(Un)Ethical Leadership and Identity: What Did We Learn
and Where Do We Go from Here?

Samuel T. Hunter

Published online: 4 April 2012

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract The purpose of this article is to highlight and

comment on the key findings emerging from the collective

efforts of the special issue on leadership, ethics, and iden-

tity. Highlights include definitional advancements, pro-

cesses comprising ethical leadership, as well as outcomes

and moderating factors. In addition, I attempt to synthesize

work across authors by identifying common themes as well

as conflicting elements in the article. I conclude with a

discussion on emerging areas in need of future research

investigation in the leadership and ethics arena.

Keywords Leadership � Ethics � Summary � Unethical

Introduction

The aim of this special issue was to solicit manuscripts

centering on leadership, ethics, and identity. The call was

successful on a number of levels, resulting in a collection

of article that range and differ in foci, styles, methods,

samples, and cultural emphasis. The aim of this article,

then, is to highlight the unique contributions of each of

these efforts, touching on what each has to say with regard

to the important topics underlying the special issue. I will

also identify common and conflicting themes emerging

from the whole of these efforts before concluding with a

more critical discussion of where gaps still exist and how

we might move forward to fill them. In direct terms I aim to

highlight, synthesize, and identify areas that warrant future

investigation. I begin, then, with highlights.

Highlights Across Contributions

To provide some level of structure in my attempt to sum-

marize and highlight findings across the diverse set of

articles comprising the special issue, I will begin by noting

the definitional issues touched on in several manuscripts,

move the discussion toward the processes involved in

ethical leadership, comment briefly on moderating influ-

ences of ethical leadership and conclude the summary

portion with a note on the outcomes of ethical leadership. I

start with definitional issues surrounding ethical leadership

and identity.

Defining Ethical and Unethical Leadership

Unal et al. (2012) provide the most direct discussion of the

challenges surrounding defining ethical leadership, although

it should be acknowledged that all manuscripts touch on the

issue to varying degrees. The most cited definition in the

leadership literature appears to have been put forth by

Brown et al. (2005) who define ethical leadership as ‘‘the

demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through

personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the

promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way

communication, reinforcement, and decision-making’’ (p.

117). A similar, albeit shorter, definition is offered by Unal

and co-authors who define unethical leadership as ‘‘super-

visor behaviors that violate moral standards’’. Grounded in

both of these definitions (and others) is a key point that

warrants specific note. Namely, that the definition of ethical

leadership is best characterized as a dynamic entity—a

moving target. More directly, the norms regarding what

defines ethical or unethical behavior can and do change.

Thus, what constitutes ethical leadership at one point in time

may vary by both timeframe and entity (i.e., organization or

S. T. Hunter (&)
Pennsylvania State University, 111 Moore Building,

State College, PA 16823, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

123

J Bus Ethics (2012) 107:79–87

DOI 10.1007/s10551-012-1301-y

group) under consideration. Unal and co-authors argue that

this normative grounding is necessary for the area of

research to move forward, and while I agree, I do think the

shifting nature of the definitions we are building this area of

research upon may provide their own share of interesting

challenges in the future. I will comment a bit more on this

issue later in the article.

Also noted extensively by Unal and colleagues is the

issue of construct overlap or, framed more critically, the

potential for construct proliferation. Directly, there is rea-

sonable debate around whether ethical leadership is an

incrementally unique construct or simply represents a form

of ‘‘old wine in new bottles.’’ Interestingly, Brown and

Trevino (2006) touched on similar issues in their recent

review of ethical leadership, yet the authors decided to take

an approach that differs, at least on the surface, subtly from

Unal and colleagues. That is, although Unal and colleagues

discuss unethical leadership, Brown and Trevino (2006)

and others have tended to focus on ethical leadership,

noting the distinctions and overlap among similar con-

structs such as spiritual leadership, authentic leadership,

and transformational leadership. Unal and co-authors, in

contrast, discuss the differences between unethical leader-

ship and constructs such as abusive supervision (Tepper

2000), petty tyranny (Ashforth 1997) and bullying (Hoel

et al. 2001), among others. Both approaches are well

grounded in theory and contribute substantively to the

leadership literature. The two foci, however, are notably

unique and their divergence from one another broaches the

question of whether we should focus on promoting ethical

leadership, identifying and stopping unethical leadership,

or both.

Processes of Ethical Leadership

Defining ethical or unethical leadership is certainly a nec-

essary beginning, yet for a richer understanding of the

construct we must also begin to investigate the processes,

activities, and mechanisms comprising ethical leadership

(Bass and Bass 2009). This is where, as I see it, the special

issue makes its most sizable and substantive contribution to

the literature, with the majority of articles touching on the

unique and varying processes comprising ethical leadership.

Avey et al. (2012), for example, provide an interesting

meditational model of ethical leadership where ethical

behaviors impact two outcomes, employee well-being and

job satisfaction, vis-à-vis unique mediating factors. Spe-

cifically, for the outcome of psychological well-being, the

proposed mediating construct is employee voice, while the

relationship between ethical leadership and job satisfaction

is mediated by feelings of employee ownership. Tested

across more than 800 working adults, there was solid evi-

dence in support of the hypothesized relationships.

Although there are a number of interesting propositions

and findings put forth by Avey and colleagues, I would like

to comment specifically on the differing mediating factors

observed for the two outcomes investigated. As Avey and

colleagues illustrate, ethical leadership exhibits a rather

complex pattern of influences on key organizational out-

comes. More directly, depending on the outcome of inter-

est, ethical leadership may impact that outcome through

varying and diverse mechanisms. Key here, it seems, is to

acknowledge that how ethical leadership impacts organi-

zational criteria may depend largely on the outcome we are

interested in.

In an effort somewhat similar to Avey et al. (2012) and

Den Hartog and Belschak (2012) examined employee

engagement as a mediator between ethical leadership and a

unique form of organizational citizenship behavior (i.e.,

employee initiative) as well as counterproductive work

behaviors. Whereas Avey et al. (2012) present a dual

mediator model of ethical leadership, the article by Den

Hartog and Belschak (2012) offer a moderated mediation

model to illustrate the complexity characterizing ethical

leadership influences. Drawing on surface acting literature,

the authors propose that inauthentic behavior, measured via

Machiavellianism, serves as a moderator in the proposed

mediation model. In essence, the authors suggest that

behaving in an ethical manner is less effective if the leader

is seen as inauthentic. Conversely, leaders who are more

authentic have greater sway as ethical leaders.

Den Hartog and Belschak (2012) test their moderated

mediation model across two studies and find strong support

for their propositions. I encourage the reader to examine

the article for a more in-depth discussion of their hypoth-

eses and theoretical rationale. I will, however, comment on

a finding I see as particularly noteworthy to this broader

discussion. First, as noted in the paragraph above, the

authors proposed and found that behaving ethically influ-

enced employee engagement that, in turn, influenced the

aforementioned outcomes. The process (i.e., meditational)

model is especially interesting in that behaving ethically

may serve as a motivating influence to subordinates. Much

like constructs of charisma or the inspirational motivation

facet of transformational leadership (Bass and Steidlmeier

1999), ethical leaders are likely to be admired and

respected by followers. This, as evidenced by the findings

across both samples, gives them the capacity to inspire

greater levels of engagement in their work. Akin to the

‘‘moral manager’’ label put forth by Trevino et al. (2000),

this perspective is somewhat unique from the more direct

ethical role-modeling approach, where an ethical leader

provides indications as to which behaviors are appropriate

or inappropriate in a given organization. The framework

offered by Den Hartog and Belshack, in contrast, illustrates

the more wide-spread influences ethical leadership might

80 S. T. Hunter

123

have on followers. That is, ethical leaders do more than

show followers what is right or wrong—if they behave

authentically, they are also able to have greater influence

over subordinates because they are operating ethically.

Turning now to the third manuscript to center on the

processes comprising ethical leadership, Thiel et al. (2012)

break from the pattern established by the two manuscripts

discussed above and provide some guidance on the ante-

cedents driving ethical decision-making. That is, whereas

Avey et al. (2012) and Den Hartog and Belschack (2012)

describe the mediating factors shaping how ethical lead-

ership impacts organizational outcomes, Thiel et al. (2012)

outline the processes that shape whether ethical, or

unethical, leadership occurs. Utilizing a sensemaking

perspective as a theoretical framework, Thiel and co-

authors provide a cognitively centered ethical decision-

making model. The focus of the article, moreover, is to

provide a number of trainable strategies that may be uti-

lized by leaders as a means to improve ethical decision-

making.

The sensemaking approach to ethical leadership taken

by the authors is a unique and interesting tact to take in

understanding why leaders do or do not behave ethically.

Differing from the other manuscripts in the special issue,

the sensemaking framework expressly acknowledges the

ill-defined nature of ethical dilemmas faced by leaders.

Moreover, the approach breaks away from rational deci-

sion-making approaches that often apply post hoc ration-

alist explanations for why decisions were made. The

sensemaking framework, instead, concedes that leaders

often apply intuitive judgments when attempting to make

moral decisions. Also somewhat unique to the sensemaking

approach is the proposition that ethical decision-making is

contingent upon the leader’s mental model as well as their

understanding of the situation. More directly, leaders that

do not recognize an ethical dilemma are unlikely to address

the issue appropriately. This acknowledgement is inter-

esting from a process perspective in that it provides prac-

titioners with a reasonable starting point for developing

trainable skill-sets and strategies to improve ethical deci-

sion-making.

Finally, the work of Koning and Waistell (2012)

examine a number of process-oriented constructs—most

notably the issues of identity and time. Utilizing a case-

study approach, the authors examined one Chinese busi-

nessman operating in Indonesia as he makes a transition

from keeping religion and business-decisions wholly sep-

arate in his life, to integrating the two by using religion to

guide business practice. In this transition, the authors

propose that the leader has become more ethically minded,

drawing on religion as a moral code to drive ethical deci-

sion-making in his organization. The article by Koning and

Waistell is noteworthy for a number of reasons, but perhaps

most critical to the discussion here in that it describes in

great detail the aforementioned transition taken by a

business leader. The case-study approach, albeit one that

was integrated with a number of other interviews with

additional businessmen, permits rich discussion and

description, supplementing the more quantitatively driven

articles in the special issue.

Outcomes of Ethical Leadership

Turning now to the outcomes investigated, the immediate

observation is that they vary substantially across manu-

scripts. Thiel et al. (2012) for example, frame ethical

decision-making itself, as the primary outcome of interest

in their article. Contrast this with the study of Avey et al.

(2012) who examined more traditional organizational

constructs such as psychological well-being and job satis-

faction, while Den Hartog and Belshack (2012) examined

employee initiative and counterproductive work behavior.

At a broad level, the efforts of the special issue suggest

that behaving ethically benefits a wide range of organiza-

tional outcomes. That is, the sole outcome of ethical

leadership is not, simply, ethical actions or role-modeling

on the part of a leader and follower. Rather, leaders who

operate in an ethical manner produce more satisfied and

happy employees who are less likely to behave in coun-

terproductive ways. The pattern of findings in these articles

is consistent with the review by Brown and Mitchell (2010)

who note that ethical leadership is related to employee

commitment, willingness to report problems, willingness to

put in extra hours and positive perceptions of work climate.

At more macro levels of analysis, ethical leadership has

also been associated with perceptions of task significance

and follower effort as well as top management team

effectiveness (De Hoogh and Den Hartog 2008). On the

whole, such findings underscore the central theme that

ethical leadership produces a wide range of complex ben-

efits to organizations.

Moderating Factors

Having touched on the definitions of ethical leadership, the

processes comprising it, as well as the outcomes of ethical

leader behavior, I will comment briefly on the moderating

factors shaping the conditions under which ethical leader-

ship will be more or less effective in impacting key orga-

nizational outcomes. The article that addressed this point

most directly was Den Hartog and Belschak (2012) who

examined inauthentic behavior, quantified as Machiavel-

lianism, as a moderator in their proposed model. This

finding was one of the more interesting in the special issue

in that it reveals the subtle nature of behaving ethically. It

(Un)Ethical Leadership and Identity 81

123

is not enough, it seems, to simply engage in displays of

ethical or moral behavior. Instead, a leader must do so in a

way that is perceived as genuine or part of their core

identity. The authors were able to demonstrate that sub-

ordinates can pick up on these subtle differences and that it

impacts how engaged employees are in their work.

Emergent Themes

Stepping back a bit and considering the aggregate of the

special issue, it is apparent that several common themes tie

the contributions together. While engaging in this attempt at

synthesis, however, it became clear that each article takes a

somewhat unique approach to the study and conceptuali-

zation of ethical and unethical leadership. These unique

approaches were sometimes complementary, adding and

extending to the other articles in the special issue. Other

times, the articles seemingly conflicted with one another on

a number of conceptual levels. I will begin, then, by con-

sidering three common themes across articles before

acknowledging the conflicts and diverging viewpoints.

Common Themes

Complexity

The first emergent theme is one of complexity. From defi-

nitional issues raised by Unal et al. (2012) to the role of

religion in ethical leadership (Koning and Waistell 2012) it

is clear that ethical and unethical leadership are complex

phenomena. The point is underscored by Den Hartog and

Belschak (2012) and Avey et al. (2012) who took a seem-

ingly similar approach to understanding ethical leadership

by developing and testing process (i.e., meditational) models

within applied settings. Despite the similar approaches,

unique mediators and outcomes were examined with strong

empirical support being observed for models in each study,

respectively. Finally, Thiel et al. (2012) note the complex

cognitive and contextual factors driving ethical decision-

making. On the whole, then, each article acknowledges in

its own unique way that what is ethical leadership and how

it impacts organizational outcomes is hardly a simple

phenomenon.

Importance of Ethical Leadership

Despite high levels of complexity, each article in the special

issue highlighted the fundamental importance of the

research area. Den Hartog and Belschack (2012), for

example, demonstrated that ethical leadership can result in

greater employee initiative as well as reduced counterpro-

ductive work behaviors. In a distinctly different fashion

Koning and Waistell (2012) demonstrated just how strongly

a focus on religion and morality can impact decision-

making in business settings. Underlying all of the articles is

the argument that leaders who operate unethically can sig-

nificantly and substantively harm their organizations. More

positively framed, those leaders who operate ethically have

the potential to shape attitudes and behaviors in beneficial

ways. The study of ethical leadership, it seems, is a valuable

endeavor worthy of growing research attention.

