateぱlaintenance.Parado樽ically,successfulchangescanalsoinhibittheilnーP1emen-
tationoffurtherinnovation,which maybeseenasnovel,risky,andathreattocurrently
eぼective operations.Theissuesthatarisein managingthesustainability ofChangeare
exploredinchapterll.
Finally,as withchange
checklists,stage modeIS
Oぼerfurther“highlevel“guidance,leavingthechange managertodeterminehowinpracticetoapplythatadviceinagiven
context.Thereisnoclear,unambiguousstatementof“thisiswhattodo.”Thecontingency
approachestochange managementexploredinthenextsection,however,seektoadvise
thechange managerhowtoadjustimplementationstrategiese稀ectiveiytodi節erentcon‐
textsandconditions.
瞳圃圏圃翻The Process Perspective
Change
is
a
process,and
not
an
event, This
is
a
straight危rward
observation
andisreflectedinthestage modelsofchange managementdiscussedintheprevioussection.Processperspectives,however,highlightothersigni賃cantaspectsoforganizationalchange
and drawtheattentionofthechange managertoissuesnotcoveredbyeitherchecklistsorstage models.Aユthoughpotentially makingchangeappeartobe morecomplex,process
thinkingencouragesthe
change managerto
adopta morecomprehensive approachtodesigning,planning,implementing,andreviewingchangeactivities,
oneofthearchitectsoftheprocessualperspective, 山Ddrew Pettigrew(1985;1987),cautionedagainstlookingfbrsinglecausesandsimpleexplanationsあrchange.lnstead,hepointedtothemanyrelated 態ctors-individual,group,organizational,social,politica1一
thatcanaがectthenatureand outcomesofchange.Pettigrew observedthatchange was
acomplexand”untidycocktail”thatincludedrationaldecisions, mixed withcompetingindividualperceptions,o貸enstimulatedbyvisionaryleadership,andspicedwith“
power
plays“torecruitsupportandtobuildcoalitionsbehindparticularideas.
lnthisview,theunitofanalysisisnot“thechange“:anew organizationstructure,or
newtechnoloIW,ornew workingpractices.Theumtofanalysisis“theprocessofchangeincontext“:howanewstructurew皿be血lplementedanddevelopedinthisparticularorgam-
zationalsetting.This
subtle
shi宣in perspectivehastworelatedimplications.First,thismeanspayingattentiontothe”ow ofeventsandnotthinkゴロロgofchangeaseitherstaticor
neatlyt山ie‐boundedwithde行nedbeg山ningandendPoints.Second,t垣salso meanspay血gattentiontothewidercontextinwhichchangeistakingplaceandnotthinkingintermsof
aparticularlocationintimeandgeography(thisnewmachineinthis魚ctorybay).lnshort,processperspectivesarguethat,tounderstandorganizationalchange,onehastounderstand
howthesubstance,context,andprocessinteractovert無letoproducetheoutcomes.
Patrick DawsonandConstantine山odriopoulos(2017)hを奴e範rtherdevelopedthispro‐
cessualperspective.They makeitclearthattounderstandchangeweneedtoconsiderthefbllowingissues:
1.Thecomexz-past,present,andfuture-in whichtheorganizationfunctions,including
externalandinternal魚ctors,andtheorganization’shistoryaspasteventsshapecurrent
responses
334
chapterlO
C力α′7ge肋名α′mge〃7e′7rRe′1Ped′1ぞs
2.Theszのsrm7ceofthechangeanditsscaleandscoPe,Whichcouldbenewtechnology,
processredesign,anew paymentsystem,orchangestostructureandculture
3.Ther〆α′7s/rZO′?〃rocess,includingtasks,activities,decisions,timing,andsequencing
4,Fがなにα
activity, Within
and
outside
the
organiZation,shaping decisions,securlng
support
5. TheZ′?Zero”!○′7sbetweenthese 魚ctors,WhichshaPeboththechangeprocessandthe
outco]比les
This perspectiveincorporatestherole
ofpowerand politicsinshaping organizational
change,This
is
a 篤aturethatthe perspectiVes we have
examinedso 魚reitherdonot
mention ordealwithonlybrieny,Asorganizationsarepoliticalsystems,andaschange
isinevitablyapoliticizedprocess,theprocessperspectivearguesthatthechange manager
mustbewillingtointerveneinthepoliticsoftheorganization.lnthisrespect,thekey
taskistolegitimizechangeproposalsinthe錠ceofcompetingideas,Themanagementof
changecanthusbedescribedas“the managementofmeaning,“ whichinvolvessymbolic
attemptstoestablishthecredib道tyofparticulardefinitionsofproblemsandsolutions
andtogainconsentandcompliance丘om otherorganization members,Partofthistask,
thereあre,istodoWith“the wayyoutellit,“or moreaccurately With“the wayyouse//
irtoothers,
Dawson and Aiodriopoulos(2017)identi~ eightlessonsfrom a process perspective
concerningchange managementpractice:
1. There
are
no
universal
prescriptions
or
simple
recipes
For
how best
to manage
change,
2. Changeisapoliticalprocess,andchangeleadersneedtobepoliticallysensitiveand
astute.
3. Time,planning,andflexibilityareessentialinchangingattitudesandbehaviorsandin
galn・ngcommitmentForchange.
4.Theyadvocate“criticalreflection,”challengingtaken-免r‐grantedassumptions;あrexam-
ple,withregardtoresistance,which maybedesi1ableifitsubvertsa weakinitiative.
5.ltisimportanttolearnfrombothpositiveandnegativeexperlences.
6, Education, training, and
development
should
be
aligned
With
new operating
Procedures.
7. Communication
is
fundamentally
important
in
steering
processes
in desired
directions,
8,“Contradictionsprovidehealthあodあrcriticalreflection.
” Changerequiresconstant
adaptationtocontextualcircumstances,
M[ostofthisadviceechoestheguidance丘omchecklistsandstage models,However,
Wherethechecklistssay”dothis,
”processaccountsadvise,
“beawareofthis,“notingthat
there are no “bestpractice”recipesForchange.The process perspectivedi窟ersinthe
emphasis placed
ontherole
ofpower and politics
in
shaping
change outcomes, one
implicationofthisemphasisisthatthechange managermustbepoliticallyskilledandbe
wilロngandabletousethoseskills.Thecapabilitiesofthechange managerareexplored
inchapter12.
