I have attached case chosen (Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35) and some basic information. Also, the Wisconsin legislature website is: https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/448. Topic is Administrative law and regulatory law for this project.

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Project Information

Assignment Focus: You will select a business law topic from the textbook and will prepare a PowerPoint presentation that will be presented to the class for review and comments.

Objective: The purpose of the individual project is to provide you an opportunity to select a law topic of interest and to present a quality presentation to the class. You will research the topic and identify a court case related to your selected topic. Then, you will apply business legal theory to the case. You will discuss the law, social issues and ethical principles related to the issues in the case you selected.

Outcome: Through this assignment you will:

Increase your knowledge and understanding of a select business law topic
Use research skills to locate articles, information, and a recent legal case relevant to the business law topic
Apply critical thinking and reasoning skills to organize information and materials into an informative presentation for delivery to the class
Thoroughly discuss a legal case using a standard case brief outline
Create a PowerPoint presentation that is supported by references to credible sources
Assessment: This assignment consists of two parts: (1) PowerPoint Presentation, and (2) Peer Review and Comment discussion board. A grading rubric will be used. You must timely submit Part 1 to participate in Part 2 of this assignment. If you do not timely submit Part 1, you may participate in Part 2, but you will not receive points for your participation in Part 2. The underlying reason for this policy is simple—no student will benefit from Part 2 when Part 1 required significant time and effort to complete. Also, you must comment on at least ten (10) classmate presentations to receive points in Part 2. Partial points will not be awarded for commenting on less than ten (10) classmate projects—you will receive a grade of zero for Part 1. There is no exception to the grading policy for this assignment.

Due Date: There are two parts to this assignment and two due dates. Part 1 is due in Module 8 and Part II is due in Module 10. Projects submitted after the due date will receive a grade of zero—no exceptions. You must timely submit Part I to participate in Part II of the Assignment.

Project Instructions: Part I PowerPoint Presentation

The presentation must be in the form of a PowerPoint, which may incorporate charts, graphics, video clips, music, etc.

The presentation must relate to a business law topic from the textbook.
The presentation will thoroughly discuss a recent case related to the business law topic selected.
The case may be among the cases listed at the end of each textbook chapter. The case cannot be any of the cases discussed in the assigned textbook readings.
You will use the case brief outline method attached to these instructions to brief the case in your presentation.
The presentation must incorporate at least two different resources outside the textbook.
Internet resources must have credible newsworthy material (in other words, no underground Web articles, no Wikipedia, no Askmehow.com, etc.).
All sources will be properly cited in a ?References? page on the last PowerPoint slide. A sample Reference List page and citing tips is provided with these instructions.
Part I will be submitted as instructed on or before the assignment due date.
Open the PowerPoint before submitting it to ensure you are loading the correct file. If I cannot open it, I cannot grade it and you will receive a grade of zero.
The PowerPoint presentation slides should be of sufficient length to thoroughly discuss a business law topic and the relevant case. 10-15 slides is typical.
The presentation must follow MCC policies and procedures for material you use in your PowerPoint presentation.
Do not wait until the last minute to start work on the individual project.
Do not use a PowerPoint presentation that belongs to someone else. Your project must be your own work.
This is not a difficult assignment. Don?t miss an opportunity for points that are important to your final grade.
CASE BRIEF OUTLINE

You may use a case from the textbook or locate a case on the Internet. If you use a case from the tetbook, it must be a case at the end of the chapter. you may not use a case that is discussed in the assigned tetbook chapter reading assignment. You may also use LexisNexis to locate a case. The link to LexisNexis is provided in the Course Syllabus and is also available in the “Optional Resources” tab on the Menu bar to the left of this reading plane. Select the MCC Library Databases link to access LexisNexis

Identify the case caption. The case caption includes the party names (who sued who), the case reporter (where the case is found, the court, and the date of the decision.

For example: Smith v. Jones, 124 N.W.3d 323 (Neb. 2011). Smith is suing Jones. The case is recorded in the 124th volume of the Northwest Reporter, 3rd Edition, on Page 323. The case was heard in the state of Nebraska in 2011).

Identify the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s). For example: The Plaintiff is John Smith; the Defendant is Linda Jones. The case you select will also refer to one of the parties as the “Appellant”, which is the person who filed the appeal, and the “Appellee”, the person who answers the appeal.