Criticality of Process

The final emergent theme across articles is the importance

of process in understanding ethical leadership. I was

impressed with the commitment to rich conceptual devel-

opment in each article aimed at not only identifying

important outcomes of ethical leadership, but also the fac-

tors driving the occurrence of it (e.g., Thiel et al. 2012) as

well as the activities comprising it. Based on the findings of

this special issue, ethical leadership impacts organizational

outcomes by making employees more engaged, permitting

them greater expression of voice, and increasing psycho-

logical ownership (Avey et al. 2012; Den Hartog and

Belschack 2012). Choices on ethical decisions, moreover,

seem to be driven by an understanding of the context filtered

through a leader’s mental model (Thiel et al. 2012). Finally,

the shift from unethical to ethical leader can result from a

key relationship or event occurring in their lives (Koning

and Waistell 2012). The clearly emergent theme is that we

have moved beyond simply suggesting ethical leadership is

a positive phenomenon for organizations. As the articles

demonstrate quite well, we have begun to understand how

and why this occurs.

Conflicting Themes

In addition to the more common themes emerging from the

collection of articles, there are a number of noteworthy

conflicts as well. I will discuss three of these apparent

conflicts: 1) ethical versus unethical leadership, 2) stable

versus dynamic definitions, and 3) rational versus intuitive

decision-making.

Ethical Versus Unethical Leadership

Mentioned briefly earlier in the article, Unal et al. (2012)

chose to focus on the normative foundations of unethical

leadership. This framing stands in contrast to the focus on

ethical leadership more commonly found in the literature

(e.g., Brown and Trevino 2006; Trevino et al. 2000; Sha-

ubroeck et al. in press). Interestingly, the articles in this

special issue tended to emphasize ethical rather than

unethical leadership—with the exception, of course, of the

82 S. T. Hunter

123

study by Unal and co-authors. There is some evidence that

the antecedents of ethical leadership are not merely the

absence or polar opposites of those that drive unethical

leadership. Instead, there may be a unique set of antecedents

for each framing. For example, Tepper et al. (2006) utilized

social exchange theory to explain why leaders’ increased

feelings of powerlessness led to more aggressive behavior

directed at subordinates. There is no current research evi-

dence, however, to suggest that higher levels of power-

lessness would result in greater ethical leadership.

Similarly, although there has been relatively little work

done on the antecedents of ethical leadership (see Brown

and Mitchell 2010 for a discussion) there is some indication,

for example, that personality traits such as agreeableness

and conscientiousness are predictive of ethical behavior

(Walumba and Shaubroeck 2009). It seems that other per-

sonality traits, in contrast, would be more predictive of

unethical leadership. In one of the few cases examining both

frameworks simultaneously, Detert et al. (2007) found that

abusive supervision—but not ethical leadership—was

related to counterproductive work behavior.

The question that emerges, then, is which framing

warrants the collective focus of leadership scholars? That

is, if one chooses to study ethicality and leadership, which

characterization should be chosen as a theoretical frame-

work? The little evidence that exists suggests that both are

important, given their unique relationships with organiza-

tional outcomes. Although admittedly speculative, given

the present state of the literature I presently see greater

value in a focus on unethical behavior given the potential

for harmful outcomes that may occur as a result. There is

an old Russian proverb that says a spoonful of tar can ruin a

barrel of honey, but that a spoonful of honey has little

impact on a barrel of tar. Leaning on such an analogy, it

would seem that the potential for harm might outweigh the

potential for good emerging from ethical leadership. Thus,

while I see value in a more positivist-framed approach to

ethical leadership, I see perhaps greater research utility in

the darker framing of unethical leadership.

Stable Versus Dynamic Definition

In the case-study analysis of the Chinese businessman

conducted by Koning and Waistell (2012) the authors

suggested that an emergent focus on religion was respon-

sible for a change in how the leader operated his business.

That is, religion served as a newfound moral compass. I

would like to extend this argument beyond what the authors

explicitly noted—alleviating them from any speculation I

personally offer—and suggest that a reliance on religion for

framing ethical leadership stands in contrast to the more

normative (i.e., dynamic) approach to ethical leadership.

Although religious and spiritual interpretation will vary,

there would appear to be some level of consistency or

standard by which moral behavior is measured. The primary

texts (e.g., Christian Bible, Quran) have remained largely

the same—or at least similar—for thousands of years. Thus,

to be direct, ethicality bound by religion would appear more

stable than a strictly normative definition of ethical lead-

ership such as those offered by Unal and co-authors as well

as Brown and Mitchell (2010). A normative approach

concedes that morality and ethicality are dictated by what

the collective currently believes to be appropriate. Such a

framing is, by definition, shifting in nature.

The conflict alluded to then, lies is whether both framings

can co-exist or whether they are fundamentally opposed and

a choice must be made about which is most appropriate as a

basis for scholarly investigation. Perhaps more directly, we

might ask ourselves if there is room for hard-and-fast rules of

morality within a more normative framework? Such a debate

has been made by a number of scholars (see Ciulla 1995) and

can also be illustrated by such jarring yet revealing questions

as: Is murder ever acceptable? To some, this question will

elicit normative or shifting responses (e.g., ‘‘in some cir-

cumstances, yes’’). In others the answer will quite readily be

more stable responses (e.g., ‘‘killing is never acceptable’’). It

is beyond the scope of the discussion here to resolve such a

philosophically oriented debate but I will concede that I see

the greatest utility in the normative approach taken by the

vast majority of ethical leadership scholars and acknowl-

edge that even within religious contexts. This suggestion is

based on the evidence that norms do shift (Ricoeur 1974)—

perhaps less so and with less variability in some contexts

(e.g., religion, spirituality). Moreover Koning and Waistell

(2012) illustrate that shifting from one religion to the next

represents a form of religious reinterpretation. Thus, the

bulk of research evidence suggests that it will be beneficial

for leaders to have a strong moral compass, but ‘‘true north’’

will shift from time to time.

Rational Versus Intuitive Ethical Decision-Making

The third and final conflict emerging across the collection

of articles is the focus on unconscious processes versus

rational decision-making. The cognitive perspective taken

by Thiel and colleagues suggest that ethical decision-

making is not a wholly rational process (Sonenshein 2007).

Rather, intuition and non-conscious processes impact

choices made during ethical dilemmas. Such a framework

stands, at least on the surface, in contrast to more norma-

tive and rational approaches to ethical leadership. Den

Hartog and Belschack (2012), for example, discuss role-

modeling behavior as a critical aspect of ethical leadership.

Leaders are theorized to express their beliefs and values to

subordinates, serving as models for appropriate behavior.

Similar theoretical frameworks have been used by scholars

(Un)Ethical Leadership and Identity 83

123

such as Shaubroeck et al. (in press), who directly investi-

gated the impact of leader role-modeling across multiple

levels of analysis. Implicit in this approach is that leaders

are aware of their beliefs and values and choose to express

them when the situation requires it. That is, leaders ratio-

nally choose to behave ethically as a tool of leadership.

Careful inspection of these two approaches to under-

standing ethical leader outcomes reveals that this conflict

may be more superficial than might appear upon initial

inspection. The sensemaking approach taken by Thiel and

colleagues is useful in understanding how value and ethical

decisions are made. That is, a cognitive approach provides

guidance as to whether a leader is aware of an ethical

dilemma and whether it violates their internal value sys-

tem. By understanding when, and under what conditions,

leaders are able to make rational choices we can develop

more accurate models for ethical and unethical leadership.

Put another way, a sensemaking approach serves as a

useful antecedent to the more rational approaches taken by

Den Hartog and Belschack (2012), Avey et al. (2012) and

others. Thus, it would seem that an integration of intuitive

and rational perspective would provide a more complete

picture of why ethical decisions are made and the impact

they have on subordinates.

Future Areas in Need of Investigation

Having discussed the unique contributions, common

themes and conflicting perspectives, I turn now to a dis-

cussion of where future research appears warranted. It

should be noted that the list is not, by necessity, all-

inclusive and instead represents a truncated discussion of

key areas of future research.

Time

Longitudinal investigation is an often-cited area in need of

greater investigation (Bluedorn and Jaussi 2008) and such a

recommendation rings particularly true with regard to

ethical and unethical leadership (Brown and Mitchell

2010). For example, Mitchell and Palmer (2010) propose

that ethical behavior, sustained over time, can increase a

leader’s confidence to engage in ethical behavior in the

future. Similarly, although there is some evidence to sug-

gest that individual differences are related to ethical lead-

ership (e.g., Walumba and Shaubroeck 2009) investigation

of the early life developmental experiences shaping a lea-

der’s mental models would appear warranted (Ligon et al.

2008). On the whole, more needs to be learned about how

long the impact of ethical and unethical behavior lasts as

well as the nature of the development process shaping

ethical leader emergence.

Identity

The collective articles in the special issue excelled in a

number of ways, particularly with regard to describing the

complex processes comprising ethical and unethical lead-

ership. With the exception of Koning and Waistell (2012)

the issue of leader identity was largely omitted by the

collective authors. This is not to suggest that the issue of

identity was not discussed in any fashion by the collective

authors, yet identity was a minimal focus of the articles.

Let me be clear that this is not a criticism levied against the

scholars but …

Identity, Self-Awareness,

and Self-Deception: Ethical Implications

for Leaders and Organizations Cam Caldwell

ABSTRACT. The ability of leaders to be perceived as

trustworthy and to develop authentic and effective rela-

tionships is largely a function of their personal identities

and their self-awareness in understanding and making

accommodations for their weaknesses. The research about

self-deception confirms that we often practice denial

regarding our identities without being fully aware of the

ethical duties that we owe to ourselves and to others. This

article offers insights about the nature of identity and self-

awareness, specifically examining how self-deception can

create barriers to self-awareness within both a personal

and a business context.

KEY WORDS: identity, self-deception, self-awareness,

ethical leadership, mediating lens, emotional intelligence

For more than three millennia, ‘‘knowledge of the

self has been considered to be at the very core of

human behavior’’ (Whetten and Cameron, 2007,

p. 58). Personal identity and self-awareness have

been identified as critical elements of effectiveness in

creating relationships with others (Albrecht, 2006;

Goleman, 2006a, b). Despite the importance of self-

knowledge in our lives, we are often unknowingly

and unintentionally guilty of self-deception (War-

ner, 2001) – with a potentially devastating impact on

our own lives and on others (Boyatzis and McKee,

2005).

The purpose of this article is to offer insights

about the nature of identity and self-awareness,

specifically examining how self-deception can create

barriers to self-awareness and conflict with one’s

identity. Section ‘‘Identity, self-awareness, and self-

deception’’ of this article draws on the academic

literature about identity and self-awareness at the

personal level and explains the construct of self-

deception and how it occurs. Section ‘‘Ethical duties

to self’’ presents five specific ethical implications

associated with self-deception. Section ‘‘Implications

for business’’ identifies how an understanding of

identity, self-awareness, and self-deception applies

within a business context. Section ‘‘Contributions

and future research’’ concludes by listing the con-

tributions of this article and opportunities for future

research about identity-related issues.

Identity, self-awareness, and self-deception

One’s identity defines how an individual affirms his/

her worth to others and to self (Ashforth and

Johnson, 2001; Sluss and Ashforth, 2007). Josselson

(1994, p. 82) indicated that identity is at its core

psychosocial, as an ‘‘expression of self, for, with,

against, or despite; but certainly in response to

others.’’ One’s individual identity is a set of mean-

ings applied to the self within a social role or situa-

tion that determines what it means to be who one is

(Burke and Tully, 1977, p. 883). This set of mean-

ings may be complex and ‘‘serves as a standard or

reference’’ for evaluating oneself and one’s behaviors

(Burke, 1991, p. 837). Brewer and Gardner (1996)

explained that identity orientation may be at a

Cam Caldwell obtained a PhD from Washington State

University where he was a Thomas S. Foley Graduate

Fellow. He writes about ethical duties of leaders and orga-

nizations in expanding the ability of organizations to increase

employee commitment and long-term wealth creation. He is

currently Visiting Professor in the College of Business at

Texas A & M University – Corpus Christi.

Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 90:393–406 � Springer 2010
DOI 10.1007/s10551-010-0424-2

personal (internal), relational (dyadic), or collective

(group or organizational) level. At the organizational

level, Albert and Whetten (1985) conceptualized

identity as encompassing the central, enduring, and

distinctive attributes of an organization. At the per-

sonal or individual level, identity also encompasses

those central, enduring, and distinctive attributes of

an individual (Berger et al., 2006).

Academic discourse can depersonalize identity

and fail to acknowledge the deeply personal

importance of self-image (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006;

Schiraldi, 2001) and the critical nature of self-

assessment in evaluating our sense of worth and

personal happiness (Langer, 1999; Strauss, 2005).

How we act in specific situations is reciprocally re-

lated to one’s identity, the roles that we have iden-

tified as important, and the congruence between our

behavior and how we believe we ideally should

behave (Burke and Reitzes, 1981). Social identity is

correlated with individual identity and deals with

one’s perceived role as a member of a group as

opposed to one’s identity as a unique individual

(Stets and Burke, 2000). Flynn (2005) suggested that

identity at the personal level was validated by

comparing the self to others and by confirming one’s

identity in context with how one believes (s)he is

perceived by others.

Moral identity is also a fundamental part of who

we are (Flanagan, 1991, p. 18) and encompasses our

efforts to answer the three following questions: (1)

‘‘what is the right thing to do?’’ (2) ‘‘how is the best

possible state of affairs achieved?’’ and (3) ‘‘what

qualities make for a good person?’’ (Hart, 2005, pp.

166–168). Moral behavior is behavior which

addresses ethical duties (Hosmer, 2007) and is

socially responsible (Reed et al., 2007, p. 179).

Moral identity encompasses the traits, feelings, and

behaviors that an individual includes in his/her self-

definition (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Brewer and

Gardner, 1996). The degree to which an individual

views moral duties is the most important determi-

nant as to the likelihood that beliefs will be translated

into actions (Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007, p. 1610).

Reflecting on moral duties is critical to moral

decision making and congruent behavior (Kurpis

et al., 2008; Warner, 2001). Lennick and Kiel (2008,

p. 209) suggest that moral intelligence encompasses

three key responsibilities: (1) the responsibility to do

no harm; (2) the responsibility to add current value;

and (3) the responsibility to add future value. Moral

identity adds to our sense of who we are by artic-

ulating the degree to which we feel responsible for

self, family, employer, community, and the other

key stakeholders to whom we owe duties (Caldwell

et al., 2008; Reynolds, 2008).