ChaPterlO
C方α′7ge崩毎′?αge〃7g′7ZReri¥)ecm’es
335
Processtheoryarguesthattheoutcomesofchange
areproduced
bytheinteractionsofseveralfactors
overtimeinagivencontext.VVhatdoesthislooklike
inpractice?DondeP1owmanandcolleagues(2007)
giveafascinatingaccountofwhattheyca=“radicaー
changeaccidenta=y′’Theystudiedtheturnaround
ofルグ′ss′on cわurch,afailing
or9anization
ina
large
southwesternU.S.city,
The
organizational
context
was
unstable.The
church Wasfaced with
a
potentia1lyterminal
prob-
lem.Seenasatraditional”silkstockings”church,the
organization
was
asset
rich
but
cash
poor.Atten-
danceandmembershipWeredeclining.Therewere
ongoingconflictsinvolvingaKKKplaque,theplay-
ingofiazzinthechurch,andwhethergaysandles‐
biansshouldbeacceptedasmembers.Thepurpose
andidentityofthechurchcreatedfurthertensions,particuーarly with
regardto
includingthe
homeーess
andotherswhoWereexcーuded.Withseveralprevi-
ouschangesinleadership,therehadbeentwopas-
tors
in
three
years,resulting
in
the
controversiaー
appointmentoftwoco‐pastors.
Howdidchangebegin?A9roupofyoungsters,whodid
not1ikethetraditional
church
school
pro-
gram,hadthe
idea
ofprovidinghotbreakfastsfor
homeless
people
on
Sunday
mornings.Some
of
thoseyoungsterswere
noteven
church
members;
theyWeresoonservin9
500peopleeverySunday.Thehotbreakfastsideawasneverintendedtopro-
duce
radical
change.However,P1owman
and
col-
leaguesarguethatsmaーーactionssuchasthiswere”amplified“bytheunstab-econtext.
VVhatweretheoutcomes?Church
membership
recovered,invoーvin9aWiderrangeofthelocalpop‐
u-ation
including
the
homeless
and
minorities.Homelessindividualsjoinedthechurch,sanginthe
choir,and
served
as
ushers.The
style
ofworship,formalityofdress,andmusicchangedasdidthepro-
fileofthecongregation;thiswas
nolongera“silk
stockings”church.The
church
gotcityfundingto
provideadaycenterforseveralthousandhomeless
andwassoonservin9over20,00omealsayear.ln
additionto
breakfasts
and
clinics,the
church
pro-
videdーegalassistance,jobtraining,laundryservices,andshowerfacilities.Thechurchmottochangedto
include“justiceintoactionP
VVhydidthishappen?The“contextualconfigura‐
tion”thatencouragedongoingchangeincluded:
・
Dissatisfied youngsters
came
up
With
the
hot
breakfastsidea.
・
Adoctorworkingasavolunteerofferedtotreat
medical
problems
instead
and soon
recruited
others,leadingtofull‐scale medical,dental,and
eyeclinicsaspartoftheSundayactivity.
・
ThechurchremovedtheKKKplaque-a major
symbolicact,
・
Leadersactedas“sense‐9lvers,“providingmean-
ingratherthandirectingchanges,andchosethe
languagelabe1s:”purgin9P”recovering,””reach-
ingouttothemarginaーized.“
・
Affluent
members
left
as
the church
focused
increasinglyonthehomeless,andnew(lessafflu-
ent)memberswereattractedbythemessageof
inclusivity.
Thefeatures
oftheorganizationafcontextencour-
agedaseriesofsmallchangestoemergeandampli-
fiedtheseintoanunplanned,radicaー,andsuccessful
change
process,There was
notop‐downtransfor-
mation
designed
byseniorーeaders.Thisisa
good
exampleofaprocessualaccountofchangeunfo-d-
ingovertime,illustratinghowfactorsatdifferent1ev-
els
ofanaーysis
interactto
produce
the
outcomes,P1owmanetaー,(2007)offerthefollowingadvicefor
thechange manager.First,besensitivetocontext,Second,be
prepared
to
be
surprised;the
emer-
genceofsmall
changes
isnotan
orderlyprocess.Third,viewthosesmaHchangesopportunistically,in
termsofhowtheymightbedeveloped.
Theprocessperspectiveonchangethusappearstohavethreestrengths;
1.ltrecognizesthecompleXityofchange,draw血gattentiontothe立lteractionbetween many
魚ctorsatdiflコerentlevels,shapmgthenature,d立ection,andconsequencesofchange.
336
ChaPterlO
C/?”′7ge崩‘”′mge′77g′7『Re′~梯形cm’es
2.ltrecognizeschangeasaprocesswithapast,apresent,andafuture,ratherthanas
astaticortilne‐boundedeventordiscreteseriesofevents,
3.lthighlightsthepoliticalnatureoforganizationsandchange,e・鮒LPhasizingtheimpor-
tanceofpoliticalskilltothechange manager.
However,theprocessperspectivehasthreelimitations:
1,ChangeinthisperspectiVeisindangerofbeingpresentedasoverco理ーp1ex and over-
whehDoinglyconfusing,andthusasunmanageable.
2,Thosewhoareinvo1vedinthechangeprocessaresometimesportrayedas minorchar-
actersmthebroadsweepofevents,relegatedtotheroleofsense-giversandinterpreters
controlled
by
social
and
contextual
化)rces,rather
than
as
proactive“movers
and
shakers,“
3,ltdoesnotlenditselfreadilytotheidentificationofspecificguide且nes,云ocusingon
awarenessratherthan prescription. Adviceisthuslimitedtothoseissuesto which
change managementshouldbesensitive:compleXity,process,context,politicalinflu‐
ences,opportunity.
霞園瞳園 ContingenCy APProaches
Dawsonand 山ロdriopoulos(2017)arenotaloneinnotingthattherearenouniversal“one
bestway”
prescriptions食)rmanagingchange,ThishasledtothedeveloPmentofcontin-
gency approaches, which
arguethatthe
best wayto
manage
change depends
onthecontext.Vi/ewillexplore節urcontingencyapproaches:“〃?eだ め 肺α“?,豹e 豹の?ge尼ααのも
sため 助走sの′”/′7・〃〃′77,Z庇 Srqce‐D”′のたJノの〃『!′増のりノ〃7のr鳶,and 的eああpe息の刺んβ〆昭雄7欲の増eたα/e緩osmのe.
VVhereto Start?
The
problem
has
been
diagnosed,and
appropriate
organizationalchanges
have been
agreed. Whatto do next? Wheretobegin? Hope Haileyand Balogun(2002,p,158)discussthisbrieflyintheircontingency model(explainedbelow)arguing,
”Changecan
start丑om‐toP‐down,bottom-up,orsomecombinationofthetwo,orasanotheralternative,bedevelopedfrom pocketsofgoodpractice.Shouldchangebeimplementedthroughout
theorganizationsimultaneously,orcanitbedeliveredgraduallythroughpilotsites?”Thechange manager,
isthus魚cedwitharangeofoptions.
Adoptinga novelapproachtothe question ofwheretostart, N1arco
Gardinietal,
(2011)arguethatchangeshouldbeginwiththosestaぜ whosecontributionswillhavethe
mostsignificantimpactontheaspectsofper危rmancethatneedtochange,ldentiルingthose”
pivotalroles”isvital,butthisisnotalways obvious.Theyreachedthis“pivotal
roles”conclusion 官om
e×Perience with alarge European retailbank.Thisbank,with
6,00obranches,魚cedincreasingcompetition官om more“customer‐丑iendly’localbanks.