Issue. This is the question the parties want the appeals court to answer. For example: Did the employer violate the Family Medical Leave Act by hiring another person to replace the employee while the employee was on FMLA leave?

Rule: What law did the court apply to resolve the issue? For example, if your presentation is on FMLA, you will discuss FMLA law.

Analysis/Application: This part of your presentation will discuss the reasons the court gave to apply the rule it used to resolve the issue. The court may discuss prior cases on the same or similar facts. You will provide a brief summary of the facts of the case and also explain the reasons why the court applied the rule (law) to those facts.

Conclusion: What did the court decide? Did it reverse the decision of the trial court? Did it affirm the decision of the trial court (meaning, a decision that the trial court did not err in its decision of the case)? What was the vote? For example, if a U.S. Supreme Court decision, was it 5-4, 7-2, etc. Who wrote the opinion? Was there a concurring opinion (judges who agreed with the result but not the reasoning the majority relied on in reaching the result) or was there a dissenting opinion (judges who disagreed with the majority decision)? If so, why did these judges refuses to join the majority? Briefly discuss the judges’ opinions.
Date and Time: Sunday, April 10, 2022 3:41:00 PM MDT
Job Number: 168644664
Document (1)
1. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
Client/Matter: -None-
Search Terms: withrow v. larkin, 421 u.s. 35
Search Type: Natural Language

? ?Caution
As of: April 10, 2022 9:41 PM Z
Withrow v. Larkin
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 18, 1974 ; April 16, 1975
No. 73-1573

Reporter
421 U.S. 35?*; 95 S. Ct. 1456?**; 43 L. Ed. 2d 712?***; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 56?****
WITHROW ET AL. v. LARKIN
Prior History:??[****1]? APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
Disposition:? The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
Core Terms

district court, license, investigated, proceedings, probable cause, contested hearing, due process, adjudicate, bias, functions, charges, suspend, restraining order, temporarily, injunction, preliminary injunction, administrative agency, adversary hearing, disqualified, prejudgment, probability, enjoined, hearings, medicine, notice, sit
Case Summary

Procedural Posture
Appellants, members of a state medical examining board, sought review of a preliminary injunction that was issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in appellee physician’s suit to enjoin appellants from enforcement of Wis. Stat. Ann. ?? 448.17, 448.18 (1974). The physician alleged that the statutes violated his procedural due process rights.
Overview
The physician successfully argued to the lower courts that Wis. Stat. Ann. ?? 448.17, 448.18 (1974) violated his procedural due process rights because the same members of the state board that conducted an investigation into allegations of professional misconduct would have also presided at his suspension hearing. On appeal, the Court reversed the grant of the injunction. The Court held that as the initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication had different bases and purposes, the fact that the same agency made them in tandem and that they related to the same issue did not result in a procedural due process violation. The Court further held that the process utilized by appellants did not in itself contain an unacceptable risk of bias, as no specific foundation had been presented for suspecting that appellants had been prejudiced by their investigation, or would have been disabled from hearing and deciding the issue of suspension based upon evidence to be presented at the suspension hearing.
Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
LexisNexis? Headnotes

Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Hearings?>?General Overview
Constitutional Law?>?…?>?Fundamental Rights?>?Procedural Due Process?>?Scope of Protection
HN1[] ?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure, Hearings
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts.

Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Impartial Decisionmaker?>?Participation in Prosecution
Evidence?>?Burdens of Proof?>?General Overview
Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Impartial Decisionmaker?>?General Overview
HN2[] ?Impartial Decisionmaker, Participation in Prosecution
The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.

Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Hearings?>?General Overview
Constitutional Law?>?…?>?Fundamental Rights?>?Procedural Due Process?>?Scope of Protection
HN3[] ?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure, Hearings
Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.

Civil Procedure?>?Remedies?>?Injunctions?>?Preliminary & Temporary Injunctions
Constitutional Law?>?…?>?Fundamental Rights?>?Procedural Due Process?>?Scope of Protection
Governments?>?Courts?>?Judges
Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Hearings?>?General Overview
HN4[] ?Injunctions, Preliminary & Temporary Injunctions
It is very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and it does not violate due process of law.