Powers (1973) suggested that when people per-

ceive their identities they implicitly create a feedback

loop which they use to monitor and control their

behaviors. Carver and Scheier (1981) developed a

model of self-regulation and self-control that is used

– both consciously and sub-consciously – to evaluate

and control our behaviors. In describing how iden-

tity is heavily dependent on an ongoing comparison

with an ideal standard of behavior, Burke (1991,

p. 838) provided the model shown in Figure 1.

According to identity control theory, when an

identity is established, a feedback loop is created

which has four components (Burke, 1991). The

identity cycle begins with the actions and mean-

ingful behaviors, which make up the output of an

identity (Burke, 1991). This output is an attempt to

adjust individual behaviors to match the ideal

internal standard which makes up how we view

ourselves (Burke, 1991). Our behavior occurs within

Figure 1. Identity process control system.

394 Cam Caldwell

the context of a social situation. Typically, we use self-

categorization and social comparisons from the

feedback we receive from others to anticipate how

to act (Stets and Burke, 2000). From the reflected

appraisals of others, we perceive evaluated input, or

our interpretation of how our actions and behaviors

fit within the situation in which we have been en-

gaged (Burke, 1991). Our interpretation of those

appraisals is heavily influenced by the roles we his-

torically play in groups (Stets and Burke, 2000). The

identity standard is the ideal or comparator which makes

up our expectations that are associated with self-

defined roles which incorporate how we have de-

fined ourselves and who we believe we ultimately

are (Stets and Burke, 2000).

The process of self-assessment in evaluating our

behavior is a complex calculus (Creed and Miles,

1996), typically occurring at the unconscious and

sub-conscious levels (Weick, 1979) that we use to

control our behavior to comply with whom we

believe we are (Carver and Scheier, 1981; Stets and

Burke, 2000). As Stets and Burke (2000, p. 225)

summarized, ‘‘the core of an identity is the catego-

rization of the self as an occupant of a role, and the

incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and

expectations associated with that role and its per-

formance.’’ In the self-assessment process, we com-

pare ourselves to others who are both like us and

different from us in determining our self-image and

identities (Hafner, 2004). Reid and Deaux (1996)

found that our social and personal identities may

integrate both our self-perceptions and the attributes

that make up those identities.

Whereas identity explains who we believe we are

(Flanagan, 1991), self-awareness includes the degree

to which we are sensitive to how we are perceived

by others (Fletcher and Bailey, 2003). Self awareness

theory ‘‘suggests that individuals who are more

cognizant of how they are perceived by others are

better at incorporating information from others into

their self-appraisals, and, ultimately, into their

behavior’’ (Moshavl et al., 2003, p. 407). Identity

and self-awareness are closely related constructs,

with one’s identity being influenced by how one

perceives duties and roles related to stakeholders

and society (Stets and Burke, 2000). Applying

identity and self-awareness to leadership effective-

ness, Ashford (1989) explained that a leader’s

awareness of how subordinates perceived him/her

had important consequences. Leaders are able to

become more effective when they demonstrate that

they are receptive to feedback from others (Kouzes

and Posner, 2007). Self-awareness is a fundamental

element of emotional intelligence and is critical to

our ability to communicate with and build rela-

tionships of trust with others (Goleman, 2006a, b;

Whetten and Cameron, 2007). Individuals high in

self-awareness are skilled at self-monitoring and in

adapting their behaviors to relate effectively with

others (Shivers-Blackwell, 2006).

Self-awareness involves having ‘‘a deep under-

standing of one’s emotions, as well as one’s strengths

and limitations and one’s values and motives’’

(Goleman et al., 2002, p. 40). Self-awareness incor-

porates the self-reflection capacity and thoughtfulness

that Covey (2004) declared as necessary to discover

one’s voice and incorporates the ability to understand

one’s true nature and the freedom to choose how one

consciously wishes to respond to life. Goleman et al.

(2002, p. 40) placed high value on the ability ‘‘to think

things over rather than react impulsively’’ and

acknowledged this sensitivity to context and values to

be a foundation for personal competence that enabled

people to develop a clear understanding of the prin-

ciples that ultimately form the basis of how they wish

to live.

Boyatzis and McKee (2005) have noted that

under times of stress, individuals become less self-

aware and miss the signs from others that enable

them to be effective in managing themselves and

their relationships. Even skilled leaders who recog-

nize the importance of tuning into the nuances of

interpersonal relationships fall prey to the compelling

problems, uncertainty, and often uncontrollable sit-

uations that highjack our physiological responses,

exponentially increase stress, and cause inevitable

self-awareness dysfunction (Dickerson and Kemeny,

2004). Sankar (2003) suggested that self-awareness

and effective leadership required character in care-

fully examining the consistency of one’s personal

attributes and behaviors in relationships with others.

The problem of congruence in how we assess

ourselves is essential to self-awareness, one’s indi-

vidual identity, and self-deception. As a form of

cognitive dissonance, self-deception has been

described as a discrepancy between the way in

395Identity, Self-Awareness, and Self-Deception

which one knows she/he ought to act and how one

actually behaves (Festinger, 1957). Brown and

Starkey (2000) described self-deception as one of

many ego defense mechanisms that enabled one to

maintain self-esteem and the continuity of one’s

identity. Defense mechanisms such as projection,

displacement, undoing, isolation, sublimation, and

denial are virtually universal phenomena (Baumei-

ster, 1998) and lead to feedback-avoiding behavior

(Moss and Sanchez, 2004). Kunda (1990) suggested

that anticipating a desired conclusion and viewing

the world through a self-serving bias can directly

affect the way in which people gather evidence and

reach conclusions.

In discussing the nature of our mental models and

pre-conceptions, Newman (1999, p. 60) explained:

When people assess the evidence available to them

when they make judgments and decisions about

important people, relationships, places, things, or is-

sues, they may quickly (and happily) conclude that

their pre-existing preferences are supported by the

facts. At other times, the evidence may point in the

opposite direction. A number of studies now indicate

that this unpleasant psychological situation does not

necessarily directly launch one into a search for pref-

erence-consistent information. Instead, it instigates a

different reaction that indirectly leads people to their

preferred conclusions: It leads to a more extensive

search for and analysis of relevant information … In
plain language, discovering that one’s preconceptions

might be wrong is a cause for concern. That affective

reaction, in turn, causes an increase in the intensity of

cognitive processing, and that extra processing can

potentially turn up new evidence that is more con-

genial to one’s directional goals.

This tendency to believe in faulty preconceptions is

consistent with several types of self-deception

identified by Siegler (1962). Siegler (1962) identi-

fied eight rationalizations that frequently occur as

part of self-deception. Those eight perceptions and

their respective meanings are briefly summarized

below:

1) A pretense to others. Claiming prior knowledge

about the likelihood of an uncertain out-

come may be either a rationalization or an

attempt to look good in others’ eyes.

2) Discount of a failure. Claiming to have known

in advance that failure was likely may be an

attempt to persuade oneself that one truly

knew about an uncertain probability.

3) Articulation of past fears. Unwillingness to deal

with uncertainty may result in claiming fore-

knowledge of a likely failure – but after that

disappointment actually occurs.

4) Inability to understand. Although evidence of a

fact contrary to what we may want to be-

lieve may be present, our failure to acknowl-

edge a situation may legitimately reflect

something we can not emotionally deal with

or understand.

5) Wanting reality to be different. One’s biases af-

fect how we see the world and affect the

formation of our beliefs so powerfully that

we get dissuaded by wishful thinking.

6) Intentional averting of attention. We know

intuitively that something is unbearably dis-

tressing and deliberately avoid addressing a

painful issue so that we do not have to deal

with it.

7) Resolving to change. At times, we acknowledge

that we have not dealt with issues that we

ought to have addressed in the past.

8) Acknowledged regret. We may express the fact

that we should have been attuned to key infor-

mation in the past, but overlooked key clues.

Understanding exactly how we engage in self-

deception can enable us to avoid those tendencies

that erode relationships with others and that

lower our self-esteem (Covey, 2004; Goleman,

1985; Warner, 2001; Whetten and Cameron,

2007).

Fingarette (2000) suggested that the intent of self-

deception is often an attempt to cope with the

frustrations of life and to create meaning where

incongruity seems to exist. In writing about self-

deception as a coping mechanism, Goleman (1985,

pp. 12–18) explained that self-deception was often a

sub-conscious effort to avoid pain and anxiety,

skewing our conscious awareness by filtering out

painful information. Smith (2004, p. 3) described

self-deception as ‘‘vital for psychological equilib-

rium’’ in enabling people to ‘‘soothe many of the

stresses of life.’’ Maslow (1962, p. 57) reminded us

that we deny reality and practice self-deception and

similar defenses because ‘‘we tend to be afraid of any

knowledge that would cause us to despise ourselves

396 Cam Caldwell

or to make us feel inferior, weak, worthless, evil,

shameful.’’

Peck (1983, pp. 104–105) noted that frequently

those who deceive others or themselves do so

unwittingly and, often, without a conscious aware-

ness of their motives for their deceptions. Philoso-

pher and theologian Buber (1980, p. 11) commented

about the subtle nature of self-deception in writing

about ‘‘the uncanny game of hide and seek in

the obscurity of the soul, in which it, the single

human soul, evades itself, avoids itself, hides from

itself.’’ Peck (1983, p. 119) describes our efforts in

‘‘defending and preserving the integrity of our own

sick selves’’ as inherent within the definition of evil

and suggests that a by-product of self-deception is to

destroy the spiritual growth and welfare of ourselves

and/or others. Self-deception is a warping of per-

ception that elevates a distorted view of reality and

self-interest above the desire for the truth (Peck,

1983, p. 121). The great danger of this warped view

of reality is that those who practice it are unable to

identify how they can create relationships healthy to

themselves and to others and are insensitive to the

feedback that the world offers (Boyatzis and McKee,

2005).

One of the foremost means of self-deception is to

treat others as an object or a means, rather than as a

valued individual or end (Warner, 2001, p. 46).

Citing the study of Buber (1971), Warner explained

that our identities and our relationships with others

becomes distorted when we reduce people to

commodities or objects. People lose their unique

value, and we destroy our ability to create life-

enhancing relationships that betray both ourselves

and others (Warner, 2001, pp. 50–53). Buber (1971)

had noted that when we treat people like an I–It, we

depersonalize them and deny our obligation to them

– as opposed to treating them like an I–You that

acknowledges not only their identity but our moral

duties to them as well. Part of our self-deception,

then, is to deny our humanity and to undervalue the

importance of creating resonating relationships with

others (Boyatzis and McKee, 2005). Ultimately, this

undermining of our ability to create powerful rela-

tionships robs us of the richness of a life that is

personally fulfilling and that enables us to accomplish

our potential – both in terms of serving others and in

becoming what we have the capacity to achieve

(Covey, 2004, p. 5).

Ethical duties to self

Self-deception is a denial of the duty owed to the self

when it causes an individual to avoid confronting the

need to modify one’s behavior (Peck, 1983). The

purpose of this section is to identify five ethical

duties owed to the self which enable individuals to

deal more productively with themselves, with oth-

ers, and with the world around them.

(1): We owe ourselves the duty to understand how vul-

nerable we can be when we are unwilling or unable to

address incongruity in our lives

The ability to confront the realities about life and

about ourselves begins with a willingness to

thoughtfully take a personal inventory of who we

are, what we believe, and the importance of truth in

our lives (Ackerman, 2005). Because self-deception

is implicitly difficult to recognize (Boyatzis and

McKee, 2005), we owe ourselves the duty of

understanding how common self-deception can be

(Fingarette, 2000). In writing about the dissonance

of self-deception, Boyatzis and McKee (2005, p. 47)

describe it as follows:

We end up seeing the world in very black-and-white

terms, and we slowly lose the ability to see ourselves,

or those around us, realistically. We miss a lot. Then,

when things do go wrong, it is very easy to continue to

blame others, and feel sorry for ourselves as things

deteriorate – especially when the downturn feels like a

surprise and follows a period of denial.

The inability to ‘‘define reality’’ (DePree, 2004,

p. 11) and to tune in emotionally to ourselves and to

others is particularly destructive for leaders (Goleman

et al., 2002). Self-awareness includes the ability to

recognize and evaluate what is happening within

oneself and with others, but the most critical com-

ponents of self-awareness and empathy are in how we

respond to and apply information about emotions in

guiding our lives and in building high trust rela-

tionships (Cooper and Sawaf, 1997). Self-deception

results in an inability to care for our own long-term

welfare (Peck, 1983), and short-circuits our ability to

understand reality, resulting in what Albrecht (2006,

p. 34) called ‘‘dumbness and numbness.’’

The consequence of self-deception is to deny

truth and create a reality that masks one’s identity,

397Identity, Self-Awareness, and Self-Deception

destroys trust, erodes relationships, and ultimately

diminishes the quality of one’s life (Mele, 2001).

Recognizing the importance of truth seeking,

integrity, and congruence in our lives is a key

indicator of emotional and spiritual health (Green-

berg, 1985; Peck, 1998), in addition to being

essential in creating relationships of trust (Hosmer,

1996; Kouzes and Posner, 2003; Mayer et al., 1995).

By recognizing how vulnerable we can be to self-

deception, we acknowledge our humanness and

demonstrate a commitment to personal integrity.

(2): In recognizing and identifying self-deceptive behav-

ior, we need to acknowledged the underlying internal factors

that cause us to deny reality

The process of thoughtfully examining the

consistency of our behaviors enables individuals to

explore the beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and motiva-

tions that cause them to be self-deceptive (Taylor,

2006). According to the Theory of Reasoned Action,

behaviors are a by-product of our beliefs, attitudes,

and intentions. Figure 2 shows this relationship.

The Theory of Reasoned Action in Figure 2

shows the interrelated nature of beliefs, attitudes,

intentions, and behaviors (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975)

while helping to explain the complexity of the

‘‘conceptual calculus’’ used in sense-making associ-

ated with human behavior (Creed and Miles, 1996,

p. 16). Examining the differences between how we

behave and what we claim to believe or intend to do

is essential to understanding ourselves and our

identities (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975).

Beliefs are cognitive perceptions that ‘‘represent

the information’’ that a person has about an object,

and attitudes are emotional responses that interrelate

constantly with cognitive beliefs (Fishbein and Aj-

zen, 1975, pp. 12–14). Within the context of self-

deception, one’s beliefs and attitudes become sub-

jective interpretations of the self within a complex

world (Jun, 2005). Intentions reflect the articulated

or unarticulated personal motivation that an indi-

vidual will carry out a specific behavior (Fishbein

and Ajzen, 1975, pp. 14–17). Intentions are likely

predictors of actual behavior, but intentions do not

equate perfectly with that behavior. When we be-

lieve that a specific behavior reflects our values but

do not behave congruently with those values, our

actions are dissonant with our beliefs and espoused

intentions.