To
deal
withthis
threat, management
developed
a
new
organizational model, which
reduced centralsupervls・on and controland gavebranch managers moreautonomyto
tailortheir marketing,promotions,ando節eringstothe立localareas.Thenew modelwas
ChaPterlO
C方の増e虚劣の70gの77emHer撃沈″1ぞs
337
communicatedquickly‐toallstaぼ,andthewayinwhichthenew roles would work was
explained.Top managementdidthisthroughroadshows, memos,intranetarticles,and
bypublishingthenew organizationcharts.Everyonereceivedthesameinあrmation,and
thechanges werealltohappenatthesametime.
Reviewingprogressa花w monthslater,however,moststa茸 membershadnotchanged
theirworkingpractices.ln particular,thebranch managers werestillusingtheprevious
structureandproceduresbecausethey werea丘aidofmakingmistakesorannoyingmoreseniorstaぜ.Theregionalsupervisorswere meanttoactascoachestothebranch manag-
ers,butmanydidnothavecoachingskills,and manybranch managersdidnothavethe
skillstoruntheirown branchesand maketheirown decisions.Realizingthattheyhad
triedtochangetoo muchatthesametime,top managementdecidedto あcusonthose
whocoulddeliverthechangethe 危stest,Theregionalmanagers,perhaps,orthebranch
supervisors? Neitherofthosegroupsqualified;theyhadnoimpactondailybranchactiv-
ities,couldtherelbrenota爺ectresults,andhadlittlecredibilitywith丘ontlinesta茸.The
branch managersthemselveshadthegreatestinfluenceontheoutcomesoftheplanned
changesbecause:
・ Theirworkhaddirectandsignificantimpactontherevenuestream.
・ Theywereconnectedwithmanyothergroupsacrosstheorganization,
・ Theycoulddecidehow peoplegotthingsdone.
lnotherwords,thebranch managerscombinedmanagerialimpactwithlocalcontrol,buttheylackedthe
skills
and
attitudesto
drive
changequickly.Theimplementation
P1an
was
redesigned, 免cusinginitially
onthe
6,00o
branch
managers. Thetraining
designedespeciallyfbrthem beganwiththeirroleinthenew organizationalmodeland
covered commercialskills,creditand asset managementcapabilities,qualityand cus-
tomer
satis鏡ction
principles,and
other
skills
such
as
managing people,communica-
tions,andconflictresolution.onlywhenthebranch managers wereready-six months
later-didthebankstartto work with othersta菖 andsupervisors, with di爺erentpro-
grams
designed 危rdifferentroles,Thistimetheresults were much better. Eighteen
monthslater:
・ Thenumberofproductssoldperbranchhadrisenby15percent.
・ Thetimespentmakゴヒロgcreditdecisionshad翫1lenby25percent.
・ Branchrelationship managerswerespending30percentmoretimewithcustomersdue
tothestreamlinedprocess.
・ Customerresponsesto marketingcampaignsdoubled,withanationalsurveyshowing
a20percentimprovementincustomersatis魚ction,
・ Knowledgesharingand mutualsupportincreased,andthebankbecamemorereceptive
toideas丘omfront亘nestaぜ.
Gardinietal.(2011)concludethatchangeismorelikelytobesuccess前lifimple
mentationhastwokeycomponents.First,startwiththe‘‘pivotalpeople,
”whosework
isclosesttotheactivitiesthatneedtobeimproved.Second,designacomprehensive
program
with
clear
and
meaningful
goals,linking
those
in
pivotalroles
with
the
338
ChaPte「1O
C乃α′7ge崩必m7αge′77の7rRe郡切に〃1ぞs
changesthatthe
rest
ofthe
organization
hasto
α1ake. This
question
of“whereto
start isnotaddressedexplicitlybythechecklists,stagemodels,orprocessapproaches.
This,ofcourse,isnottheonlyContingencya]ぼectingtheappropriate mLodeofchange
ilnLple]α1entation,
The ChangeLeadershipstyles continuum
oneofthe oldestcontingencyapproachesaddressesthe question ofchange manage-
茸lentstyle,whichcanrange overacontinuum 丑om autocraticto delnocratic,or,as
Tannenbaum and schmidt(1958)describedthis,from leadeトoriented to 貴)1loweト
orientedleadership(seeFigurelo.2).Thecultures-or,atleast,the managementtext‐
books-of developed
western
economies
have
endorsed
participative approaches
to
change management,食)rwhichevidencehaslongestablishedthebenefits(e.g.,Coch
andFrench,1948).Thosewhoareinvolvedinthedesignandimplementationofchange
are
more
likelyto
contribute
to
its
success
than those
on whom change
has
been
imposed,However,thechange managershouldbeawareoftherangeofoptionsavail‐
ablewithregardtostyleandofthedisadvantagesandadvantagesofthese(seetablelo.6),
Forexample,“telling
”people withoutparticipationisquickanddecisive,butitmay
causeresentmentand doesnotcapturestaffideas. ontheotherhand,”invitingpar‐
ticipation”increasescommitmentandaccesstousefulinformation,butitistimecon‐
sumingandinvolvesalossofmanagementcontrol,lnacrisiswherearapidresponse
isrequired,“inviting participation
” can bedamaging,ln an organizationthatvalues
theknowledgeandCommitmentofits
sta賃,theresentmentcausedby“telling”sta賃
aboutplannedchangescanalsobedamaging,Choiceofchange managementstylethus
needstoreflectthecontext,
The stace‐Dunphy contingency Matrix
Participativeapproachestochange managementhavealsobeenchallengedbythework
oftwoAustralianresearchers,DougStaceand DexterDunphy(Staceand Dunphy,2001),TheirapproaChbeginsbyestablishingascaleofchange,丘om “finetuning
”to“corporate
trans危rmation“(seetablelo,7andFigurel.1,‘Assessing DepthofChange,
“inchapterl).Theythenidentiル 危urstylesofchange(seetablelo,8),
FIGUREIO.2Tallnenbaum-SchmidtLeadershipContinuum
Leadermakesdecisionsthatareopentoreview
ChaPte「1O
C乃研7ge粥‘”′mgの’7emβのPeczか弧
339
繍霊
正
解
e
o
鵬
鮎
脚
欲
繊
細
~≠
m
r
u
c
a
5
繍
幽図画
$
官
b
S
墨
棚
服
飾
ug
o
rtments
tion,bette
enthighe
eddecisio
nformati
erdecisi
340
ChaPterlO
C77の7ge崩‘”′?qge′77gm目標功ecr′yes
P1ottingscaleofchange againststyleofchangeproducesthe mlatriXinFigure
lo,3.