Administrative Law?>?Judicial Review?>?Remand & Remittitur
Civil Procedure?>?Appeals?>?Remands
Constitutional Law?>?…?>?Fundamental Rights?>?Procedural Due Process?>?Scope of Protection
HN5[] ?Judicial Review, Remand & Remittitur
It is not contrary to due process to allow judges and administrators who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal to confront and decide the same questions a second time around.

Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Hearings?>?General Overview
Constitutional Law?>?…?>?Fundamental Rights?>?Procedural Due Process?>?Scope of Protection
HN6[] ?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure, Hearings
In a medical license suspension matter, the initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation. Clearly, if the initial view of the facts based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised.

Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Hearings?>?General Overview
Constitutional Law?>?…?>?Fundamental Rights?>?Procedural Due Process?>?General Overview
Administrative Law?>?…?>?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure?>?Impartial Decisionmaker?>?Participation in Prosecution
Administrative Law?>?Judicial Review?>?Standards of Review?>?General Overview
Civil Procedure?>?…?>?Injunctions?>?Grounds for Injunctions?>?General Overview
HN7[] ?Formal Adjudicatory Procedure, Hearings
In an administrative proceeding, that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in a case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Findings of that kind made by judges with special insights into local realities are entitled to respect, but injunctions resting on such factors should be accompanied by at least the minimum findings required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and 65(d).
Lawyers’ Edition Display

Summary
To enforce certain statutory provisions regulating the practice of medicine, a Wisconsin statute empowers an examining board to warn and reprimand a physician, temporarily suspend his license, and institute criminal or license revocation proceedings. When the examining board instituted an investigation of the plaintiff-physician, he brought an action, seeking injunctive relief, against the board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Following earlier denials of the physician’s motions for temporary restraining orders, the District Court granted such a motion and granted a motion to convene a three-judge court, concluding that when the board moved from purely investigative proceedings to a hearing regarding suspension of the physician’s license, a question concerning the due process rights of the physician arose (368 F Supp 793). In compliance with the restraining order, the board did not hold the contested hearing it had previously scheduled, but it did hold a final investigative session and issued a “decision” finding that the physician had engaged in conduct proscribed by statute. The three-judge court preliminarily enjoined the board from using the statute giving the board various enforcement powers, and held that the statute was unconstitutional as violative of due process of law in that the board could suspend the physician’s license at the board’s own hearing on charges evolving from the board’s own investigation (368 F Supp 796). Subsequently, the District Court modified its judgment by withdrawing the declaration of unconstitutionality and enjoining enforcement of the statute against the plaintiff-physician only, the court finding that the physician’s challenge to the statute’s constitutionality had a high likelihood of success.
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In an option by White, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held that the District Court erred in restraining the board’s hearing and in enjoining enforcement of the statute, that there was little likelihood that the physician’s challenge would be successful on the merits, and that the procedure whereby the board both investigated and adjudicated the physician’s case did not violate due process of law.
Headnotes

INJUNCTION ?89.5?>?state statute — restraining order — subsequent declaration of unconstitutionality — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[1][] [1]
Since a state statute should not be declared unconstitutional by a Federal District Court if a preliminary injunction is granted to a plaintiff to protect his interests during the ensuing litigation, a Federal District Court should not declare unconstitutional a state statute regarding suspension of a physician’s license to practice medicine and errs in enjoining the utilization of such a statute against any licensee, where the plaintiff-licensee has been granted a restraining order against a contested hearing pursuant to the statute; the question before the Federal District Court is not whether the act is constitutional or unconstitutional, but is whether the showing made raises serious questions, under the Federal Constitution, and discloses that enforcement of the act, pending final hearing, would inflict irreparable damages upon the complainants.

INJUNCTION ?150 ?>?amended judgment — findings and conclusions — reasons for issuing injunction — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[2][] [2]
An amended judgment wherein a Federal District Court, preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a state statute against the plaintiff, finds that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the statute were to be applied against him and that the plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of the statute has a high likelihood of success, satisfies the requirement of findings and conclusions under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and satisfies the requirement of Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that an order granting an injunction set forth the reasons for its issuance.

ERROR ?1700 ?>?lack of specificity — refusal to remand — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[3][] [3]
Even though a decision to vacate and remand to a Federal District Court for fuller emendation of the findings, conclusions and judgment would be justified in view of their lack of specificity, nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court will not remand the cause where such action would not add anything essential to the determination of the merits, the District Court’s decision turned upon the sequence of functions followed by the appellants and not upon any factual issue peculiar to the case, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 USCS 1253, and a remand would be a costly procedure to emphasize points that have already been made and recognized by both parties as well as by the District Court.