The eight rationalizations identified by Siegler

(1962) put us in a position of denial about truth in

attempt to adjust to that which is uncomfortable.

Horowitz (1983, p. 136) identified nine predictable

consequences of this denial:

• Avoided associations which short-circuit con-
nections to the event or issue.

• Numbness or the inability to process appro-
priate emotional reactions.

• Flattened response or the constriction of
expectable emotional reactions.

• Dimming of attention or the inability to focus
clearly on thoughts or sensations.

• Daze or defocused attention that avoids
acknowledging the significance of events.

• Memory failure or the inability to recall
events, details, or specific facts.

• Disavowal in thinking or saying that obvious
meanings are not so.

• Blocking through fantasy by avoiding reality
and substituting what might or could be.

The danger of these responses is that they are

palliatives that defer our ability to deal effectively

with reality and move forward in our lives (Gol-

eman, 1985). Understanding the factors that cause us

to deny reality is critical for us to recognize the root

causes of self-deception. Possessing an accurate

assessment of ourselves is critical to goal achievement

and enables individuals to ‘‘inoculate against self-

deception’’ (Taylor, 2006, p. 647).

Beliefs

Attitudes

Intentions Behaviors

Figure 2. Theory of reasoned action.

398 Cam Caldwell

(3): We owe ourselves the duty to thoughtfully examine

our core beliefs and to reflect upon those beliefs on a regular

basis

Examining our core beliefs is fundamental to

developing a clear understanding of our values and

goals and the assumptions upon which those values

and goals are based (Caldwell et al., 2002). A classic

definition of self-deception is that an individual

‘‘believes in two contradictory beliefs’’ at the same

time without acknowledging that a conflict exists

(Mele, 2001, p. 92). The challenge in knowing

ourselves is our willingness to engage ‘‘in objective

self-examination, and also accepting whatever per-

sonal shortcomings’’ that may be uncovered by that

self-examination process (Morris et al., 2005,

p. 1340). The willingness to conduct this self-

examination requires both a personal confidence

and authentic humility, but allows an individual to

more accurately assess the magnitude of the variance

between one’s self-assessment and the evaluations of

others (Rowan et al., 2002).

Caldwell and Hayes (2007) suggested that inven-

torying six core beliefs about self, others, the nature of

the divine, the past, current reality, and the future

were critical to self-assessment and self understanding.

Such an inventory enables one to define reality in

understanding both the self and one’s duties to others.

Formally going through the process of identifying key

issues from the perspective of these six core beliefs

provides an opportunity to raise our understanding

about these issues from the unconscious to the con-

scious level – a process that is essential to confronting

our self-deceptions (Mele, 2001).

Goffee and Jones (2006) observed that our

responsibility to achieve self-knowledge and the self-

awareness associated with how we are observed by

others is a key to becoming more authentic and to

knowing our identities. Ackerman (2005) has iden-

tified the importance of clarifying and understanding

our core beliefs as a critical element to self-under-

standing, goal achievement, and the undertaking of

self-correcting action – including the vital process of

understanding how we deceive ourselves. Gilovich

(1991) noted that our ability to accurately view the

world requires that we understand ourselves and our

preconceived biases that cause us to distort reality.

Goleman (1985, p. 106) has explained that each

individual sees the world through a ‘‘schema (which)

implicitly selects what will be noted and what will

not.’’ Understanding who one is and what one be-

lieves allows an individual to be aware of blind-spots

that can distort reality, impair relationships and

decision quality, and severely impact the quality of

one’s life (Goleman, 1985).

(4): We have the responsibility to evaluate the stresses

that cause us to become vulnerable to self-deception,

acknowledge those stress factors, and seek to mitigate the

potentially destructive influences of stress in our lives

People avoid the discomfort of information that

conflicts with their preferred view of the world by

an unconscious effort to minimize anxiety (Smith,

2003). Goleman (1985, p. 22) has explained that …

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 2

Self-Awareness and the Evolution of Leaders:
The Need for a Better Measure of Self-Awareness

Greg C. Ashley
Bellevue University

Roni Reiter-Palmon

University of Nebraska at Omaha

ABSTRACT

A growing body of empirical research suggests that self-awareness is associated with successful
leadership. Although self-awareness research has generated a number of scales to measure self-
awareness, none have done so with the explicit focus of leadership. The present research is a summary
of three studies designed to develop and begin validation for a scale to measure self-awareness in the
context of leadership and leader development. The result of Study 1 and 2 was a 54-item self-awareness
scale. A confirmatory factor analysis provided evidence for a marginal fit. Predictive validity was assessed
in Study 3 by looking for associations between self-awareness and outcomes from an MBA capstone
course designed in part to improve communication, foster teamwork, and increase self-awareness. Self-
awareness was the independent variable. The dependent variables were the graded, videotaped
outcomes of two types of structured role-playing exercises designed to meet course objectives and
involved students working in dyads or in small groups. Positive associations were found between the new
scale and some group context measures of performance, but not for the dyad measures. Implications and
suggestions for future research are provided.

Introduction

The construct of self-awareness has been taken up by a wide array of academic disciplines, suggesting
that self-awareness may explain variance in a number of domains. Although definitions vary, self-
awareness is an inwardly-focused evaluative process in which individuals make self/standard
comparisons with the goal of better self-knowledge and improvement. The scope of the present writing is
focused on how self-awareness may be related to the context of leadership, specifically leader
development. As will be discussed, empirical support is mounting suggesting that self-awareness is
related to leadership such that leaders higher in self-awareness tend to get better outcomes than those
with lower levels of self-awareness. Given the increasing attention self-awareness processes are getting
from leadership theorists, a scale to measure self-awareness may be of value. As such, the specific
purpose of the present writing is to discuss the development of a scale to measure self-awareness.

Historical Relevance of Self-Awareness

Humans have a unique capacity to contemplate not only their status quo, but also their ideal status quo.
This capacity is underpinned by the ability to imagine a future that is better than the past, evaluate
alternatives, identify problems, and a yearning to progress toward an ideal. Intertwined are processes of
self-reflexive thought, self-examination, and introspection. All of the above broadly circumscribe the
construct of self-awareness, and although conceptualizations of self-awareness do vary, at their core is
an ability to focus attention inward and study oneself as though looking in a mirror.

The relevance of self-awareness cannot be overstated. In fact, Leary and Buttermore (2003) theorize that
the capacity for self-reflection may have been one of essential drivers for the remarkably rapid
appearance of human civilization 40,000 – 60,000 years ago. Leary and Buttermore attribute the explosive
growth in human culture and technological advances during this time to a nascent capacity to think
symbolically and abstractly about oneself and to ponder the changes required to move toward a better
future.

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 3

Not surprisingly, there has been a long-standing and cross-cultural interest in self-awareness by
philosophers, social scientists, clinicians, and more recently, leadership theorists. Writings on the self are
known from China as early as 500 BC and from India as early as 600 BC, to name just a few (Leary &
Tangney, 2003). More modern seminal treatments of self-awareness by psychologists and sociologists
can be seen in the works of James (1890), Mead (1934), Cooley (1956), and Duval and Wicklund (1972).
Although each of these modern writers has a nuanced view of self-awareness, a common theme
emerges suggesting that individuals view themselves as both observers and subjects of observation.
Moreover, individuals often use a reflective process whereby they imagine themselves from the vantage
point of another with the goal of comparing self-evaluations against others’ evaluations. Specifically,
Mead and Duval and Wicklund theorize that individuals have a motivated desire for accurate assessment
of self-worth or progress against a goal or standard. As such, the effective use of self-awareness
processes would seem to be of great relevance to leadership scholars.

The discussion will unfold as follows. First, a short discussion on how self-awareness has been
conceptualized, and specifically how it might be conceptualized in a leadership context. Second, a case
will be made as to why we should care about self-awareness, including evidence showing the relation
between self-awareness and leader outcomes, and also why we need a new measure. Third, a
discussion regarding the construction of a self-awareness measure, including psychometric properties.
Lastly, a study demonstrating partial support for the predictive validity of the present measure.

What Is Self-Awareness and Why Do We Care?

Various conceptualizations of self-awareness have emerged over time with newer formulations often
adding nuances on previous versions. As a starting point, consider Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory of
objective self-awareness (OSA). According to original OSA theory, individuals periodically focus attention
inward and begin a comparison process to assess themselves against a salient standard (e.g., a behavior
or progress toward a goal). OSA predicted the likely outcome of such a comparison would be the
identification of a self/standard gap, which in turn would lead to negative affect. The self/standard
comparison involved processes of introspection and self-evaluation (Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973).

In one of the first attempts to develop a scale to measure self awareness, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss
(1975) suggested the following dimensions: “(a) preoccupation with past, present, and future behaviors;
(b) sensitivity to inner feelings; (c) recognition of one’s positive and negative attributes; (d) introspective
behavior; (e) a tendency to picture or imagine oneself; (f) awareness of one’s physical appearance and
presentation; and (g) concern over the appraisal of others” (p. 523). A three-dimensional structure
emerged in the final scale and the dimensions were labeled as private self-consciousness (e.g., “I reflect
about myself a lot”), public self-consciousness (e.g., “I’m concerned about what others think of me”), and
social anxiety (e.g., “Large groups make me nervous”).

Several researchers used the Fenigstein et al. (1975) scale as a departure point for revisions regarding
self-awareness dimensionality. Burnkrant and Page (1984), for example, theorized that the private self-
consciousness factor was better specified as a two-dimensional construct containing dimensions labeled
as self-reflection and internal state awareness. The latter included “such feelings as tranquility, elation,
and depression as well as such bodily events as heartbeat and breathing” (p. 631). Additional analyses
by Burnkrant and Page using different participant pools demonstrated better fit using the revised
dimensionality than Fenigstein et al’s. model.

As can be discerned from the discussion thus far, earlier researchers considered self-awareness
processes as predominantly cognitive in nature. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) viewed this as a gap and
believed that in addition to cognition, it was also necessary to consider motivational and emotional
influences. In other words, the reasons for engaging in self-awareness were important as well. Trapnell
and Campbell note that individuals may increase levels of self-awareness based either on neurotic-like
tendencies (e.g., anxiety) or for purposes of gaining self-knowledge or personal growth.

As part of their justification for including motivational/emotional influences, Trapnell and Campbell (1999)
cited a large body of research suggesting that high levels of self-awareness paradoxically can result in
either good or bad outcomes (see also Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Greenberg, & Becker, 1991). On the

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 4

positive side, high self-awareness has been shown to have psychotherapeutic effects and enables
individuals to better adjust to their environment. On the contrary, high self-awareness also is associated
with a number of maladies like depression and anxiety. According to Trapnell and Campbell’s line of
reasoning, outcomes are influenced by the motivational disposition for engaging in self-awareness.
Hence, research by Trapnell and Campbell suggests the private self-consciousness factor is better
viewed as two dimensions, which they labeled rumination and reflection. In summary, the review of
literature above leaves open the possibility that self-awareness processes are an amalgam of both
cognitive and affective influences.

An additional divergence in the way self-awareness has been conceptualized concerns the trait versus
state distinction. Fenigstein et al. (1975) thought self-awareness could be both, labeling the trait form as
self-consciousness and the state form as self-awareness. Other self-awareness researchers have used
mirrors and cameras to manipulate (i.e., increase) levels of self-awareness, thus implying that self-
awareness has state-like properties. Self-awareness also has been conceptualized as a skill (Church,
1997b) which suggests that interventions could be used to increase self-awareness. Self-awareness also
has been viewed as a cognitive schema (Church, 1997a) where self-awareness outcomes might vary
based on context or relationships.

The construct of self-awareness also has been included as part of the dimensionality of two different
conceptualizations of emotional intelligence (i.e., Dulewicz & Higgs, 2000; Goleman, 2004). Of note is
that these authors tend to view emotional intelligence as a competency that can be learned and which
explains variance in leader outcomes. As pertaining to the specific dimension of self-awareness, a
competency-based view is consistent with the cognitive and state distinctions discussed above, thus
suggesting trainability.

Some researchers have given less priority to teasing out nuances in self-awareness conceptualizations,
but rather were more focused on self-awareness outcomes. In such instances, self-awareness often has
been defined simply as self/other agreement (e.g., Van Velsor, Taylor, & Leslie, 1993). For example,
those leaders whose self-report ratings of performance are similar to performance ratings ascribed to
them by others are defined operationally as having high levels of self-awareness. Using this operational
standard, a large body of empirical research has accrued suggesting those managers with high levels of
self-awareness tend to have better performance outcomes than those with lower levels of self-awareness
(e.g., Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, & Fleenor, 1998; Bass & Yammarino, 1991; Furnham & Stringfield,
1994). Moreover, congruence between subordinates’ evaluation of their manager and the managers’ self-
evaluation may lead to increased levels of subordinate satisfaction (Wexley, Alexander, Greenawalt, &
Couch, 1980). The gestalt of self/other congruence research suggests that increased congruence
between self versus other ratings is amenable to interventions, for example, by increasing salience on the
value of feedback.

Taken as a whole, the preponderance of literature discussed above tends to suggest that self-awareness
is trainable. To the extent that self-awareness might be increased via an intervention, a new scale to
measure self-awareness designed specifically for the context of leadership may be useful for the study of
leadership in general and leader development in specific.

Why Do We Need Another Scale?

A new scale is needed because existing scales are too parsimonious, do not speak to the complexity of
self-awareness processes, and only partially tap into the dimensionality of self-awareness that operates in
a leadership context. As such, each of the existing scales discussed above has desirable aspects but is
not complete. For example, while the Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) scale does recognize the
notions of self-reflection and attention to inner thoughts and feelings, nothing is considered regarding the
reasons for engaging in self-awareness (i.e., motivational factors), nor is there any discussion where or
how standards are developed or accepted. In like manner, the Burnkrant and Page (1984) and Trapnell
and Campbell (1999) views of self-awareness are mute on the topic of standard setting, do not provide a
framework for why self-examination begins, and do not consider an individual’s desire to detect
self/standard gaps.