Thisidentifies ourstrategies:ParticiPativeevolution,charismatictransFormation,貴)rced
evolution,and dictatoria.transft)rlnation.Figure
lo,3alsoadvocatestheuseofdiがerent
change managementstylesdependingontheattributesofthecontext.Staceand Dunphy
(2001)thusarguethatparticipativestrategiesareti・neconsumingastheyexposeconflict-
ingviewsthataredifficulttoreconcile,▽vhereorganizationa.survivaldependsonrapid
andstrategicchange,dictatorialtransfbrmationisappropriate.StaceandDunphy(2001,
p,185)citetheexampleofapolicechiefappointedtostamp outcorruption and mod‐
ernizeapolicedepartmentwho,inhisown words,initiallyadopteda managementstyle
thatwas“6‐rm,hardandautocratic,andithadtobethatbecausethatiswhattheorga-
nizationunderstood,”
onceagain,wehaveacontingencyperspectivethatarguesthat,whiiecollaborative-
consultativemーodeswillworkwellundersomeconditions,therearecircumstanceswhere
directive-coercive modesofchange managementarelikelytobemoreappropriate and
e爺ective,lnparticular,where majorchangesarenecessaryfbrsurvival,timeisshort,and
thoseaぼectedcannotagreeonthechanges,then dictatoria.trans.brmation maybethe
necessarychoiceofstyle.lnvitingparticipation underthoseconditions wouldtaketime
andbeunlikelytoproduceanyagreement,
FIGUREIO.3Thestace-DunpllyContingencyApproachtoChangelmplementation
ーncrementalchange
strategies
Transformativechange
strategies
Port′c′Pot~eevo/Ur′on chor′smor′crrons危rmor′on
Collaborative一Consultativemodes
Usewhentheorganization
needsminoradUustmentto
meetenvironmental
conditions,wheretimeis
available,andwherekeyinterestgroupsfavorchange
Usewhentheorganizationneeds
majoradjustmentstomeet
environmentalconditions,where
thereislittletimefor
participation,andwherethereis
supportforradica-change
Forcedevo/〃”on D′Crotor′oだro“s行ormo士′o打
Directive-coerC1ve
modes
Usewhenminoradjustments
arerequired,wheretimeis
available,butwherekeyinterestgroupsopposechange
Usewhenmajoradjustmentsare
necessary,wherethereisnotimeforparticipation,wherethereis
nointernaーsupportforstrategic
change,butwherethisis
necessaryforsurvival
sco/eofchonge:
Sty/eofchonge:
Source:StaceandDunphy(2001).
ChaPterlO
C/zの増e叱函′mgememβセメー字だけかes
341
The Hope Hailey‐Balogun Change Kaleidoscope
Veronica Hope HaileyandJuliaBalogun(2002;Balogunetal.,2016)alsoadvocate a
conte×t‐sensitiveaPProachtothedesignandimplementationofchange,Their丘amework
identifiesthecharacteristicsoftheorganizationalcontextthatshouldbetakenintocon‐
sideration when makingchangeimP1ementationdesignchoices.Theydescribethisframe-
workas“TheChange Kaleidoscope,”shownin Figurelo.4(HopeHaileyand Balogun,
2002,p,156),
FIGUREIO.4TheChangeKaleidoscope
Theargumentthatchangeimーp1ementationshou1dref1ecttheorganiZationa1contextisnotanovelone,butH[opeHaileyandBalogunarguethatothercontingency models化)cusontoo narrow arange of魚ctorssuch astypeofchange,time 丘alエーe,thePowerofthe
change manager,andthedegreeoforganizationalsuPport食)rchange.Theeightcontext
魚ctorsinthechangekaleidoscoPeare:
万′7だ
Scope
Presery傭わ〃
Dれ形な!ぴ
Reαの〃ess
DePend立1gonurgency,whatisthenecessaryspeedofthechange?
Hownarrow orbroadisthescoPeofthechangeagenda?
lsthereaneedto maintainadegreeofcontinuityonsomedimen‐
sions,insomeareas?
ALretheattitudesandvaluesofthosealmectedsimilarorarethere
diversesubcultures?
Dotheindividualsinvolvedhavethenecessaryskillsandknowledge?
Doestheorganization havetheresourcestoilローP1el・lent more
change?
▽vhatdegreeofaccePtanceoforresistancetochangeisthere?
▽Vhatisthepowerofthechange managerrelativetoother
stakeholders?
Contextfactors;
enablersandconstraints
lmplementationoptions
Timin9
Scope
Needforcontinuity
Diversityofattitudes
Capabilityofthoseinvolved
Capacityoftheor9anization
Readinessforchange
powerofthechangemana9er
VVhattypeofchangeisrequired?
VVhereshouldwestart?
VVhatimplementationstyleWi=Weuse?
VVhattar9etsareweaimingfor?
VVhatinterventionstrategieswillbeappropriate?
VVhatchangeimplementationrolesareneeded?
342
ChaPterlO
Cメ7の増ど脳〆”′mge′77gmReなPeα和郎
Theseeightcontext錠ctorscanbeeitherconstraints(e,g,,shortageoftime,low caPル
bility)orenablers(e,gりbroadagreementonneedforchange,power鏡lchange manager).
Thepointisthatthedesignofthechangeimplementationprocessshouldbeinfluenced
bythenatureofthosecontext鏡ctors.Hope Haileyand‐Balogun(2002,p.161)identiル
thesiXdesign optionssumαーarizedmtablelo,9,
TABLEIO.9ChangeKaleidoscoPel1mP1e1mlenta錠on0Ptions
Designoptions
Meaning
方MPe
ThesCOPeandsPeedofthePrOPosedchange
万αrger
FocusonChangingoutputs,behaviors,attitudes,andvalues
′〃fervent′ons
Leversand mechanisms:technical,political,cultural,education,communication
andinFormedjudgmentarekeytochoosingthecontextuallyappropriatechangedesign
丘omthe widerangeofoPtionsavailable,aS HOPe Haileyand Balogun(2002,P.163)
explain:
Understandingthecontextualconstraintsandenablersiskeytounderstandingthetypeof
changeanorganizationisabletoundertakeasopposedtothetypeofchangeitneedsto
undertake,andthere長)rewhatsortofchangepathisrequifed.Sinロー旦arly,understandingthe
contextualconstraintsandenablersiscentralto mal圏LngchoicesaboutstartPointandstyle,h産oreparticipativechangeaPproachesrequiregreaterskillsin態cilitation,agreaterreadi-
ness化)rchange丘omthoseparticipating,moretime,andthereIR)re,o貸en,morefunds.Choicesaboutthechangetargetandinterventionsmayobviouslybea爺ectedbythescope
ofchange,butalsoby,丘)rexample,capacity.N1anagementdeveloPmentinterventionscan
beexpensiveandmーaynotbeaccessibletoorganizationswith1imitedfunds,lnrea1ity
choosingtherightoptionsisaboutasldingtherightquestionsandexercisillgchange
judgement.
