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Exercise 7UMGC – Landstuhl y Rota+ Economics 203
Fall (ii) 2020 Exercise 7

Exercise 7 (25 points; 15 points individual; 10 points class bonus) (If Extra Credit, maximum score = 15)

Please note that you must complete your answers on this sheet. And that you must turn in your answers to Exercise 7 before the beginning of our Week 8 class.

Note: If Exercise 7 counts as an extra-credit exercise, you must answer all of the questions in order to be eligible to receive extra-credit points. If Exercise 7 is a make-up exercise, you must answer all of the questions to receive the 10 class bonus points, as per every other exercise.

Last Name, First Name:

Individual Score: (- = + /15

Class Score: + /10

Total Score: + /25

1. Question #1 Score = (- = + / 3.0
(Dominant Strategy Equilibrium; Week 6) (3 points; as marked)
Telesource and Belair are two of the largest firms in the wireless carrier market in Mobileland. Both firms account for more than 80% of the market. Suppose they decide to collude and set the same price. Their payoffs from cheating and colluding are given in the matrix below.
(i) Explain why both firms have an incentive to cheat. (Make sure you explain how we reach the dominant-strategy equilibrium.) (1.5 points) (-
Answer:

(ii) Does this help explain why a cartel is unstable? (1.5 points) (-
Answer:

Telesource

Collude Cheat

Collude Belair earns $24 million Belair earns $4 million
Telesource earns $24 million Telesource earns $30 million
Belair

Cheat Belair earns $30 million Belair earns $20 million
Telesource earns $4 million Telesource earns $20 million

2. Question #2 Score = (- = + /3.0

(a) Coase Theorem (Week 7) (1.5 points) (.375 points per segment) (-
For each of the cases below, identify which of them are more consistent with the assumptions of the Coase Theorem (see Week 7 slides) that would produce a privately negotiated solution to a …

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