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 5

In the leadership context, the effectiveness of self-awareness outcomes turns on developing or accepting
specific standards along with a strong desire for accurate self-evaluation. Regarding standard setting, a
noteworthy shortcoming of existing scales is lack of recognition that standards may be nuanced beyond
the self by multiple relevant stakeholders. The acceptance of any standard, internal or external, requires
an understanding of one’s strengths and weaknesses, and this self-knowledge is not addressed in
existing scales. Moreover, because standard setting may in part be exogenous to the individual, it makes
sense that additional attention to accuracy is warranted because the foci of evaluation likewise are
external to the individual. The ability to integrate both internal and external standards and still make
accurate self/standard comparisons may explain why research related to self/other congruence has noted
positive outcomes for leaders high in self-awareness.

An additional gap with existing self-awareness measures concerns the way in which current
conceptualizations of self-awareness deal with the presence of affect. While some existing
conceptualizations do acknowledge the presence of affect, none considers the possibility of affect as the
subject of self-awareness, that is, as a relevant dimension of self that can be assessed against an ideal.
Lastly, existing scales presume a narrow view of personality where simple behaviors are assessed
against a one-dimensional standard. In reality, self-awareness processes are multifaceted and may
include a wide array of strengths and weakness, for example, self-awareness of thinking styles.

The foregoing review was the primary theoretical underpinning for the beginning development of the
present scale, which started with Study 1.

Study 1: Initial Scale Construction

The primary task of Study 1 was to conceptualize the dimensionality of self-awareness in the specific
context of leader development. One of the defining hallmarks of self-awareness that appears in nearly all
conceptualizations of self-awareness is the notion that individuals evaluate themselves against some
salient standard or goal. At its core, self-awareness is the process that signals whether an individual
needs to moderate a behavior, emotion, or course of action. In other words, the outcome of a self-
awareness episode may signal the need for self-regulation. Although the value of self-regulation in a
leadership context hardly needs explication, the focus here is on the decision processes used to refine
and nuance the salient standard or goal. In short, effective leaders need to integrate the standards and
goals of relevant stakeholders (e.g., bosses, subordinates, peers, and customers) into their own self-
regulatory processes (Tsui & Ashford, 1994).

Based on the foregoing concepts, and focusing to the context of leadership, the initial dimensionality of
self-awareness was theorized to include (a) a recognition of internal and external standards, (b) a
recognition of one’s positive and negative attributes/abilities, (c) a desire for introspective and self-
reflective thought, and (d) a desire for accurately detecting gaps in personal behaviors, traits, and goal
progress.

As is typical in scale development, participants also were asked to complete several additional scales
measuring related constructs where theory and/or prior empirical findings suggest relevance in order to
help establish validity. In this regard, four existing measures of self-awareness were selected.
Correlations between these scales and the present scale were expected to be in the moderate range
because of modest crossover with the present scale, but yet not reflecting the same dimensionality.

Additional measures included were creativity, emotional intelligence, empathy, feedback seeking,
generalized self-efficacy, locus of control, metacognition, and need for cognition (specific details are
provided in the Measures section below). Self-awareness processes include a desire to identify
self/standard gaps, hence creativity is relevant because creative ideas are those that are both original
and useful. As such, individuals must be able to determine whether an idea meets standards (i.e., is a
useful idea). In this regard, constructs that help to capture performance-related cues from the
environment also are useful, for example, feedback seeking, emotional intelligence, and empathy. The
process of setting standards and the accompanying self/standard evaluation is likely to be cognitively

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 6

intense at times such that an individual high in need for cognition would benefit more (i.e., enhancing self-
awareness) than those individuals low on this trait. This logic also applies to metacognition. Lastly, locus
of control and general self-efficacy were included because effective leaders are assumed to be high on
these constructs. Weak to neutral correlations were hypothesized for scales measuring
depression/anxiety, self-monitoring, and socially desirable responding. As regards depression/anxiety,
known empirical links to self-awareness appear to be underpinned on many different factors such as an
unreasonable/unrealistic comparison standard, rumination, and/or inaccurate evaluation of self/standard
progress. The dimensionality of the present scale is likely to preclude these underpinnings to
depression/anxiety primarily because of the focus on accuracy. As regards self-monitoring and socially
desirable responding, these are processes that focus attention primarily outward and only are tangentially
concerned with accuracy of self-appraisal. As such, correlations with the present measure should be
minimal.

Study 1 Method

Participants. Participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses at a large Midwestern
university. The sample size was 419 and was composed of mostly white freshman, sophomores, and
juniors (mean age 21.8, SD = 4.9; 134 males, 285 females). Participant responses were collected using
an internet-based commercial survey tool commonly used in social science research (i.e.,
SurveyMonkey).

Measures. Self-awareness scale items for the present scale were generated from two sources. First, I/O
psychology faculty and graduate students familiar with the research generated items by dimension. This
process resulted in 62 useable items. Second, a pilot study was conducted that included a biographical
essay related to self-awareness. The essay was designed to capture retrospective self-reports of events
in participants’ life experiences that might be related to self-awareness but may have been overlooked by
the item writers. An additional nine items were generated from the self-reports, resulting in a final draft of
71 items.

Three of the four existing self-awareness measures which were included as part of the validation process
already were discussed above, specifically, the Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss’ (1975) self-consciousness
scale, Burnkrant and Page’s (1984) self-reflection / internal state awareness scale, and Trapnell and
Campbell’s (1999) rumination / reflection scale. A fourth measure of self-awareness included was Grant,
Franklin, and Langford’s (2002) self-reflection / insight scale.

Other related, established constructs were measured using the following existing scales; creativity
(Runco, Noble, & Luptak, 1990), depression/anxiety (Costello & Comrey, 1967), emotional intelligence
(Wong & Law, 2002), empathy (Davis, 1980), feedback seeking (Tuckey, Brewer, & Williamson, 2002),
generalized self-efficacy (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001)locus of control (Rotter, 1966), metacognition
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994), need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), self-monitoring (Snyder,
1974), and socially desirable responding (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The foregoing scales were selected
in part because they evinced acceptable levels of reliability which also were supported in the present
research (see Table 1).

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 7

Table 1
Reliabilities of Related Scales Included in Present Research.

Full Scale Reliabilities

Scale Original Present Research

Self-Consciousness .80 .82

Self-Reflection/Internal State Awareness Not reported .81

Rumination/Reflection .90 .93

Self-Reflection/Insight .91/.87
*

.90

Creative Activities Checklist Ranged .64 to .91
*

.91

Depression/Anxiety .90/.70
*

.94/.85

Emotional Intelligence Ranged .83 to.90
*

.89

Empathy Ranged .71 to .77
*

.83

Feedback .82
†

.89

Generalized Self-Efficacy .86 .90

Locus of Control Ranged .49 to .84 .69

Metacognition Ranged .88 to .93
*

Ranged .87 to .94

Need for Cognition .90 .89

Self-Monitoring .70 .62

Socially Desirable Responding Ranged .73 to .88 .72

* = not reported for full scale but by dimension
†
The Feedback Seeking scale was composed of four dimensions, however, the present research only
used the desire for useful information dimension which is shown above.

Study 1 Results

Exploratory factor analysis. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using Varimax rotation
despite no prior assumption regarding orthogonality. Although 4, 7, and 12 factor solutions emerged, the
4-factor solution had fewer crossloadings and was much easier to interpret than that the seven and
twelve-factor solutions. Total variance explained by the four factors equaled 27% (10.6%, 7.8%, 4.7%,
and 3.8% respectively).

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 8

The dimensionality evinced by the EFA was similar but not identical to the proposed dimensionality. A
comparison of theoretical versus empirical dimensionality is provided in Table 2 which highlights two
dissimilarities. First, a dimension related to accuracy of self-evaluation was not apparent. Second, an
unexpected dimension emerged that can be described as an indifference toward the use of external cues
for purposes of self-evaluation.

Table 2
Hypothesized Dimensions of Self-Awareness versus EFA Dimensions.

EFA Dimensions Hypothesized Dimensions

Self-critical Recognition of internal and external standards

Desire for realistic awareness
Indifference to external cues

Recognition of one’s positive and negative
attributes/abilities

Self-reflection Introspection and self-reflection

Accurately detecting gaps in personal behaviors, traits,
and goal progress

The Cronbach alpha for the entire scale was .85 (individual factors ranged from .73 to .83). Correlations
between the four factors ranged from small and insignificant to a high of .38.

Correlations between Present Self-awareness Scale and Other Measures

Correlations between the present self-awareness scale and all of the included measures discussed above
are shown in Table 3. Correlations between the present self-awareness scale and the four existing self-
awareness measures ranged from .37 to .57. These correlations are moderate and not as high as would
be expected from scales that are measuring the same construct.

Correlations between the present self-awareness measure and the remaining measures also are shown
in Table 3. Taken as a whole, these measures provided additional support for validity. In particular, note
the low correlation between the present measure and socially desirable responding (r = -.16). This result
suggests that a negligible amount of variance was explained by socially desirable responding.

Table 3
Correlations between the Present Self-Awareness Scale (N=44) and the other Included Measures
(N=375).

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Note. All correlations were significant to at least the .p < 0.05 level except for the depression measure which was not
significant.

SELF-AWARENESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERS

Copyright (c) 2012 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 9

Study 1 Discussion

The overall pattern of correlations evinced in Study 1 was consistent with the literature review above that
suggested self-awareness is composed of both cognitive and affective components. First, the
dimensionality found in the EFA, in addition to positive correlations with constructs thought to be cognitive
in nature (e.g., metacognition), suggests that self-evaluation does engage cognitive processes. These
processes are required to establish standards and make realistic comparisons between one’s present
progress versus the desired or optimal progress. Second, correlations with anxiety and empathy suggest
that being self-aware is not without emotion. Conceptually, the notion of emotional outcomes seems
reasonable when considering that the core of self-awareness processes is concerned with self/standard
gaps, and this line of reasoning is consistent with prior self-awareness theory (e.g., Duval and Wicklund,
1972).

Despite the empirical gleanings provided by Study 1, a critical review of the work indicated some gaps.
First, the dimensionality evinced in the EFA was similar but still not completely representative of ex ante
theory. This result, in combination with the unexplainable EFA dimension labeled indifference to external
cues, suggested a possible need to revisit the theoretical dimensionality of self-awareness in a leadership
context. The outcome of this review suggested that the original conceptualization of self-awareness may
have been missing the dimension of insight. In other words, it seems likely that self-awareness processes
ultimately need to reach a synthesis or conclusion in order to be effective, something that might be called
the “a-ha” moment. After all, what good is an episode of self-reflection if nothing comes of it? Note also
that Grant et al. (2002) included insight in their measure of self-awareness and that the insight dimension
of their scale was positively correlated with the present self-awareness measure. Two additional studies
were designed to address these gaps.

Study 1 also did not include a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). As such, a CFA was conducted in Study
2 with the goal of further clarifying the factor structure and providing additional empirical support for the
scale.

A second gap with Study 1 was a test of criterion validity. As noted above, a large body of evidence has
accrued suggesting that high levels of self-awareness are associated with positive outcomes for leaders.
If this is true, then the present measure of self-awareness should correlate with objective measures of
performance. Study 3 was designed as an empirical test of this premise.

Study 2

The first task of Study 2 was to conduct a pilot study with the goal of clarifying the factor structure of self-
awareness in the present context. A second, goal of the …

The Competent Community
Toward a Vital Reformulation of Professional Ethics

W. Brad Johnson United States Naval Academy
Jeffrey E. Barnett Loyola University Maryland

Nancy S. Elman University of Pittsburgh
Linda Forrest University of Oregon

Nadine J. Kaslow Emory University

Psychologists are ethically obligated to ensure their own
competence. When problems of professional competence
occur, psychologists must take appropriate steps to regain
competence while protecting those they serve. Yet concep-
tualizations of the competence obligation are thoroughly
intertwined with Western ideals of individualism and a
model of the person as self-contained, self-controlled, and
perpetually rational. Research in health care, education,
and multicultural and social psychology raise serious
doubts about psychologists’ capacity for consistently accu-
rate self-assessments of competence. To address this prob-
lem, the authors advocate that education, training, profes-
sional ethics standards, and credentialing criteria be
infused with a robust communitarian ethos and a culturally
pervasive ethic of care. The authors propose a shift in
discourse about competence to incorporate both competent
individuals and competent communities.

Keywords: ethics, competence, communitarian, self-assess-
ment, care

A person is a person through other persons.
—Zulu idiom

We are bound up in a delicate network of interdependence.
—Desmond Tutu

Developing and assessing competence increasinglyare the sine qua non of training and credentialingefforts in professional psychology (DeMers,
2009; Elman, Illfelder, & Robiner, 2005; Kaslow, 2004;
Kaslow et al., 2004; Rodolfa et al., 2005; Vasquez, 1992).
Professional psychologists—those who deliver services re-
quiring licensure— have an ethical obligation to establish
and maintain competence in those areas in which they
practice. Like other health care professions in Western
cultures (e.g., American Dental Association, 2011; Amer-
ican Medical Association, 2001, 2004), the American Psy-
chological Association’s (APA’s) “Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct” (referred to here as
the Ethics Code; APA, 2010) holds the individual psychol-
ogist exclusively responsible for ensuring competence to
practice. Notions of self-contained identity, preeminence of
personal control, and presumed accuracy of self-assess-
ment drive professional standards that make ongoing eval-
uations of competence a largely private affair at the level of

the individual psychologist. This is the case despite the fact
that human beings are conspicuously inaccurate in their
self-assessments of any characteristic or competency (Dun-
ning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). Furthermore, increasingly di-
verse demographics require greater multicultural compe-
tence to practice ethically, yet evidence exists that
self-reported multicultural competence is only somewhat
correlated with objective measures of cultural competence
(Cartwright, Daniels, & Zhang, 2008; Constantine &
Ladany, 2000; Worthington, Mobley, Franks, & Tan,
2000). Unfortunately, psychologists and other health care
professionals suffer occasional problems of professional
competence (Elman & Forrest, 2007; Kaslow et al., 2007;
Tarkan, 2011). When personal distress, illness, or cognitive
decline—not to mention the natural degradation in the
currency of one’s education—place psychologists’ compe-
tence at risk, it may be both unreasonable and illogical to
expect psychologists to accurately predict adverse effects
of these events, or to fully recognize decrements in func-
tioning, let alone to formulate a cogent and ethical re-
sponse.