Theargumentthat”thebestapproach”dependsoncontextisanappealingone,Con‐
tingencyapproaches,however,arenotbeyondcriticism.First,theideaof“fitting”change
implementationtoaparticulartypeofchangeinagivencontextmaybeeasiertoexplain
ChaPterlO
C方の7ge崩‘”′mgの’?emReなPecrか郡
343
intheorythantoputintopractice,Asthechangekaleidoscopeimplies,thechangeman-
agerneeds
considerabledepthandbreadthofunderstandingofthe change
contextto
n[lakein貴)rmedjudgments,Second,contingency approaches are more ambiguous and
difficulttoe×plainthanthesilnIP1er“o音theshelf’competition丘omchecklistsandstage
models,Third,contingencyapproachesrequireadegreeofbehavioralfle)dbility,especially
withregardtostyle,withwhichsomeseniormanagers maybeuncom食)rtableiftheylack
the necessarycapabilities.Fourth,ifmanagers
adoptdinerentapproaches
at different
timesandindifferentconditions,willthisweakenthe壮credibilitywithstaf胃 Finally,is
everythingcontingent?Arethereno“universals”whenitcomestoorganizationalchange?
EXERC聡E
1nthischapter,wehaveexploredthreechan9eChecklists,threeStage modelsofimple-
10罰
mentation,the processaPProachtochange,andfourcontingencyframeWorks.These
Deyezo夢 箕αグ
approachesaresimilarinsomerespectsanddifferentinothers.Cantheybecombined?
ow“C乃α“ge
TrythefoHowlngexPeriment:
崩おメメ
1. Bringtheadvicefromthesedifferentmodeーsintoasingーelist,omittingtheoverlaps.
2一Reflectingonyourownexperienceandknowledgeoforganizationalchange,consider
瀞臓灘園園禦懸轍灘瀦灘翻灘
whatissuesandstepsare missingfromtheseguidelines;addthesetoyourmaster
list.Now createyourowncompositechange managementmode-;ifpossible,dothis
asagroupactivity.
3.Canyou
prioritizethis
advice? 帆′hatitemsare
more
important,and which
are
less
important?Takingacontingencyapproach,in whichorganizationcontextsdopartic-
ularitemsbecome moreorーesssignificant?
4.Canyouidentifyapreferredsequenceofchangeimplementationsteps?Andcanyou
explainandjustifythisrecommendation?
5.Lookingatyourcompositechange managementmodel,identifythree management
ski=sassociatedwitheachoftheelements.Usethisasthebasisofapersonaーassess-
ment;whatareyourstronqestandyourweakestchanqe manaclementskiーls?
EXERCISE
Asyoureadthiscase,considerthefollowin9questions:
10.2
,. canorganizationa-cu-turebeb-amedforp-anecrashes? wi=thosecrashespromptGezzZ〃g
Boeingtochangeitsculture,orcouldtheybeabarriertocu-turechange?
344
ChaPterlO
C’?”′7ge脳超′74ge/77e′7!RのPe“′1’es
4, Checkyouronline newssourcesand
bringthiscase historyupto date.Has David
Calhoun
been
ableto
changethe
culture
atBoeing?
Have
there been
any
more
accidents?VVhatisyourassessmentofDavid Calhoun’schangeleadership?
The American
companv Boeinq
makesairplanes,rockets,satel-ites,telecommunica-
Boeing
737
Max
crashed, killin9 189
peop-e. Five
months
ーater,in March
2019,an
EthiopianAirlines737Maxcrashed,ki=ing157people,lnvestigatorsfoundthattheplane’s
new Maneuvering CharacteristicsAugmentationSystem(MCA automaticallyforcedthe
aircrafttostallandnosedive,Thissystem hadbeenomittedfromflightmanualsandcrew
training.The U,S,FederaIAviation Authority(FAA)groundedthe737 Max.Boeing’srep‐
utation was
damaged.Butchiefexecutive
Dennis
Muilenburg
decidedto
keep making
the737
Max,to
demonstrate
confidence
inthe
plane,eventhoughtheycould
notbe
sold.Boeingfired Muilenbu『gattheendof2019,and David CalhountookoverasCEO.
下o
understand
how this
cou-d
have
happened,We
haveto
go
backto
l997,when
Boein9
acquired
McDonnelー
Douglas,a
competitorwith
a
”financefirstethos.”Boeing
took
on
many
McDonnelI
Douglas
executives
including
theirchief
executive, Harry
Stonecipher,rwho
was
known
for
his
ag9ressive
cost
cutting.ln 2001,Boeing’s
chief
executiveandthen
president,PhiI
Conditand
HarryStonecipher,decidedto
putsome
distancebetweenthecompany’s500seniormanagementandstaffandtheplane-mak-
ersand movedtheheadquartersto Chicago.-2,00o milesfrom Seattle.Theyexplained
thatseniormanagementwas
being
drawn
into day-to-day operational
decisions when
theyweresoclosetothemanufacturingbase.1nalarge,modern,multinationalcompany,
theyfeltthatseniorexecutivesshouldnothavesuchcontactwithengineers.Stonecipher
said,“仇′henpeop-esaylchangedthecultureofBoeing,thatwastheintent,sothatit’s
run
likea
businessratherthana
greatengineeringfirm.ltisagreatengineeringfirm,
butpeop-einvestin a company becausethey wantto make moneゾ(Useem,2019).
StonecipherbecamechiefexecutiveofBoeingin2003(butwasforcedtoresignin2005
fo=owinganimproperrelationship withafemaleexecutive).
Thepreviouscloseproximityofmanagersandengineersmeant,however,thatsenior
executiveshadagoodunderstandingofengineeringissues.They”spokethelanguage
ofengineeringandsafetyasa mothertongue,“andtheycouldseeforthemselveswhat
was happening.AS Useem(2019)pointsout,”The present737 Max disastercan be
traced backtwodecades.‐tothe momentBoeing’sleadershipdecidedtodivorceitself
fromthefirm’sownculture.”WithStonecipheraspresident,thenews10gansbecame”a
Signallingtheshifttoa”shareholder-firstcuーture,“
between
2014and 2019,Boeing
spent
$43,4
billion
on
stock
buybacks, and
only
$15,7
billion
on research
and
Chapterl〇
CZ7ロ“ge脳云の7αge〃?の”βを濁りに『んes
345
.
qー
C
n
n
q-
developmentforcommercia-airplanes(Catchpole,2020,p.56).This culture placed
short-tenn
rewardsto
shareholders
ahead
ofengineering
decisions
and
longer‐term
strategy.Boeing’sboardevenapprovedafurther$20billionbuybackinDecember2018,
two monthsafterthefirst737Maxcrash(butthatdecision waslaterreversed).