COURTS ?225.5 ?>?three-judge court — injunction against enforcement of state statute — high likelihood of success of constitutional challenge — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[4A][] [4A]LEdHN[4B][] [4B]
The requirement, under 28 USCS 2281, 2284, of a three-judge Federal District Court for entering a preliminary or permanent injunction against the enforcement of a state statute on the grounds of unconstitutionality of the law, includes preliminary injunctions against enforcement of state statutes based on “a high likelihood of success” of the constitutional challenge to the statutes.

INJUNCTION ?149 ?>?preliminary injunction against enforcement of statute — abuse of discretion — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[5][] [5]
A Federal District Court abuses its discretion in preliminarily enjoining enforcement–as against the physician being investigated by a state medical examining board–of a state statute permitting the board to temporarily suspend a physician’s license, where it is unlikely that the physician will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim that for the board to temporarily suspend his license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation would constitute a denial of the physician’s rights to procedural due process.

LAW ?746 ?>?fair trial — due process — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[6][] [6]
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.

LAW ?751 ?>?due process — administrative adjudication — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[7][] [7]
The due process requirement of a fair trial in a fair tribunal applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts.

LAW ?778.5 ?>?due process — bias of adjudicator — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[8][] [8]
Cases in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him are situations where the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable under due process of law.

LAW ?8 ?>? LAW ?751 ?>?due process — bias in administrative adjudication — presumptions and burden of proof — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[9][] [9]
To carry its burden of persuasion, the contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators, and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.

LAW ?751 ?>?administrative board — bias — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[10][] [10]
The processes utilized by a state medical examining board empowered to warn or reprimand physicians, to suspend licenses, and to institute criminal actions or revoke licenses, do not in themselves contain an unacceptable risk of bias violative of due process where, although the investigative proceeding is closed to the public, the physician and his counsel are permitted to be present throughout; the physician’s counsel actually attends the hearings and knows the facts presented to the examining board; and no specific foundation is presented for suspecting that the board has been prejudiced by its investigation or would be disabled from hearing and deciding on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the contested hearing.

LAW ?8 ?>? SURGEONS ?2 ?>?evidence revealed in investigative procedures — fairness in later adversary hearing — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[11][] [11]
The mere exposure of a state examining board–empowered to warn or reprimand physicians, to suspend licenses, and to institute criminal actions or revoke licenses–to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the board members at a later adversary hearing.

LAW ?8 ?>?state administrators — fairness — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[12][] [12]
State administrators are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.

INJUNCTION ?149 ?>?restraining order and preliminary injunction — erroneous entry of — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[13][] [13]
A Federal District Court errs in entering a restraining order against holding a contested hearing by a state medical examining board and in granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a state statute permitting the board to temporarily suspend a physician’s license, where such injunction is based on the untenable view that it would be unconstitutional for the board to suspend a physician’s license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation.

LAW ?8 ?>? SURGEONS ?2 ?>?proceedings of state medical board — prejudice not shown — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[14][] [14]
Prejudice and prejudgment of a state medical examining board is not shown where, following the entry of a restraining order against the board’s holding a contested hearing to determine whether a physician’s license should be temporarily suspended, the board makes and issues formal findings of fact and conclusions of law asserting that there is probable cause to believe that a physician has engaged in various acts prohibited by state statutes, such findings and conclusions being verified and filed with the district attorney for the purpose of initiating license revocation and criminal proceedings.

LAW ?91 ?>? LAW ?751 ?>?administrative agencies’ involvement in investigation and enforcement hearings — Administrative Procedure Act — due process — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[15][] [15]
The procedure whereby the members of administrative agencies receive the results of investigations, approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then participate in the ensuing hearings, violates neither the Administrative Procedure Act (5 USCS 551 et seq.) nor due process of law.

LAW ?751?>?due process — reversal of decision — reconsideration by same judge or administrator — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[16][] [16]
It is not contrary to due process to allow judges and administrators who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal to confront and decide the same questions the second time around.