In this article, we propose a fundamental shift in
conceptualizations of the ethical obligation to maintain
professional competence. We advocate that individual no-
tions of accountability must be augmented with interdepen-
dent, collectivistic, or communitarian perspectives on eth-
ics, which balance individual responsibilities with
community obligations (Etzioni, 1998; Markus & Ki-
tayama, 1991; Pedersen, 1997). When communities of psy-
chologists accept responsibility for supporting the func-
tioning and professional competence of colleagues,
problems of professional competence will be less frequent

This article was published Online First February 20, 2012.
W. Brad Johnson, Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law,

United States Naval Academy; Jeffrey E. Barnett, Department of
Psychology, Loyola University Maryland; Nancy S. Elman, Depart-
ment of Psychology in Education, University of Pittsburgh; Linda
Forrest, Department of Counseling Psychology and Human Services,
University of Oregon; Nadine J. Kaslow, Department of Psychiatry
and Behavioral Sciences, Emory University.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to W.
Brad Johnson, Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law, United States
Naval Academy, Luce Hall, Stop 7B, Annapolis, MD 21402. E-mail:
[email protected]

557October 2012 ● American Psychologist
© 2012 American Psychological Association 0003-066X/12/$12.00
Vol. 67, No. 7, 557–569 DOI: 10.1037/a0027206

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and less likely to harm consumers, the profession, and
psychologists themselves. We conclude with recommenda-
tions for the profession, including a shift from a predomi-
nantly individual and deontological ethics code toward one
that incorporates a robust communitarian ethic of care.

The Burgeoning Culture of
Competence in Psychology

For nearly three decades, professional psychology has
moved toward competency-based education, training, and
credentialing (Bourg, 1990; Rodolfa et al., 2005). Leaders
have fostered a “culture shift” that emphasizes acquisition
of competence during training and ongoing assessment of
competence over the course of one’s career (Kaslow, 2004;
Kaslow et al., 2004, 2009; Lichtenberg et al., 2007; Rob-
erts, Borden, Christiansen, & Lopez, 2005). This culture
shift recognizes that it is imperative that the profession
articulate the unique competencies that define a profes-
sional psychologist. Such clarity enables the profession to
communicate with its members and with the public about
the services psychologists provide (Kaslow, 2004). Kaslow
et al. (2009) asserted that “competence in health-care pro-
viders is demanded by consumers, expected and certified
by regulators, and lauded by policymakers” (p. 528).

Competence in professional psychology refers to de-
velopmentally appropriate levels of knowledge, skills, and
attitudes and their integration in various foundational do-
mains of functioning. The most durable and frequently
referenced definition of competence was offered by Epstein
and Hundert (2002): “Professional competence is the ha-
bitual and judicious use of communication, knowledge,
technical skills, clinical reasoning, emotions, values, and
reflection in daily practice for the benefit of the individual
and the community served” (p. 226). Although definitions

of competence center around a psychologist’s ability to
carry out certain tasks appropriately and effectively (John-
son et al., 2008; Kaslow, 2004), educators and supervisors
remain keenly aware of the complexity of competence and
the difficulties inherent in capturing its nuanced cognitive,
affective, and relational dimensions (Kaslow et al., 2009;
Pope & Vasquez, 2007). Although competence refers to an
overall or integrated macro facility as a psychologist, com-
petencies describe elements of knowledge, skills, and spe-
cific attitudes/values, or the essential micro components of
competence (Bourg, 1990; Kaslow et al., 2004).

Professional Competence as an
Ethical Obligation
Once a professional psychologist achieves licensure by
exhibiting entry-level competence, he or she is free of the
scrutinizing gaze of supervisors and generally not required
to ever again demonstrate competence or undergo peer
review. The one exception to this is the decision to secure
board certification in a specialty area, which entails a peer
review process for competency assessment (Nezu, Finch, &
Simon, 2009). However, only 2.5% to 3.0% of psycholo-
gists hold board certification (D. Cox, personal communi-
cation, October 28, 2011).

Systemic features of the profession’s current creden-
tialing and regulatory procedures exacerbate inattention to
competence among licensed psychologists. First, at pres-
ent, maintaining licensure is contingent merely upon doc-
umenting sufficient continuing education hours, and many
jurisdictions have no such requirements. It is indicative of
a systemic problem that psychologists often speak of main-
taining licensure, not maintaining competence. One notable
jurisdictional exception is Ontario, Canada, where psychol-
ogists complete a comprehensive self-assessment protocol
to document continued competence and develop a plan for
the enhancement of their competence (College of Psychol-
ogists of Ontario, 2011).

Second, the regulatory culture is largely complaint
driven. A psychologist conceivably may provide care be-
low minimum thresholds of competence for an entire career
without coming to the attention of a local community of
psychologists, an ethics committee, or a regulatory board.
Ethics committees and regulatory boards take action only
after potentially unethical behavior is brought to their at-
tention (Bennett et al., 2006; DeMers & Schaffer, 2011).
Unfortunately, not all substandard conduct is brought to
ethics committees’ and regulatory boards’ attention (Van
Horne, 2004). This complaint-driven approach unduly fo-
cuses on addressing ethical and legal transgressions and
fails to leverage the professional community to collabora-
tively prevent problems of competence and to aspire to
excellence.

Postlicensure, psychologists must individually accept
that their status as professionals invokes ethical and legal
obligations; each professional must individually embrace
an ethic of continual self-assessment of professional com-
petence across the life span (Roberts et al., 2005). Principle
A of APA’s Ethics Code underscores this obligation in

W. Brad
Johnson

558 October 2012 ● American Psychologist

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aspirational terms: “Psychologists strive to be aware of the
possible effect of their own physical and mental health on
their ability to help those with whom they work” (APA,
2010, p. 3). More important, in Standard 2.06, Personal
Problems and Conflicts, the Ethics Code details the indi-
vidual psychologist’s enforceable duty to continuously
self-evaluate competence and to take steps to protect con-
sumers when personal problems or conflicts threaten to
reduce competence:

(a) Psychologists refrain from initiating an activity when they
know or should know that there is a substantial likelihood that
their personal problems will prevent them from performing their
work-related activities in a competent manner.

(b) When psychologists become aware of personal problems that
may interfere with their performing work-related duties ade-
quately, they take appropriate measures, such as obtaining pro-
fessional consultation or assistance, and determine whether they
should limit, suspend, or terminate their work-related duties.
(APA, 2010, p. 5)

Because no ethical standard enjoins psychologists to
maintain close collegial or consultative relationships or
intervene and assist when a colleague’s competence begins
to ebb, assessing competence and taking appropriate mea-
sures to maintain competence remain an exclusively per-
sonal obligation. Although scholars concur that an ethical
psychologist should engage in continuous self-assessment
and remain acutely self-aware when it comes to level of
performance (Barnett, Baker, Elman, & Schoener, 2007;
Kaslow, 2004; Pope & Vasquez, 2007; Vasquez, 1992),
many psychologists never avail themselves of personal
psychotherapy (Guy, Stark, & Poelstra, 1988; Norcross,
2005) or ongoing consultation (Guy et al., 1988; Norcross,
2005).

The Problem(s) With Assessing
Professional Competence
Although psychology’s shift to a culture of competence,
which emphasizes formative and summative assessments
of trainees, has enhanced training rigor and efficacy, main-
taining competence beyond initial credentialing continues
to mean that psychologists rely on self-assessment and
voluntary consultation with colleagues if problems arise
(Roberts et al., 2005). Self-assessment of competence is
fraught with several disadvantages including the inherent
fallibility of human self-assessment and the fact that com-
petence is context driven and vulnerable to decrements in
the context of distress (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, &
Kruger, 2003). To make matters worse, psychologists are
reluctant to address problems of competence in colleagues,
even when they detect clear evidence of such problems
(Barnett, 2008; Barnett & Hillard, 2001; Bernard, Murphy,
& Little, 1987; Good, Thoreson, & Shaughnessy, 1995).

Human Beings Fail to Recognize Their Own
Problems With Competence

Across hundreds of studies in social psychology, human
self-assessments of skill and character traits are flawed in
substantive and systematic ways (Dunning et al., 2004);
“people tend to be blissfully unaware of their own incom-
petence” (Dunning et al., 2003, p. 83). On tests of humor,
grammar, logic, clinical skill, and desirable character vir-
tues, people overestimate their test performance and ability.
Ironically, this effect is most pronounced for the least
competent performers, who subsequently make unfortu-
nate, possibly unethical, personal and professional choices
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Those whose competence is
most compromised may be least able to effectively detect
problems with competence and respond appropriately.
“Poor performers are doubly cursed: their lack of skill
deprives them not only of the ability to produce correct
responses, but also of the expertise necessary to surmise
that they are not producing them” (Dunning et al., 2003,
p. 83).

To complicate matters further, psychologists, like
other human beings, are self-serving and prone to attribute
poor performance to bad luck or uncontrollable circum-
stances (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Vulnerability to the
self-serving bias persists across cultures and increases the
probability that a psychologist suffering problems of pro-
fessional competence will ignore performance problems or
attribute them to fleeting circumstances (Mezulis, Abram-
son, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Myers, 2009). Self-serving
bias, and a related perceptual predisposition, illusory opti-
mism—the belief that one is immune to misfortune—may
undermine a healthy appreciation for one’s vulnerability to
decreased competence and may prevent psychologists from
taking appropriate precautions (e.g., self-care, collegial
consultation, peer review, or limiting or closing one’s prac-
tice).

What about self-assessment efficacy among health
care professionals? Psychology, medicine, nursing, and
other health care professions increasingly are rooted in

Jeffrey E.
Barnett

559October 2012 ● American Psychologist

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self-directed, lifelong learning that is contingent on self-
assessment of competence and ongoing professional devel-
opment activities. Unfortunately, medical providers often
fail to accurately assess their own competence levels (Da-
vis et al., 2006). Statistical correlations between physi-
cians’ self-rated performance and external assessments are
weak to nonexistent (Barnsley et al., 2004; Risucci, Toro-
lani, & Ward, 1989). Professionals who function in the
lowest quartile of competence are least able to accurately
self-assess or to use benchmark exemplars to improve their
performance (Hodges, Regehr, & Martin, 2001).

Some proportion of health care professionals have
difficulty recognizing the limits of their own competence;
as a rule of thumb, “people’s capacity to evaluate them-
selves and predict their behavior is usually quite modest
and often much more meager than common intuition would
lead one to believe” (Dunning et al., 2004, p. 70). If we
extrapolate from medicine to psychology, these findings
raise concerns about psychology’s adherence to a tradition
of self-directed learning and self-assessment and mainte-
nance of competence. Yet ethics codes and continuing
education policies in medicine, psychology, and other
health care disciplines presume that individual practitioners
are capable of recognizing and resolving their own com-
petence deficiencies (Eva, Cunnington, Reiter, Keane, &
Norman, 2004).

Professional Competence Is Impermanent
and Context Specific
The current system of training, credentialing, and regula-
tion implicitly assumes that competence, once achieved, is
relatively permanent and impervious to contextual effects
of the psychologist’s environment and/or wellness (John-
son et al., 2008; Schulte & Daly, 2009). Epstein and

Hundert (2002) reminded us that competence is “a state-
ment of the relationship between an ability (in the person),
a task (in the world), and the ecology of the health systems
and clinical contexts in which these tasks occur” (p. 228).
Competence demonstrated in one context—such as a state
hospital internship—may not effectively transfer to an ac-
ademic health sciences center, a college counseling clinic,
or private practice with children.

Similarly, multicultural scholarship confirms the im-
portance of cultural context in professional competence
(Knapp & VandeCreek, 2007; Vasquez, 2010). For in-
stance, culture often shapes help-seeking behavior, identi-
fication of prejudice and discrimination, diagnostic assess-
ment and intervention decisions, and the therapeutic
alliance and its outcomes (Arredondo et al., 1996; Peder-
sen, 1997).

In addition, competence is not always steady when
psychologists are faced with professional stress and per-
sonal distress. Several authors have cogently articulated the
“hazards” of psychotherapy practice for the psychologist
(Barnett et al., 2007; Barnett & Hillard, 2001; O’Connor,
2001; Smith & Moss, 2009), with one reflecting that “psy-
chotherapy is often a grueling and demanding calling”
(Norcross, 2000, p. 710). Sources of distress in professional
practice may include isolation from other professionals,
vicarious traumatization, or shame regarding one’s feelings
about clients who are persistently fragile, suicidal, or un-
responsive to intervention. Distress often forecasts emo-
tional exhaustion and burnout (Sherman & Thelen, 1998;
Smith & Moss, 2009). Professional distress occurs
when—in response to ongoing stressors, challenges, con-
flicts, or demands—a psychologist’s emotional state is
characterized by depression, anxiety, and fatigue (Barnett
et al., 2007; Norcross, 2000). Although distress does not
always lead to problems of professional competence (i.e.,
failure to meet expected performance benchmarks in one or
more competency domains; Elman & Forrest, 2007), it
increases the risk of diminished competence (i.e., lowered
levels of performance in one or more competency domains,
even if the reduced level of performance remains at or
above minimal competency standards).

How frequent are problems of professional compe-
tence? A significant proportion of practicing psychologists
experience episodes of considerable distress but often fail
to assess or take measures to address declining competence
(Advisory Committee on Colleague Assistance, 2006; Bar-
nett & Hillard, 2001; Sherman & Thelen, 1998). Surveys of
practicing psychotherapists indicate that between one third
and one half have experienced at least one serious episode
of depression, half have reported episodes of emotional
exhaustion, and nearly a quarter have had suicidal feelings
(Mahoney, 1997; Pope & Tabachnick, 1994). Although
emotional distress— even episodes of serious psychopa-
thology—need not pose an ethical concern if psychologists
accurately self-assess and effectively address their own
problems of professional competence, they often fail to do
so. Large surveys revealed that 59% of practicing psychol-
ogists continued to see clients when too distressed to be
effective (Pope, Tabachnick, & Keith-Spiegel, 1987),

Nancy S.
Elman

560 October 2012 ● American Psychologist

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whereas 30% admitted that their personal problems de-
creased the quality of the care they provided (Guy,
Poelstra, & Stark, 1989; Sherman & Thelen, 1998).