Theimmediatecausesofthe737 Maxcrashes weretechnical--fauーtysoftware.But
otherfactorshadplayedarole.lntheinterestsofcostandtimeto market,Boeinghad
decidedto modi~the737ratherthandesignanewaircraftfrom scratch.下oavoidreg-
ulatorydelays,Boeing maintainedthatnoadditionalpiーottraining wasrequiredforthe
737 Max.Boeingengineersweresurprisedwhensomesoftwaredevelopmenttasks(not
specifictoMCAS)wereoutsourcedtoco=egegraduatesemployedbyanlndiansubcon-
tractorinSeattleearning$9anhour.Edpierson,aformerBoeing manage若claimedthat,
beforethefatalcrashes,the737Maxhadexperienced morethanadozenothersafety
incidents. Pierson
said,“Something
happened
in
the
translation
from,‘let’s
build
a
high‐qualitysafeproducrto‘ーersgetitdoneontimざ Diss,2020).Therewaspressure
on737englneersandtestpilotsandalsoa
lotofpressureon
productionemployees.Pierson saw tired vvorkers doingjobsfor whichthey were nottrained,and makingmistakes.Heasked
managementtoshutdownthe737factory,buttheyrefused.The
softwarefailureswerethussymptomsofa widermanagementproblem.
ln March2020,theHouseTransportationCommittee,oftheU.S.Congress,re-eased
itspreliminaryfindingsfollowingayearofinvestigationintothe737Maxcrashes.Con-
c-udin9thatthesetragicaccidentsweredueto multiplefactors,the Committee’sreport
focusedonfiveissues:
Theimplementationofaggressivecostcuttin9andexcessivepressureonemployees
to maintaintheproductionpressure,duetocompetitionfrom Airbus.
Boeing’sfauーtyassumptionsaboutcriticaltechnologies,andthe MCASsysteminpanic-
u-ar,whichreliedonasinglesensorand wasnotclassedasasafety-criticalsystem.
Boeing’scu-tureofconcealment,withholdingcriticalinformationfromthe FAA,cus-
tomers,andpilots.
Conflicts
ofinterestamon9
Boeing
employees who
were
authorized
to carry out
aviationsafetycertification workonbehalfoftheFAA.
・ Boeing’sinfーuenceontheFAパsoversight;FAA managementrejectedsafetyconcerns
raisedbytheirownexperts,
TheHouse下ransPo性ationComm紙ee(2020,p.13)concluded,”Theseprelimina~inves-
tigativefindingsmakeclearthatBoeing mustcreateand maintainane作ectiveandvigorous
safetycultureandtheFAAmustdeveーoPamoreaggressivecenificationandoVersightstruc-
turetoensuresafeaircra代designsandtoregaintheconfidenceoftheflyingpublic.”The
focusonfinancehadchangedtherelationshipsbetween
Boeing managementand engi-
neers:「twastheabiliWtocomfoitabーyinteractwithanengineerwhointurnfeelscomfon‐
ab-etelーingyoutheirrese~ations,versuscallingamanager2,00omilesawaywhoyouknow
hasarePutationforwantingtotakeyourpensionaway.lt’save~ d旧erentdynamic.Asa
redpefordisempowerーngengineersinpa忙iculallyoucouーdn’tcomeupWithabetterformat”
(Useem,2019},Boeings”moralcomPasぎ wasbroken,andthefocuson”makingthenur作
berざputquali夢andsafetyatrisk.McNultyandMarcus(2019,P.4)claimthat”Boeingshould
engageinadeepcultureredesignProcess茅Edmondson(2019)argues,”Wharsrequiredis
346
ChaPterlO
Cym′7ge崩乾閉口ge′77g′”ReなPec“・’es
Find on
裟ou方ube,”New Boeing CEO David CalhountakesthereinsbydeveloPingfreshstrate9y”
(2020,3:21minutes),
cose sourCes
Catchoole-D.2020.Boeing’slongdescent-月リアZz′′だIR1r2、:56一5文
TheHouseCommitteeonTransportationandln丘astructure,2020.刀ちgBoe′′7g 万7脳履又吻び喝丹′
Co廟,come堺′e′7ces, md/esso′7s方々o′77′Zsde霊宮′7,deye/G羽フ7mちα′?〆ce“前mr/o′?.Washmgton.
Useem,J.2019,Thelong-あrgottenf旦ghtthatsentBoeingo菖course.上deqs,November20,
https://www.theatlantic,com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how‐boeing‐lost‐its‐bearings,
EXERCISE
Asyoureadthiscase,considerthefo=owingquestions:
10.3
,. whatーsyourassessmentofthestrengthsandlimitationsofthe3Gapproachtochange?D諺五[の〃z
2.ーfyou wereadvisingthe board ofKraftHeinzonhowto“invigorate“thecompanyCZZOたeo“ 豹e
today,whatchanges wou-d yourecommend,and why? Usethe dimensions ofthe
iGRに夢eP
changeka-eidoscopetoframeyouradviceconcerningtiming,scope,needforconti-
nuity,diversityofattitudes,capabilityofthoseinvolved,capacityoftheorganization,
園璽極圏鰍
readinessforchange,andpowerofthechange manager.
3.VVhatmistakeswouldyouadvisetheboardtoavoidwhenimplementingthechanges
thatyouarerecommending(refertotabーeslo.landlo.2)?
1n2013,Heinz,theiconicfoodcompany withanannualrevenueof$”.6bil-ion,vvas
boughtfor$29bi=ionby Warren BuffetrsBerkshire HathawayandtheBrazilianprivate
equityfirm 3G Capital.Thenew owners wastednotime makingchanges.Eーevenofthe
twelvemostseniorexecutiveswerereplaced,600staffwereーaidoff,thecorporateplanes
ata Holiday-nnhotelandnotattheRitz-Carlton,and muchlongerworkinghours were
expected.Micro‐managementlimitedeachstaffmemberto200copiesa month;printer
usage wastracked,Executiveswerea=owedonlyloobusinesscardsayear,
Heinzemployeesreferredto”aninsularmanagementstyleinwhichonlyasmallinner
circleknows whatisrealーygoーng on.” onesaid,
“-t’sa
bitlike God-youfee-there’sa
ChaPterlO
C乃α′78g虜q′?”ge“7emβe潟夢βα′yes
347
grandplan,butyouaren’tsure whatitis“{Reingo-dandRoberts,2013,p.189),onthe
otherhand,3Ghadayoungteam ofmostlyBrazilianexecutives,who movedasdi「eCted
from companytocompanyacrosscountriesandindustries,loyalto3G,notHeinz,and
drivento workhardtoreceivebonusesorstockoptions.
Thedrivingforcebehindthesechanges Was“The3G い′ay“
Which3G hadusedto
managechangeinpreviousacquisitionssuchasBurgerKing.Efficiencywaskey,every-
thingwasmeasured,andcostswereslashed.lnthisperspective,「eanestand meanest“
wins,andhumancapitalwasnotseenasakeycomponentofcorporatesuccess.The
assumptionwasthatemployeesweremotivatedbytheeconomicreturnsthatcamefrom
owningcompanysharesratherthanbyanysenseofpurposeormission.
Thoselikelytobeaffectedbya3Gdealoftensaw a“howto”guide writtenbycon-
sultantBobFiferasa“mustread,“becauseithadbeenpopularwiththepartnersat3G
(asithadbeen withJack Welch,theiconicchiefexecutiveatGE).Theguide wastitled,“Double ourProfits:78 い′aysto CutCosts,lncrease Sales,and DramaticallylmProve
our
Bottom
Line
in
6
Months
or
l‐ess.” Chaptertitles
included“CutCosts
First,Ask
QuestionsLater”and“Don’tBeAfraidto Useashotgun,“
However,inthe mindsofmanyfood
industryexperts,whilesomeof3G’s
prevlous
acquisitions wou-d
have
been
primecandidatesfora
cost-cutting
regimen,Heinz was
not
an
obvious
target
for
that“hack
and
slash”approach.The company
had
been
throughseveralyearsofefficiencyimprovementsFslimmingandtrimming”),anditwas
alreadyare-ative-yーeanandefficientoperation.