LAW ?751 ?>?findings by state medical board — due process — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[17][] [17]
A state medical examining board stays within the accepted bounds of due process where, after the board conducts an investigation, it issues findings and conclusions asserting the commission of certain acts and ultimately concludes that there is probable cause to believe that a physician has violated state statutes.

LAW ?751 ?>?charge and adjudication by same agency — due process — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[18][] [18]
Since the initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes, the fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation.

LAW ?751 ?>?investigative and adjudicatory functions in one agency — due process — particular circumstances — unfairness — ?>?Headnote:
LEdHN[19][] [19]
Although the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions in an administrative agency does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, a court is not thereby precluded from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.
Syllabus

Wisconsin statutes prohibit various acts of professional misconduct by physicians and empower a State Examining Board to warn and reprimand physicians, to temporarily suspend licenses, and to institute criminal action or action to evoke a license. When the Board notified appellee licensed physician that a closed investigative hearing, which appellee and his attorney could attend, would be held to determine whether appellee had engaged in certain proscribed acts, appellee brought an action against appellant Board members seeking injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order against the hearing on the ground that the statutes were unconstitutional and that appellants’ acts with respect to appellee violated his constitutional rights. The District Court denied the restraining order, and the Board proceeded with the hearing, and after hearing testimony notified appellee that a “contested hearing” would be held at which the Board would determine whether his license would be temporarily suspended. The court then granted?[****2]? appellee’s motion for a restraining order against the contested hearing on the ground that a substantial federal due process question had arisen. The Board complied with the order and did not proceed with the contested hearing but instead held a final investigative session and made “findings of fact” that appellee had engaged in certain proscribed conduct and “conclusions of law” that there was probable cause to believe he had violated certain criminal provisions. Subsequently, a three-judge court declared that the statute empowering the Board temporarily to suspend a physician’s license without formal proceedings was unconstitutional and preliminarily enjoined the Board from enforcing it on the ground that it would be a denial of due process for the board to suspend appellee’s license “at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation.” After appellants appealed from this decision the District Court modified the judgment so as to withdraw its declaration of unconstitutionality and to preliminarily enjoin its enforcement against appellee only, stating that appellee would suffer irreparable injury if the statute were applied to him and that his challenge?[****3]? to its constitutionality had a high likelihood of success. Held:
1. The three-judge court’s initial judgment should not have declared the statute unconstitutional and erroneously enjoined the Board from applying it against all licensees. Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310. P. 43.
2. While a decision to vacate and remand for fuller emendation of the District Court’s findings, conclusions, and judgment would be justified in view of their lack of specificity, such action, under the circumstances, would not add anything essential to the determination of the merits and would be a costly procedure to emphasize points already made and recognized by the parties as well as by the District Court. Pp. 44-46.
3. The District Court erred when it restrained the Board’s contested hearing and when it preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the statute against appellee, since on the record it is quite unlikely that appellee would ultimately prevail on the merits of the due process issue. Pp. 46-55.
(a) The combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation as creating an unconstitutional?[****4]? risks of bias. Pp. 46-54.
(b) Here the processes utilized by the Board do not in themselves contain an unacceptable risk of bias, since, although the investigative hearing had been closed to the public, appellee and his attorney were permitted to be present throughout and in fact his attorney did attend the hearings and knew the facts presented to the Board; moreover, no specific foundation has been presented for suspecting that the Board had been prejudiced by its investigation or would be disabled from hearing and deciding on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the contested hearing, the mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures being insufficient in itself to impugn the Board’s fairness at a later adversary hearing. Pp. 54-55.
4. The fact that the Board, when prevented from going forward with the contested hearing, proceeded to issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law that there was probable cause to believe appellee had engaged in various prohibited acts, does not show prejudice and prejudgment, and the Board stayed within accepted bounds of due process by issuing such findings and conclusions after investigation. The?[****5]? initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes, and the fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation. Pp. 55-58.
Reversed and remanded. See 368 F.Supp. 796.
White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Counsel:?Betty R. Brown, Solicitor General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the brief were Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and LeRoy L. Dalton, Assistant Attorney General.

Robert H. Friebert argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.
Judges:?Burger, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Opinion

?[*37]??[***718]??[**1459]? MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The statutes of the State of Wisconsin forbid the practice of medicine without a license from an Examining Board composed of practicing physicians. T