And what of declining competence that is due to the
effects of aging and diminished cognitive acuity? Many of
us will experience a “terminal drop” in cognitive function-
ing in the years prior to death (Suedfeld & Piedrahita,
1984). As physicians age, they perform less effectively on
complicated surgical procedures (Tarkan, 2011); those with
mild cognitive deficits may not be aware that their perfor-
mance is flagging. As psychologists age, one can expect
similar problems of professional competence related to
advancing cognitive decline. Yet a significant proportion of
psychologists plan to practice well beyond the typical re-
tirement age, and nearly 13% in one survey planned to
practice until death (Guy, Stark, Poelstra, & Souder, 1987);
this proportion is likely to increase given the current neg-
ative economic environment. Although airline pilots must
submit to twice-yearly physical and psychological exams
after the age of 40 and accept mandatory retirement at age
65 (Tarkan, 2011), health care providers face no such
scrutiny unless a complaint triggers a regulatory investiga-
tion. Noting the crux of the problem as it pertains to
assessment of competence, Guy et al. (1987) wrote,

The problem of greatest concern is that it is the psychotherapist
alone who must make ongoing assessments regarding the impact
of advancing age on his or her clinical competency . . . obtaining
licensure or registration in most states [or provinces] permits the
clinician to practice without further supervision or evaluation
until death. (p. 817)

There are good reasons to question whether a newly
minted psychologist will have either the capacity or the will
to effectively self-assess his or her competence across a

lifetime of ever-changing job demands, varied life stres-
sors, bouts of intense personal distress, and ultimately,
physical and cognitive decline.

Reluctance to Address Problems of
Professional Competence in Colleagues
If psychologists are not always accurate in their self-as-
sessments, and if they are likely to experience distress and
episodic problems with professional competence, can they
count on colleagues to step in and help? Unfortunately,
psychologists admit that they might not directly approach a
colleague who appears to be functioning below thresholds
for competence or otherwise behaving unethically, even
when they believe that they are ethically obligated to do so
(Barnett, 2008; Bernard et al., 1987; Wilkins, McGuire,
Abbott, & Blau, 1990; Wood, Klein, Cross, Lammers, &
Elliott, 1985). This is not a problem limited to psychology
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999). When a psychologist exhibits
problems of professional competence, colleagues—if they
notice the problem—may avoid initiating a difficult discus-
sion and assisting the psychologist for several reasons: (a)
lack of certainty regarding their ethical duty to intervene,
(b) fear that there is insufficient evidence to intervene, (c)
concern about causing negative professional outcomes for
a colleague to whom they feel some loyalty, (d) worry
about harsh or unpredictable responses by regulatory
boards and ethics committees, (e) concern that if they
address or report a colleague’s behavior they will be os-
tracized by the community of psychologists, and (f) lack of
an established relationship with the psychologist sufficient
to warrant collegial intervention (Barnett & Hillard, 2001;
Biaggio, Duffy, & Staffelbach, 1998; O’Connor, 2001;
Smith & Moss, 2009). Additional multicultural factors may
affect psychologists’ decisions to intervene with col-
leagues, and these include (a) uncertainty about whether
prejudice, discrimination, or bias has occurred and if so
whether it was intentional or unconscious; (b) doubts about
their own multicultural competence; and (c) inexperience
and lack of skill at addressing multicultural issues (Toporek
& Williams, 2006).

Clues as to why psychologists might be reluctant to
address problems with colleagues are evident in the current
APA Ethics Code (APA, 2010). The only ethical standard
bearing on responsibility for monitoring colleagues is Stan-
dard 1.04, which enjoins APA members to seek informal
resolutions to confirmed or suspected ethical violations on
the part of other psychologists. Therefore, concerns about
competence need not trigger any intervention until the
colleague’s behavior rises to the level of a perceived ethical
transgression. To complicate matters further, failure to
intervene and support a colleague who exhibits question-
able competence may be fueled in part by the fundamental
attribution error (Ross, 1977). That is, when explaining
another psychologist’s behavior, each of us is inclined to
overestimate the extent to which problems of competence
reflect that individual’s traits or attitudes while underesti-
mating the impact of the situation on that individual’s
practice (e.g., relationship turmoil, financial difficulties,
physical illness, difficult client events). Our susceptibility

Linda Forrest

561October 2012 ● American Psychologist

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to the fundamental attribution error helps to explain why it
might be it easy to blame a colleague for problems of
competence, thus electing avoidance or ostracism rather
than engagement and assistance.

Although formal Colleague Assistance Programs
(CAPs) might offer one avenue for outreach, assessment,
and peer support when a psychologist’s competence ap-
pears to falter (Barnett & Hillard, 2001), many struggling
professionals avoid these programs because they fear their
involvement might trigger regulatory board action, and
psychologists do not often recommend peers to CAPs for
fear of adversely affecting their peers’ ability to practice
(Schoener, 2005). Further, most state, provincial, and ter-
ritorial psychological associations do not offer formal
CAPs because of a lack of utilization (Advisory Committee
on Colleague Assistance, 2006; Barnett & Hillard, 2001).

Communitarianism and the
Ethics of Care
Western cultures often promote independent models of the
self that celebrate personal control and the preeminence of
individual rights and responsibilities. Moral philosophies
and ethical theories emerging from this individualistic con-
text tend to be deontological or rule based (James & Foster,
2006). Beginning with Plato, moral agents are construed as
continuously rational, healthy, and untroubled when delib-
erating the correct course of moral behavior (Macintyre,
1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). But traditional individ-
ualistic ethical theories have been criticized for erroneous
assumptions of impartiality and universality in ethical de-
cision making and an implied preference for emotional
detachment in the process of ethical reasoning (Beauchamp
& Childress, 2008; Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996).

In reaction to individualistic models of moral philos-
ophy, communitarian, feminist, and multicultural scholars
emphasize the salience of mutual interdependence and
emotional responsiveness in leading a moral life. Commu-
nitarians emphasize the interdependent self. From …

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN
INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATIVES:

ZEAL, PATERNALISM AND
MANDATED REPORTING

ALEXIS ANDERSON, LYNN BARENBERG & PAUL R. TREMBLAY*

In this Article, the authors, two clinical law teachers and a social
worker teaching in the clinic, wrestle with some persistent questions
that arise in cross-professional, interdisciplinary law practice. In the
past decade much writing has praised the benefits of interdisciplinary
legal practice, but many sympathetic skeptics have worried about the
ethical implications of lawyers working with nonlawyers, such as so-
cial workers and mental health professionals. Those worries include
the difference in advocacy stances between lawyers and other helping
professionals, and the mandated reporting requirements that apply to
helping professionals but usually not to lawyers. This Article ad-
dresses those concerns in a direct way, using social work as an exem-
plar for many kinds of interdisciplinary practices.

Part I ofthe Article explores the commitments of zeal and auton-
omy in interdisciplinary work involving lawyers and social workers.
It acknowledges that social workers and lawyers receive differing
training about advocacy stances, attention to the needs of the larger
society, and concern for the best interests of clients, and therefore are
apt to confront client interactions with dissimilar orientations. But
the authors conclude that those differences in orientation in fact offer
critical opportunities, when the professionals collaborate, for more
effective lawyering, rather than posing a risk to a lawyer’s or a social
worker’s ethical commitments. A lawyer and social worker team are
likely to offer clients a richer brand of legal representation when
working together than a lawyer working without the collaboration
would provide. While some pointed ethical conflicts might arise, the
authors contend that those conflicts are not unlike those faced by any
reflective lawyer practicing without the benefit of collaboration.

* Alexis Anderson is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law at Boston Coiiege Law
School. Lynn Barenberg is a Lecturer in Law at Boston Coiiege Law Schooi and the Staff
Social Worker at tiie Boston Coiiege Legal Assistance Bureau. Paui Trembiay is a Clinical
Professor of Law at Boston Coiiege Law Schooi. The authors thank Dean John Garvey
and the Law Schooi Fund for generous support for this project, and Carol Liebman, Carlo
Obligato, the participants at a workshop held at the Committee for Pubiic Counsel Ser-
vices in Boston, and the participants at the UCLA/University of London Sixth Interna-
tional Clinical Conference at Lake Arrowhead, California for helpful comments on earlier
versions of this Article. We also thank Albert Chan, Jeremy Eggleton, Meredith Duval,
Mark Sullivan and Michael Yeung for their valuable research assistance.

659

660 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659

Part II of the Article addresses the mandated reporter issue.
When lawyers and social workers (or other helping professionals)
collaborate, lawyers tend to be prohibited from reporting suspected
child abuse and neglect if learned during a client’s representation,
while social workers tend to be mandated by state law to make a re-
port. The authors contend that when a social worker serves within a
law firm or legal clinic as a consultant to the legal team, the social
worker ought not be covered by the state mandated reporting laws if
the lawyers are not so covered. If the social worker, by contrast, pro-
vides social work services to the law firm’s client, the state reporting
laws will apply, and the collaboration must account for the resulting
conflict in confidentiality duties.

INTRODUCTION

It is a rare legal problem that is in fact purely “legal.” As much
literature shows, nearly all disputes which end up among lawyers and
courts involve complex emotional and interpersonal dynamics,^ and
most involve “industries” other than the law.̂ To resolve those dis-
putes successfully, or even to “win” before a tribunal, a lawyer must
use skills other than those traditionally taught in law schools. Or, per-
haps more likely, the lawyer must associate with persons who possess
those skills. The benefits of an interdisciplinary law practice^ are be-
coming more and more apparent to lawyers and law teachers alike.^

1 See, e.g., Angela Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment:
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm Into the Clinical Setting, 11
CLIN. L . R E V . 15, 24-25 (2004); Melissa Nelken, Negotiation and Analysis: If I’d Wanted to
Learn About Feelings, I Wouldn’t Have Gone to Law School, 46 J. LEGAL E D U C . 420, 427
(1996); Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: The Emotional Epistemology In Legal Deliber-
ation and Negotiation, 10 H A R V . NEGOT. L . R E V . 231, 238 (2005); Marjorie A. Silver, Emo-
tional Competence and the Lawyer’s Journey, in T H E AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 5 (Marjorie A. Silver, ed., 2006) [hereinafter
T H E AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL].

2 See, e.g., D A V I D A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN PRICE & PAUL R . TREMBLAY,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 157, 159-61 (2d ed. 2004).

3 For purposes of this article, we refer to the collaborative law practice about which we
write, where a lawyer and a “helping professional,” see infra note 5, work as a team to
address the legal matters which the client has brought to the team, as interdisciplinary
practice. We distinguish that phrase, for our purposes, from multidiscipiinary practice,
commonly known as “MDP,” in which an institution, like a law firm, offers to its clients or
customers more than one kind of direct service, like legal services and accounting services.
In making this distinction we hope to keep separate the vast literature on MDP from the
more narrow, and insufficiently explored, questions we attend to here. For a reference to
some of the MDP literature, see infra note 9.

* See, e.g.. Special Issue on Legal Representation of Children: Proceedings of the
UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Children’s Advocacy and Justice
Ten Years After Fordham, Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing
Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years after Fordham, 6 N E V . L J . 592,
598 (2006) (supporting interdisciplinary legal services for children); Susan R. Jones, Pro-
moting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law,

spring 2007] Interdisciplinary Collaborations 661

While lawyers tend to be well trained to identify and address spe-
cific legal issues of concern to their clients, they often feel ill-equipped
to work with the more challenging relationship issues presented in
their work with clients. These challenges affect all aspects of the law-
yering process, including intake, interviewing, counseling, case plan-
ning, and legal strategy decisionmaking. The ambition of
interdisciplinary collaboration is to provide lawyers with information
and skills that will help them to understand better and work more
effectively with clients throughout the lawyering process. Because of
their specialized training in human behavior, interpersonal dynamics,
mental health assessment, psychosocial assessment, and systems the-
ory, social workers and similar “helping professionals”^ are able to
help lawyers develop their practice knowledge and skills. The poten-
tial benefits of collaboration with other disciplines include more effec-
tive management of the lawyer-client relationship, more effective
interviewing and counseling, increased likelihood of a successful out-
come for the client, increased client cooperation, increased efficiency,
increased client satisfaction, enhanced client well-being, and reduced
lawyer stress.^

This Article explores some pointed ethical predicaments which

14 WASH. U . J . L . & POL’Y 249 (2004) (small business transactions); Randye Retkin, Gary
L. Stein & Barbara Hennie Draimin, Attorneys and Social Workers Collaborating in HIV
Care: Breaking New Ground, 24 FORDHAM U R B . L . J . 533 (1997) (AIDS practice); Jacque-
line St. Joan, Building Bridges, Building Walls: Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social
Workers In a Domestic Violence Clinic and Issues of Client Confidentiality, 1 CLIN. L . R E V .
403 (2001) (domestic violence clinic); Annie G. Steinberg, Child-Centered, Vertically Struc-
tured, and Interdisciplinary: An Integratlve Approach to Children’s Policy, Practice, and
Research, 40 FAM. C T . R E V . 116 (2002) (child-centered interdisciplinary practice); Pauline
H. Tester, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317 (2004) (family law and
divorce practice).

5 In this article we use the term “helping professional,” as it recurs in social science
literature, to refer to those caregivers and counselors trained in the dynamics of human
relationships. See, e.g., Chris A. Milne, The Vermont Lead Law—An Opportunity to Serve
as a Helping Professional, 22 V T . B . J . & L. D I G . 17 (Dec. 1996) (distinguishing a “helping
professional,” concerned with a family as a whole from an advocate for a single member of
a family). Cf DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E . LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF
CHILDREN: A G U I D E FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998).

6 See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and
Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L . R E V . 1295
(1993) (describing collaboration with a psychologist); Claire Donohue, untitled paper
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (analyzing the author’s experiences
at a multi-service community-based clinic offering both counseling and legal services);
Maryann Zavez, The Ethical and Moral Considerations Presented by Lawyer/Social Worker
Interdisciplinary Collaborations, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 191 (2005) (offer-
ing comments on experience practicing in an interdisciplinary family law clinic in Ver-
mont); Christina Zawisza & Adela Beckerman, Two Heads Are Better Than One: The
Case-Based Rationale for Dual Disciplinary Teaching in Child Advocacy Clinics, 1 F L .
COASTAL L . R E V . 631 (2006) (noting their experiences with interdisciplinary practice in
children and family law matters).

662 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659

arise in an interdisciplinary practice. The Article will focus specifi-
cally on two common ethical topics arising in the context of lawyers
working with social workers, with the hope that the ideas included
here will have implications beyond that collaboration. In law school
clinic and poverty law settings, the lawyer/social worker collaboration
is the most common variety of cross-disciplinary practice. The insights
we discover from that setting ought to apply equally well to other
common, even if less prevalent, cross-professional relationships, in-
cluding lawyers working with doctors, nurses, psychologists, and simi-
lar helping professionals.^ Our treatment here will not address some
other equally interesting and challenging questions arising from mul-
tidisciplinary practice (MDP) in the business world, such as collabora-
tion between lawyers and other professionals such as accountants,
public relations specialists, financial planners, and title insurers.^
Those topics, perhaps because of their sheer financial importance,
have received substantial attention within ethics scholarship.^ Our
questions, by contrast, have begun to attract scholarly attention, but
substantially less thus far than the corporate MDP questions.^”

This article seeks to further the ongoing work of scholars of col-
laborative practice by honing in on two questions, the first general in
scope and the second more discrete, which remain the subject of some

^ As we shall see below, see text accompanying notes 40 and 54 infra, some of our
analyses of competing ethical responsibilities rely on the specific legal and professional
obligations of social work, as the profession we chose to explore. To the extent that we
have engaged in such profession-specific analysis, our conclusions may not be inevitably
applicable to a different helping profession. That acknowledgement notwithstanding, we
expect that the general suggestions and conclusions we offer here will have much relevance
to collaboration between lawyers and any other helping professional.