Summingupthesituation,businessjournaーistsJenniferReingoldand DanieIRoberts
(2013,p.186)specu-atedthat”the experimentnow underway willdetermine whetherHeinz will
become
a
newly
invigorated
embodimentofefficiency-orwhether3G will
takethecultofcostcuttingsofarthatitchokesoffHeinz’sabilitytoinnovateand make
theproductsthathave madelta marketleaderforalmostacenturyandahaーf.”
ln2015,Heinzandthefoodindust~ giantKra代announceda mergerthatwouldcreate
anentitywithanannualrevenueof$28bi=ion,thethirdlargestfoodcompanyintheUnited
Statesandthefi代hーargestintheworld.Annualcostsavingsof$1.5bilーionweree×pected.
The mergerwasfolloWedbymorecostcutting.However,lessattention waspaidto
changingcustomerpreferences,suchasforhealthyorganicfoodinsteadofprocessed
cheeseandーunch meat.Marginswerealsocutbysupermarketpurchasingstrategies(LaMonica,2019).ーnanattempttogrowfurther,KraftHeinz madeanofferof$143bi-lion
forUnileverin2017一buttheofferwasrejected.FurthercostcuttingatKraftHeinzfailed,
leadingtofallingsales,falling operating
income,andafallingshare
price.Unileve
in
contrast,wascomparative-ysuccessful.Cox(2019)said,“Howthetableshaveturned.
TheCheezWhizgianthas melteddownslnceofferingtobuyUnilever:itsUS$40bi=ion
marketvalueisnowjustaquarterofitserstwhileprey.Uniーever,meanwhile,hasblos
somedinto aUs$155billion behemothぞ By2018,KraftHeinz was makinglosses,the
sharepricehadfa=enby60percentinovertwoyears,andthesecuritiesandExchange
Commission wasinvestigatingitsaccountingpractices.
Findonyou77ube,”VVarrenBuffettonWhatheplanstodowithhisKraftHeinzsharesand3GCaPital”
(2019,8:31minutes).
348
ChaPterlO
C/70′7geルのmge′77emRezspedか弧
Cose sou「Ces
Carey,D.,Du]maine,B,,andUseem,M,2019,CE0saresuddenlyhavingachangeofheartabout
whattheircompaniesshouldstand危r-andthediverging危tesof2 majorcorporationsshow
why.β”s′′7ess万難′der,SePtember6,https://www,bus血ess血sider,com.au/ba代-he血斧unilever
ceo‐investments‐economy.Co R.2019.Unilevercan’thelpbutmullaKra代Pounce,Rez′定裕,March8,https://www.reuters,
com/article/us‐kra貴-heinz‐unileverbrea頭ngview,Kell,j,2017.Big危odisgoingtogetevenbigger,恥mme,March15,175(4):11‐12,La Monica,P,R,2019.Whatwentwrongat]KraftHeinz?C靴wβ“sZ′?盗品February22,httPs://
edition,cnn,com/2019/02/22/血vesting/kra作hemz‐stockstrategy/index,htロロ.
Reingold,1,and Roberts,D,2013,SqueezingHeinz,恥“”′2e(october28):184-92,https://www.
免rbes.com/sites/greatspecuiation/2015/03/30/analysis-ofthe‐虹a作heinz‐merger,
Additiona1
Reading
Balogun,J,,HOPeHailey,v,and Gusta篤son,S,2016,E尤P′のZ′?gszmzegZccあの増a4thed,HarloW,Esse×:Pearson.VVide-rangingtheoreticalandPracticalte×tonchange manage-
ment,advocatingacontingentaPProachthattailorschangeimplementationtothecon‐
text,basedonthe”changekaleidoscope”tool,
1)awson,P,,and 山口drioPoulos,C,2017.み名α打αgZ′7gc力α刀ge,creα”vめノα′7d!′7刀oyのZo′?.3rded,London:SagePublications,AcomPrehensiveandclearlyexplainedaccountofa
processualpersPectiveonchangeandinnovation,theoreticalandpractical,
Kotter,J.P.2012,Accelerate!嵐αryαm β“sZ〃essRel′!鍬 0(11):4 52.ExP1ainshowto
drivestrategic,transfbrmationalchange withoutdisruptingdailyoperations.Thisisa
developmentofKotter’soriginaleight-stage modeloftransft)rInationalchange,
Roundup
DoyoU W0rkwith
a
”one
SiZefitS
ar
aPProachtochange
management?下o
what
extent
do
you
adapt
your
ap-
proachtothesca1e
andtiming
ofthe
change,staffreadiness,yourownrela‐
tivepower,andothercontextfeatures
identifiedinthischapter?
Howcapableareyouinadoptingmore
thanonechangeimage?Areyoumore
comfortablewithatop‐downora
bot-
tom-up
approach-orsomewhere
in
between?Doyouneedtodevelopany
particularskillstoachievegreaterflexi‐
bi-ity(assumingyoubelievethatflexi‐
bi-itywillgiveyouanadvantage)?
lsthere
a
dominantchange
approach
inyourorganization?lfso,howappro-
priateisit?VVhatwouldyouneedtodo
to
modify
or
replace that
dominant
approach?
Howdoyouhandーethemanydifferent
changeinitiativesthatareunfoldingin
ourorganization
orbusiness
unitata
giventime--whentheseareallatdiffer」
ent
stages?
ls
this
a
problem?
lf
not,whynot?lfitis,whatisyourpreferred
solution?lfpossible,shareanddiscuss
your
responses
to
this
question
and
the
others
in
this
”reflection” with
co=eagues.
ChaPterlO
C方q′7geル必α′mge′77e′7rReなPeα′、ぞs
349
HereisashortsummaryofthekeyPointsthatwewouldlikeyoutotake丘omthischaPter,
inrelationtoeachofthelearningoutcomes:
圏国璽欄
N[a頭ngchange魚ilisrelativelyeasy;thereare manythingsthatonecan do,and not
do,to
achievethatresult,J‐ohn Kotteridentifies
eight main 魚ilure 魚ctors:lack of
urgency,nosupportivecoalition,novlslon,Poorcommunication,obstaclestochange
notremoved,no“wins”orachievementstocelebrate,declaringvictorytoosoon,and
notanchoring orembeddingthe
changes. Lackofcommunicationis
a Particularly
significantcauseofchange態ilure.
Assess物eszre〃gz超 α〃〆助川『α”の7sげc庇cた猿なお“?mmgZ〃g所α〃解 明先”かのノ.v▽eintroducedthreecheck1istsor”recipes
“おor managingchange:
Boston ConsultingG‐rouP’sDICE modeIProsci’sADKAR modeIStoutedsevidence‐based model
onestrength oftheseapproachesisthattheyprovideclarityandsimP1icityinanarea
thatcanbecomP1exanduntidy.APotherstrengthisthatdi掻erentcheckliststendtoo鎖er
muchthesameadvice,whichisreassuring,onelimitationisthatthesechec虹iststend
tolackanytheoreticalunderp山ning,relyingo賃enonanargumentthatsoundslike,‘‘This
worked あrus,soitshouldwork 危ryou,”From aPractitionerperspective,anotherlim-
itationisthatthesearegeneric“high‐levelguides“andnotdetailed“bestpractice
”road
maPs.Thechange managerisle貴withthechallengingtaskoftranslatingthisguidance
intoachangeimplementationplanthatwinfittheorganizationalcircumstances.Thesechec撞stsdonotsubstitute 危rlocalknowledge,in危rmedjudgment,andcreativity,
“/ediscussedthequestionconcerningwhentouseeachofthesechecklists.Astheytendto o都erbroadlysimilaradvice,itmaynot matter. However,theyencouragediE元rent
emPhases一DICE
ontakingaction based
on
scoringtheissues,ADKAR on
individualperceptions,and Stouten on 危1lowingtheresearchevidencebase.A more
appropriatequestion,perhaps,ishowtousethesechecklists.Theyshouldbeseenas
high‐levelguidesandnotdetailedroad maPs,andtheywillbehelpfulaslongastheyarenotusedinatightlyprescriptive manner,buttotriggerdiscussion,diagnosis,and
planning.ltmaybeusefulinsomesettingstoapply morethanonemodeltothesamechangeprogram.Thesecommentsconcerning when andhowto usechange manage‐
mentguidelinesaPP1ytoallthe modelsand官ameworksinthischapter.
Ey叫卿だ 功eqdl耽溺αgesqfszqge′??ode!sげ 効α′?gem解明ememv~′eintroducedthreestage modelsofchange management:
Lewidsthree‐stage modeIKotter’seight‐stagemodeI
McKinsey5A modeI
StagemodelscomplementachecklistaPproachbyemphasizinghowchangeun丘)ldsand
developsovertime,ma紅ngchanging demandsonthechange managerand onthose
who are a”ヨected,ateach stage,A”though changerarely developsina neatandtidymanner, aPProaching
the
process
in
this
way
encourages
the change
manager
to
350
ChaPterlO
C77α′?ge脳叱mqg1e′77g′7rRe若sPeα′1’es
anticiPateandPrePare貴)rPossiblefutureProblems.ltalsoencouragesa化)cusonthe
”PiPeline
’’ofchange benefits
and on‐how ”leakage“
duringtheProcesscanleadto
disaPPointingoutcomes.ltmayalsobeh‐eIPfultoconsideramoreextendedtimeline,
consideringhow pasteVentscou1dinnuencecurrentproPOSa1s,andhow changesWi11
besustained,andeventuallydecay,intothe和hire,
翻顧鰹瞳園 Assess物e豹eormcq/鯛〆メαα!m/1’α卿e ザ 街eprocess〃gな〆αれ’eo′?c加〃ge.TheProcesspersPectivearguesthattheoutcomesofchangeareshapedbythecombina-
tion andinteractionofanumberof態ctorsovertmlein agivencontext,Thosefactors
includetheconteぬ andsubstanceofthechange,theinIP1ementationprocess,andalso
theinternalandexternalorganizationpo互tics.onestrengthoftheprocessPerspectiveisthatitemPhasizestheroleoforganizationalpo五tics,w垣chisoftenoverlookedorregarded
as marginalbyotheraPProaches.ThePracticaladvicenowing丘omthisPerspectiveis
s加1江artothatProvidedbychecな誼stsandstage mode1s:P1an,tram,com.numcate,1earn
丑om mdstakes,adaPttocircumstances.However,wheresomechangemanagementadvice
recommends“dothis,“theprocessPersPectiVesays,
“beawareofthis,“leav節gthechange
managerWiththetaskofreach血gin云ormedjudgmentswithregardtoaPpropriateaction・
TheProcessPerspectivehigmightsthecomP1exityandPo互ticizednamreofchangeand
seeschangeasaprocesswithaPast,Present,and 鏡ture,ratherthanasastaticort無]e-boundedevent. However,there are dangersinthisPersPective,in Presentingchangeas
overcomP1exandunumanageable,inplacingthefbcusonconteぬattheexPenseof血dividual
andteam contributions,and加the角cusonawarenessratherthancleard江rection.
優麗園園園 う“〆印可mば α“‘〆α姿のか の〃ZZ′7ge′?リノ のPro僻みes『ocあの?ge/”α′?αgemem
V~ZePresented化)urcontingencyaPProaches:
”/heretostart?
Changeleadershipstylescontinuum
Stace‐DunPhycontingency matriX
ChangekaleidoscoPe
ContingencyaPProachesarguethatchangeimplementationshouldtakeinto account
theattributesoftheorganizationalcontextconcerned.However,theseapProachesdif
発rwithregardtothecontingencies-thekey 態ctors-thatthechange managerneeds
toconsider.Forexample,“wheretostart?”arguesthatchangeshouldbeginwiththe
“pivotalroles,
” wherechangeswillhavethebiggestimPactonthebehaviorandPer-
あrmancethatisofconcern.Those“pivotalroles”wilIVary丘om onechangeinitiative
toanother.Thestylescontinuum suggestschoosingachangeleadershipstylebasedon
considerationsofavailabletime,useofavailableexPertise,andstaffcommitment.AdictatorialaPproachto managementingeneral,andtochange managementinpartic-
ular,Probablyrunscounterto most managementbelie危,However,thestace‐Dunphy
contingencyframeworksuggeststhatwherechangeisVital,timeisshort,andconsensus
isunlikely,adictatorialaPProachismorelikelytobeeぼectiveinachievingmanagement
outcomes.ThemostcomP1exofthesemodels,thechangekaleidoscoPe,identi行eseight
setsofcontext魚ctorsands広setsofchangeimplementationdesignoPtions.Thedesign
oPtions,thisaPProachargues,needtoreflectthecontextdiagnosls,
lt mayseem obviousto arguethat“the bestaPproach” dePendsonthecontext,
However,thisideaof“fitting”changetothesettingiseasiertoexP1ainintheorythan
351Chapterlo C乃α′?ge崩超″”ge′“e′7rReなPed′yes
toputintopractice.Detaileddiagnosisofthecontexttakestimeandrequiresconsid‐
erablelocalknowledgeandinsight.A contingencyapproach also demandsnLeゴロibilityinstyle官om changeleadersand managerswho mLayinso]meinstancesberequiredto
mーoveoutoftheir”com化)rtzones,”andinconsistentbehaviormayweaken management
credibility.ourtwofinalquestionsare:lsever賃hingcontingentinthisarea?Arethere
nouniversalsinorganizationalchange?
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