8 See, e.g., the intra-firm entity established by the Boston law firm of Mintz, Levin,
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., known as ML Strategies, LLC, and described at
http://www.mlstrategies.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). For a general analysis of different
models for organization of legal entities involved in MDP, see J. Michael Norwood & Alan
Patterson, Problem-Solving in a Multidisciplinary Environment? Must Ethics Get in the
Way of Holistic Services?, 9 CLIN. L . R E V . 337 (2002).

9 See, e.g., Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice: Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L .
R E V . 787 (2002); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 G E O . J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 217 (2000); Bryant G. Garth, “Prom the Trenches and Towers”: MDPs after
Enron/Andersen, Multidisciplinary Practice after Enron: Eliminating a Competitor but not
the Competition, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 591 (2004); George C. Nnona, Situating Multidis-
ciplinary Practice Within Social History: A Systemic Analysis of Inter-Professional Competi-
tion, 80 ST. JOHN’S L . REV. 849 (2006).

10 We will find that some of the insights generated by the conventional MDP debates
inform our discussion here. For instance, a significant worry within the MDP debate arises
from the different ethical roles and duties of nonlawyer professionals and lawyers, and
whether client interests will suffer as a result. See GEOFFREY C . H A Z A R D , JR., SUSAN P.
KoNiAK, R O G E R C . CRAMTON & G E O R G E M . COHEN, T H E LAW AND ETHICS OF LAW-
YERiNG 1120-21 (4th ed. 2005).

Spring 2007] Interdisciplinary Collaborations 663

uncertainty in the literature and the doctrine. Those questions are as
follows:

1) The Perceived Tensions Between the Lawyer’s Zeal or Client Au-
tonomy Commitments and the Social Worker’s Attention to
Broader Interests: The first, broader inquiry of this Article ex-
plores a common understanding—or perhaps misunderstand-
ing—of the effect of a lawyer/social worker collaboration. For
some this understanding is a worry; for others, an opportunity.
The basic idea is that a lawyer working with a social worker will
adjust her role responsibilities away from the typical unfettered
zeal and commitment to client autonomy that her legal training
has taught her. Social workers attend to a larger “moral commu-
nity” and to social justice concerns;^^ lawyers attend to the
wishes of their clients. Surely, the argument goes, these two ori-
entations must clash, and perhaps in ways which challenge a law-
yer’s ability to comply with her Rules-driven obligations, and
which challenge the social worker’s commitment to broader soci-
etal interests. We hope to understand this perceived tension, to
assess its validity, and to compare carefully the rules governing
lawyers’ work with the messages offered by (and the rules and
laws governing) the collaborating social workers.

2) The Mandated Reporter Question: The second topic of this Arti-
cle is, seemingly, the most challenging analytical problem faced
by non-lawyer professionals working within a law firm, or in con-
junction with a lawyer. The question is simple, but its answer
profoundly important: Is a professional who is otherwise man-
dated when acting in his professional role to report abuse to a
state agency subject to that same command when consulting or
collaborating with a lawyer? We will address that question di-
rectly and offer as clear an answer to it as the available doctrine
and our imagination permit.

Part I of this Article will address the first of those two topics.

11 See C O D E OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, availa-
ble at http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/cocie/code.asp (last visited February 10, 2007)
[hereinafter SOCIAL WORKER C O D E ] . While the NASW Code of Ethics is not binding on
social workers directly (much like the ABA’s Model Rules are not binding on lawyers until
adopted by a state), the Code’s provisions often serve as the basis for licensing regulations
in a state. See, e.g., I I I . ADMIN. C O D E tit. 68, § 1470.96(2) (2007)(defining “unethical,
unauthorized, or unprofessional conduct” of social workers); Ohio Counselor, Social
Worker & Marriage and Family Therapist Board Laws and Rules §B(4) (“the board sub-
scribes to codes of ethics and practice standards for . . . social workers . . . promulgated by
the . . . National Association of Social Workers [among other associations], which shall be
used as aids in resolving ambiguities which may arise in the interpretation of the rules of
professional ethics and conduct”). The Code also captures the sentiments conveyed by
social work training and philosophy. See Lisa A. Stanger, Conflicts Between Attorneys and
Social Workers Representing Children in Delinquency Proceedings, 65 FORDHAM L . R E V .
1123,1140-48 (1996) (describing the influence and teaching of the NASW Code of Ethics).

664 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659

after a preliminary exploration of the differences, as well as the com-
monality, between the role expectations of the two professions. Part I
concludes that collaboration between lawyers and social workers is
likely to encourage richer and more robust legal representation on
behalf of the clients served by the collaboration. Part II then ad-
dresses the mandated reporter issue. It concludes that, while author-
ity is sparse at best, in certain settings the most reasonable
construction of the reach of the appropriate obligations would hold
that a social worker employed by a law firm is not bound by a report-
ing requirement. In other settings, especially those in which the social
worker provides services directly to the lawyer’s client, the most plau-
sible construction is that the reporting duty survives, notwithstanding
the legal ethics rules.

I. ROLE TENSIONS IN LAW-SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

A. The Perceived Lawyer/Social Worker Divide

A broad concern arising from interdisciplinary practice is the po-
tential for a clash of professional orientations. From the lawyer’s per-
spective, it appears possible, and perhaps even likely, that an attorney
working in tandem with a social worker will tend to offer legal ser-
vices which are less zealous than those offered by a “solo” lawyer,
because social workers see disputes and problems with a more inclu-
sive perspective, and care more about a broader audience, than do
lawyers. It also seems possible, and perhaps even likely, that the law-
yer collaborating with a social worker, and influenced by the social
worker’s best interests-focused orientation, will tend to be more pa-
ternalistic than the “solo” lawyer. Were these predictions true, per-
haps a collaborating lawyer would need to obtain some explicit
informed consent from her client to this different, less client-centered
representation.i2 And, from the social worker’s viewpoint, the legal
collaboration could well produce analogous professional dilemmas
were he to join the cHent’s legal team as a consultant. We explore
these worries in this part. We conclude that they are ultimately un-
founded, although not without some substance. While lawyers and
social workers may initially approach their work from different start-
ing points, we maintain that any fear of irreconcilable professional

12 While there is no explicit mandate that requires attorneys to embrace client-centered
representation, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Re-
finement, 32 A R I Z . L . R E V . 501, 534 (1990), it is clear that attorneys must abide by clients’
lawful decisions. See M O D E L RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R . 1.2 (2003) [hereinafter
M O D E L RULES]. Thus, to the extent a collaborating lawyer might be less zealous, a client’s
decisionmaking could be adversely affected. As discussed more fully below in Section I.B.,
we conclude that this concern is ultimately unpersuasive.

Spring 2007] Interdisciplinary Collaborations 665

conflict is overblown. Instead, the collaboration between the two pro-
fessions offers the client the potential for an enhanced exploration of
the client’s goals and options during a comprehensive legal counseling
session undertaken before the lawyers embark on their zealous advo-
cacy with third parties.

Before turning to our analysis of the effect of interdisciplinary
collaboration on the ethical duties lawyers owe their clients, it is im-
portant first to test the common assumption that the two professions’
perspectives are fundamentally at odds. Were social workers and law-
yers to be fully allied in their cultures and professional mandates, then
any ethical concerns would disappear. Despite some shared profes-
sional values, social workers and lawyers do enter professional collab-
oration with different ethical mandates and distinct orientations to
their roles in working on behalf of clients, and it is these differences
that are potential sources of interdisciplinary tension.

Let us begin by acknowledging some shared fundamental values
as reflected in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Social Worker Code of Ethics. Both lawyers and social workers iden-
tify as helping professionals. Both serve as counselors, advisors and
advocates for their clients. Both attempt to facilitate conflict resolu-
tion, while respecting chent self-determination and confidentiality. In
addition, both strive to uphold fundamental societal values and pro-
mote public service.i3 These values are at the core of each profes-
sion’s orientation to practice.

As important as it is to acknowledge the values shared by lawyers
and social workers, it is equally important to appreciate certain funda-
mental differences in their professional cultures and their approaches
to advocacy and problem-solving. Some of these distinctions reflect
contrasting objectives of the professional intervention; others reflect
differences in training and professional orientation. Both perspectives
have much to offer to the process of advocating on behalf of clients.

While any shorthand summary risks obscuring the complexities of
each profession’s work, we have found the following chart useful as an
introductory contrast of the two professional orientations to advo-
cacy.” But it is the professions’ contrasting trainings and perspectives

13 See MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Preamble, R. 1.2, 1.6, and 2.1; SOCIAL WORKER
CODE, supra note 11, Ethical Standards 1.01, 1.02, 1.07. See also Jane Aiken & Stephen
Wizner, Law as Social Work, 11 WASH. U . J. L. & POL’Y 63 (2003).

I-* We realize that the chart could mask the nuanced work of individual professionals.
For example, a good lawyer will concern herself with client well-being and the impact of
the case on third parties. She will also be a problem-solver to advance her client’s inter-
ests. A good social worker will have an interest in protecting his client’s legal rights and
autonomy. While recognizing its limitations, the chart, we believe, is a useful shorthand
description of the different trainings and orientations of the two disciplines.

666 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659

that produce potential tensions in practice. Recognizing that no one
list can capture the complexities of professional life, we offer this di-
chotomy to suggest the different points of view each specialist brings
to the table.

Law Social Work
Adversarial process / Cooperative process / Problem

Litigation solving
Zealous advocacy for stated Safeguard best interest

interest
Protect legal rights Enhance client well-being
Protection of individual rights Consideration of third parties

and community
Address legal problem Address underlying cause of

problem
Analytic (break whole into Synthetic (put parts together

parts) to assess whole)
Focus on outcome Focus on process
Value professional autonomy Value professional

collaboration

For those lawyers who might be considering interdisciplinary col-
laboration with social workers, a number of professional responsibility
concerns arise. These include: the perceived tension between the law-
yer’s duty to represent the client’s stated interest zealously and the
social worker’s duty to enhance the client’s best interest and well-be-
ing,i5 the concern that consideration of the social work perspective
will increase lawyer paternalism and inhibit client autonomy, and the
worry that legal counseling will become legal “therapy.” In addition
to these specific concerns, interdisciplinary collaboration often raises
concerns about potential role and goal confusion.

We are not the first to discuss the challenges posed by interdisci-
plinary collaboration between social workers and lawyers. As Jean
Koh Peters described her experiences with social worker/attorney
partnerships, “due to the distinct ethical mandates of the two profes-
sions [ ] legal and social work practitioners must expect conflict and

15 See, e.g., Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Con-
flicts Between Children’s Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Cli-
ent, 1 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 15 (1991); St. Joan, supra note 4. Surveys of professional
attitudes have shown that social workers and lawyers may need to build bridges toward
greater understanding. See, e.g., James L. Scherrer, How Social Workers Help Lawyers, 21
SOCIAL WORK 279 (1976) (noting conflicting professional attitudes which could undermine
successful attorney/social worker teamwork); Franklin B. Fogelson, How Social Workers
Perceive Lawyers, 51 SOCIAL CASEWORK 95 (1970) (survey of social workers suggested
distrust of lawyers which would adversely affect interdisciplinary collaboration).

Spring 2007] Interdisciplinary Collaborations 667

tension in cooperating to represent a common client.”^” Paula
Galowitz confirmed those concerns in her review of interdisciplinary
collaboration in legal services practice: “There is an inherent tension
between a lawyer’s and a social worker’s ethical responsibilities. The
lawyer’s responsibility is to advocate zealously for the client’s wishes,
while the social worker’s is to safeguard the client’s best interests.”‘”‘
More recently, Kate Kruse reached a similar conclusion: “[T]he pater-
nalism that the social work ethic entails remains in tension with the
deference to client autonomy inherent in the zealous advocate’s con-
struction of what it means to act in a client’s interest.”^^ While each
commentator proceeds to suggest protocols designed to resolve such
tensions, their analyses are bottomed on the presumption that ethical
conflicts must be expected in interdisciplinary practice.^^

Our starting point is somewhat different. Rather than presume
ethical tensions, we seek to explore those underlying assumptions.
While we grant that social workers and lawyers join forces with dis-
tinct professional orientations, it is our experience that these differ-
ences do not interfere with effective lawyering as might be expected,
but in fact serve to enhance lawyering. Ethical questions do arise, but
when carefully scrutinized, those ethical issues prove not to be irrec-
oncilable conflicts. Indeed, as developed below,2o these questions are
not qualitatively different from the ethical dilemmas faced by an at-
torney practicing without the benefit of another professional’s
wisdom.

With mutual understanding of one another’s professional respon-

sibilities, clearly stated role expectations, express administrative poii-

lt Peters, supra note 15.
‘^ Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-Examining

the Nature and Potential ofthe Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L . R E V . 2123, 2140 (1999).
‘^ Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers Should Be Lawyers, But What Does That Mean?: A

Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14 WASH. U . J. L. & POL’Y 49, 76 (2004). Kruse’s
article offers important insights on the apparently competing views of professional role
held by lawyers and social workers. Her analysis attempted a reconciliation of the views
expressed in two articles presented at a conference held at Washington University School
of Law in March 2003, entitled “Promoting Justice Through Interdisciplinary Teaching,
Practice, and Scholarship.” The first article, by Jane Aiken and Stephen Wizner, chal-
lenged lawyers to think and act more like social workers. Aiken & Wizner, supra note 13.
The second, by Abbe Smith, offered a contrary view based on criminal defense practice
experience. Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes,
11 WASH. U . J. L . & POL’Y 83 (2003).

1̂ See also Joan L. O’Sullivan, Susan P. Leviton, Deborah J. Weimer, Stanley S. Herr,
Douglas L. Colbert, Jerome E. Deise, Andrew P. Reese & Michael A. Millemann, Ethical
Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLIN. L . R E V . …